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IS IT TRUE THAT, before the recent cases that are said to have redefined its path, Canadian copyright law was 
missing a purpose?  This article presents an alternative view, based on domestic and international human rights 
law. It argues that the recent “upbringing” of users’ rights in Canada in reality reflects the implicit entrenchment 
of the so-called human right of access to knowledge in the domestic legal system. The article starts with a 
critical analysis of Canadian copyright case law, presenting some unsuspected problems in what the doctrine 
calls “the trilogy” – the group of cases that is believed to have unveiled the principle of balance in Canadian 
copyright law. It calls for an integral approach to users’ rights, which does not ignore the complex fabric of 
decisions that provides for the internalization of international human rights in Canadian law. Arguing that the 
Supreme Court of Canada should explicitly acknowledge this relation, the article sketches a framework for 
understanding how a human right of access to knowledge, if present in the international human rights system, 
would also be found within Canadian law itself. Finally, the article denies the supposed human rights nature of 
copyright, and, conversely, argues that several different instruments within the United Nations system provide 
solid grounds for grasping the existence of a human right of access to knowledge. Understanding, that users’ 
rights are human rights has important implications for copyright policy. The most important of all is the 
presumption against retrogressive measures, which would oblige those who push the ongoing process of 
copyright reform in this country to prove that any additional layer of protection would be legitimate within a 
human rights context. 
EST-IL VRAI QUE, avant la jurisprudence récente qui aurait, paraît-il,  redéfini sa voie, le droit d’auteur 
canadien avait manqué son but ? Dans cet article, on présente un point de vue différent, fondé sur la 
protection des droits de la personne à l’échelle nationale et internationale. L’auteur soutient que la récente 
« éducation » des droits des utilisateurs au Canada reflète en réalité l’enchâssement implicite du droit humain 
d’accès à la connaissance dans le système juridique national. L’article débute par une analyse critique de la 
jurisprudence relative au droit d’auteur canadien, en présentant certains problèmes insoupçonnés dans ce 
que la doctrine appelle « la trilogie » – soit le groupe de décisions dont on estime qu’elles ont révélé le 
principe d’équilibre propre au droit d’auteur canadien. Il revendique une approche intégrale envers les droits 
des utilisateurs, qui tiendrait compte de la texture complexe des décisions en assurant l’internalisation de la 
protection internationale des droits de la personne au sein du droit canadien. Soutenant que la Cour 
suprême du Canada devrait reconnaître explicitement cette relation, l’auteur de l’article dresse un cadre 
pour comprendre la manière dont le droit humain d’accès à la connaissance, s’il existe dans le régime 
international des droits de la personne, se retrouverait également au sein du droit canadien lui-même. Enfin, 
l’auteur réfute la supposée nature liée aux droits de la personne du droit d’auteur et, à l’inverse, soutient 
que plusieurs  et différents instruments au sein du système des Nations Unies offrent des bases solides pour 
établir l’existence d’un droit humain d’accès à la connaissance. L’affirmation selon laquelle les droits des 
utilisateurs sont des droits  humains entraîne d’importantes conséquences pour la politique sur le droit 
d’auteur. La plus capitale de toutes étant la présomption contre des mesures rétrogrades, qui obligerait ceux 
qui font avancer le processus continu de la réforme du droit d’auteur au Canada à démontrer qu’une couche 
supplémentaire de protection serait légitime dans le contexte de la protection des droits de la personne.
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1. A FRESH START
Canada is divided between two	different	ongoing	processes	of	redefinition	of	its	
copyright	law.	On	the	one	side,	albeit	not	always	expressly,	there	is	a	movement	
to	 increase	 reconciliation	 between	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	 the	
international	human	rights	system;	and,	on	the	other	side,	there	is	a	legislative	
agenda	for	expanding	vertiginously	the	scope	of	intellectual	property	rights	and	
shifting	 it	 away	 from	 such	 a	 system.	 One	 process	 is	 a	 movement	 toward	 a	
balanced	 perspective	 of	 intellectual	 property	 and	 a	 structure	 of	more	 liberal	
design	 in	 favour	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge;	 the	 other	 process	 is	 a	 movement	
toward	 an	extremist	 conception	of	 copyright,	which	 shifts	 law	away	 from	 the	
social	infrastructure	that	it	should	serve	and	seeks	to	impose	behaviours	that	are	
not	 naturally	 assimilated	 by	 the	 general	 public.	 The	 first,	 a	 democratic	
perception	of	culture;	the	second	a	positivist	system	in	which	the	laws	sought	to	
be	enacted	do	not	correspond	to	a	general	feeling	of	obligation,	or	to	a	general	
demand	for	conformity.
	 Several	 authors	 have	 already	written	 about	 the	 second	 process. Both	
about	its	more	burlesque	expression	–	of	the	lobbyist	media-supporting	ministers	
and	their	fundraising	campaigns,	and	of	the	open	doors	of	the	media	for	discussing	
their	business	and	enjoying	lunch	with	and	at	the	expense	of	Canadian	ministries1	
–	as	well	as	of	the	many	faces	of	its	legal	aspects,	such	as	the	restrictions	to	fair	
dealing	possibilities,	the	adoption	of	paracopyright	provisions	backing	the	use	of	
technological	protection	measures	(TPMs)	and	digital	rights	management	(DRM)	
information,	 or	 the	 strengthening	 of	 copyright	 law	 by	 contractual	 provisions	
“enacted”	by	the	rights-holders	themselves.	The	authors	who	address	the	first	set	
of	issues	(the	first	process)	tend	to	cheer	recent	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	
of	Canada	 for	giving	domestic	 copyright	 law	a	purpose,	 finding	 in	 it	 the	until	
then	much	neglected	principle	of	balance,	and	recognizing	fair	dealing	defences	
1.	 Michael	Geist,	“Unchecked	Lobby	Power	Plays	an	Old	Familiar	Tune,”	(12	June	2006)	The Hills Times,	
available	at	Michael	Geist’s	Blog	<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1292/159/>.
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as	users’	 rights.	But	 rare	 are	 the	 critical	 approaches	 to	 any	 instances	 in	which	
those	decisions	fail.	There	is	no	symmetrical	assessment	of	them	in	comparison	to	
values	and	principles	flowing	from	the	international	human	rights	system	either.
	 This	article	will	undertake	these	last	challenges:	to	critically	assess	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decisions	and	to	identify	a	possible	interconnection	
between	 Canadian	 copyright	 jurisprudence	 and	 a	 system	 that	 could	 be	
advantageously	understood	as	giving	more	solid	grounds	 to	 its	conclusions	
–	a	system	which,	though	this	is	generally	ignored,	is	already	present,	 it	will	
be	 argued,	 in	 the	 underlying	 foundations	 of	 copyright	 law	 in	 Canada.	 The	
utility	of	such	an	approach	is	to	recognize	that	the	purpose	and	the	balance	
of	Canadian	 copyright	 law	derive,	 to	 a	great	 extent,	 from	 the	 international	
human	 rights	 system	 that helps	 to	 construct	 a	 more	 stable	 framework	 for	
protecting	users’	rights.	
Such	 stability	 originates	 from	 two	 different	 circumstances.	 First,	 from	
the	recognition	of	a	binding	system	entrenched	in	customary	international	law,	
to	which	Canadian	 law	 is	no	more	 than	a	node.	Second,	 from	the	 fact	 that	all	
human	rights	must	be	realized,	if	not	immediately,	at	least	progressively,	and	thus	
any	measures	that	diminish	their	degree	of	protection	–	so-called	retrogressive	
measures	 –	must	be	carefully	 considered	and	 strongly	 justified.	That	 is	 to	 say,	
those	who	 seek	 to	 strengthen	 their	 intellectual	property	 rights,	 as	well	 as	 the	
government	officials	who	back,	and	are	backed	by	them	would	have	the	burden	
of	proving	that	any	additional	 layer	of	protection	would	be	legitimate	within	a	
human	rights	context.	From	this	perspective,	and	already	answering	the	title	of	
this	paper,	intellectual	property	additional	enforcement	possibilities	are	normally	
retrogressive	measures	against	users’	rights	and,	as	such,	must	be	avoided	or,	at	
least,	very	well	justified.
This	paper	will	begin	by	analysing	the	“chain	novel”	of	copyright	decisions	
that	have	to	do	with	the	axiological	definition	of	users’	rights	in	Canada.	It	will	
search	for	 the	 integrity	of	 those	decisions,	before	 looking,	 in	Section	3,	at	 the	
decisions	that	provide	for	the	incorporation	of	international	human	rights	within	
the	Canadian	system.	The	metaphor	of	the	chain	novel,	borrowed	from	Ronald	
Dworkin’s	Law’s	Empire2	will	be	useful	to	explain	how	decisions	in	a	legal	system	
are	like	a	collective	work,	an	intertwined	fabric	of	rulings,	in	which	“judges	…	are	
actors	as	well	as	critics,”	in	which	a	judge	“adds	to	the	tradition	he	interprets,”	
and	“future	 judges	confront	a	new	tradition	that	 includes	what	he	has	done.”3	
Dworkin’s	Hercules4	must	find	the	best	interpretation	in	this	novel,	which	is	the	
interpretation	that	“flow[s]	throughout	the	text.”5		And	so	must	we	do	the	same	
in	the	lines	that	follow.
This,	the	idea	of	law	as	integrity,	might	help	us	to	find	what	the	justifications	
and	the	dimension	of	fit6	in	Canadian	copyright	law	are	–	what	the	chain	novel	
2.	 Ronald	Dworkin,	Law’s Empire	(Belknap	Press,	1986).
3.	 Dworkin,	Law’s Empire,	supra note	2	at p.	229.
4.	 The	Judge	Hercules,	an	idealized	judge,	is	the	main	character:	see	Ronald	Dworkin,	Taking Rights Seriously	
(Harvard	University	Press,	1977)	and	Dworkin,	Law’s Empire,	supra note	2.
5.	 Dworkin,	Law’s Empire,	supra note	2	at	p.	230.
6.	 “When	a	judge	declares	that	a	particular	principle	is	instinct	in	law,	he	reports	not	a	simple-minded	claim	
about	the	motives	of	past	statesmen,	a	claim	a	wise	cynic	can	easily	refute,	but	an	interpretive	proposal:	
that	the	principle	both	fits	and	justifies	some	complex	part	of	legal	practice,	that	it	provides	an	attractive	
way	to	see,	in	the	structure	of	that	practice,	the	consistency	of	principle	integrity	requires”:	Dworkin,	Law’s 
Empire,	supra	note	2	at	p.	228.
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of	copyright	in	Canada	tells	us	with	respect	to	users’	rights,	and	in	Section	3,	we	
will	understand	how	this	chain	novel	 intertwines	with	the	quintessential	stories	
told	 by	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system.	 If	 the	 principles	 that	 back	 the	
recognition	of	users’	rights	in	Canadian	copyright	law	have	not	been	proclaimed	
by	Canadian	courts	out	of	the	blue,	they	must	be	rooted	in	a	wider	network	of	
decisions	from	which	we	can,	interpretively,	make	sense	of	them.	These	decisions,	
Section	3	will	argue,	extend	beyond	Canadian	copyright	law	itself	and	provide	
for	 the	 internalization	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 domestic	 system.	
International	human	rights	appear	indeed	as	a	much	better	candidate	than	fiat	
to	justify	users’	rights	–	and	we	will	look	into	such	a	justificatory	framework	as	an	
integral	interpretive	project.
Section	 4	will	 examine	 the	 interrelation	 between	 intellectual	 property	
and	human	rights,	questioning	the	human	rights	nature	of	copyright.	It	will	also	
seek	to	systematize	the	principle	of	balance	in	a	broader	framework,	which	links	
Canadian	copyright	law	to	the	international	human	rights	system.	It	will	portray	
the	human	rights	nature	of	users’	rights,	showing	that	we	can	speak	of	a	human	
right	of	access	to	knowledge,	and	will	discuss	the	justiciability	of	such	a	right,	and	
the	sources	 from	which	 it	flows.	 It	will	 also	portray	 two	general	 characteristics	
of	the	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge:	its	multi-layered	dimension	and	its	
instrumental	nature	as	a	background	right	of	other	human	rights.
The	goal	of	this	discussion	is	to	demonstrate	that	both	paths	of	copyright	
law	in	Canada	can	be	reconciled,	and	the	integrity	of	our	framework	can	shed	new	
light	into	the	understanding	of	the	inherent	relationship	between	users’	rights	in	
Canada	and	the	international	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	Conversely,	
this	would	restrain	any	trends	of	excessively	strengthening	intellectual	property	
rights	in	the	ongoing	process	of	legislative	reform	of	copyright	in	Canada.
*
2. THE USERS’ RIGHTS CHAIN NOVEL
first there was none, and then there was... purpose.7	 	 Is	 it	 really	conceivable	
that	copyright	law	in	Canada	was	only	granted	a	purpose	at	the	onset	of	the	
21st	century’?		Is	it	so	that	before	Théberge,8	CCH,9	and	SOCAN,10	the	whole	
structure	of	copyright	in	Canada	was	merely,	positively	and	emptily	a	“creature	
of	the	copyright	act,”	as	set	down	in	Compo	v	Blue	Crest11	and	resurrected	in	
Bishop	v	Stevens,12	and	nothing	more	than	that	–	the	creature	of	a	purposeless	
	
7.	 Daniel	Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law	in	Canada,”	(2005)	2:2	University of Ottawa Law and 
Technology Journal	315–356,	<http://www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.2/2005.2.2.uoltj.Gervais.315-356.pdf>	at	p.317.
8.	 Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.,	2002	SCC	34,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/
en/2002/2002scc34/2002scc34.html>,	2002:2	Supreme Court Reports	336.
9.	 CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada,	2004	SCC	13,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/
en/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.pdf>,	2004:1	Supreme Court Reports	339.
10.	 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers,	
2004	SCC	45,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2004/2004scc45/2004scc45.html>, 2004:2	Supreme Court 
Reports	427	[SOCAN].
11.	 Compo Co. Ltd. v Blue Crest Music,	1979	SCC	6,	<http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1979/1979canlii6/197
9canlii6.html>,	1980:1	Supreme Court Reports	357	[Compo	v Blue Crest].
12.	 Bishop v Stevens, 1990	SCC	75,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs2-467/1990rcs2-467.html>,	
1990:2	Supreme Court Reports	467	[Bishop v Stevens].
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Copyright	Act?	 	 Is	 it	 likely	 that	 the	 trilogy	provoked	such	a	great	shift	 in	 the	
interpretation	given	by	the	courts	that	all	previous	rulings	are	now	precluded	by	
a	liberal	and	generous	interpretation	of	users’	rights	which	not	only	overwhelms	
the	stricter	fashion	of	Michelin,13	but	also	deflates14	the	understanding	that	the	
contours	of	the	Canadian	Copyright	Act15	are	reasonable	limits	prescribed	in	a	
free	and	democratic	society?	Or	is	it	that	there	still	are	lessons	to	be	extracted	
from	 each	 and	 all	 of	 those	 rulings	 –	 that	 all	 of	 them	 intertwine	 to	 form	 the	
complex	fabric	of	Canadian	copyright	 law,	and	that	the	glue	of	this	fabric,	the	
purpose	of	this	novel,	its	dimension	of	fit,	is	not	only	to	be	found	in	the	Copyright	
Act	 in	isolation,	but	in	a	broader	framework,	to	which	the	Act	itself	is	no	more	
than	an	“integral	part?”
	 It	 is	strongly	believed	that	the	assertiveness	of	the	last	 inquiry	 is	true–	
and	that	its	answer	helps	us	to	respond	to	the	three	former	questions.	Addressing	
it	will	be	the	object	of	this	section.	My	belief	is	the	corollary	of	two	connected	
assumptions.	First,	our	Hercules,	still	after	the	trilogy,	must	pursue	the	large	view;	
that	is	to	say,	he	must	find	integrity	in	law	and	consider	the	important	lesson	that	
the	connection	between	the	previous	cases	and	the	trilogy	has	to	teach.	Binnie	
J	is	unequivocally	leading	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	towards	an	enlightened	
effort	to	set	up	the	principles	for	pursuing	a	view	of	fairness	in	Canadian	copyright	
law.	But	the	linkage	of	all	those	cases	referred	to	above	reveals	that	something	is	
not	yet	clear:	the	connection	of	copyright	case	law	in	Canada	with	the	domestic	
framework	for	the	reception	of	international	human	rights	norms.	Second,	and	as	
a	consequence,	the	connection	of	copyright	law	in	Canada	with	the	international	
human	rights	framework	will	unveil	the	fact	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
did	not	provide	Canadian	copyright	 law	with	a	purpose	“it	had	arguably	been	
missing,”16	but	merely	(and	perhaps	unsuspectingly)	reflected	a	purpose	which	
has	 been	 increasingly	 proclaimed	 in	 a	 system	whose	 internalization	we	 are	 in	
need	of	acknowledging	in	a	more	straightforward	fashion.	
	 Indeed,	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 is	 evolving	
together	with	the	contours	of	international	doctrine	and	customs	with	respect	to	
users’	rights	and	the	idea	of	a	right	of	access	to	knowledge	must	be	seen	as	much	
more	than	a	happy	coincidence	or	a	pari	passu	 development.	What	remains	to	
be	 shown	 is	 the	 inherent	 connection	 between	 both	 sets	 of	 norms	 –	 the	 local	
and	the	global	–	with	respect	to	the	purposive	construction	of	copyright	law	in	
Canada.	The	next	section	will	examine	how	the	presumption	of	conformity	with	
international	 human	 rights	 law	 in	general,	 and	 the	 incorporation	of	 customary	
international	human	rights	law	in	particular,	might	be	addressed	to	reverse	the	
apparent	 dissociation	 between	 copyright	 law	 in	 Canada	 and	 the	 international	
human	rights	system.
	 	
13.	 Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v National Automobile, Aerospace, 
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) (T.D.), (Fed	Ct.	Trial	Div,	1997), 
<http://recueil.cmf.gc.ca/en/1996/1997fc19917.html/1997fc19917.html.html>,	1997:2	Canadian Federal 
Court Reports	306,	[Michelin,	cited	to	Federal Court Reporter].
14.	 Jane	Bailey,	“Deflating	the	Michelin	Man:	Protecting	User’s	Rights	in	the	Canadian	Copyright	Reform	
Process”	in	Michael	Geist,	ed.,	In the Public interest: the Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	
125–166,	<http://209.171.61.222/PublicInterest/Two_02_Bailey.pdf>	at	p.125	[Bailey].
15.	 Copyright Act,	(1985)	Revised Statutes of Canada	c.	C-42,	<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowTdm/cs/C-
42//20071217/en>.
16.	 Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law,”	supra	note	7	at	p.	317.
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	 This	 section	 will	 briefly	 point	 out	 that	 there	 still	 remains	 the	 same	
perception	 that	 restricts	 the	 contours	 of	 such	 rights	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
Copyright	 Act	 itself	 –	 a	 positivist	 notion,	 which	 seemingly	 limits	 copyright	 in	
Canada	to	the	boundaries	of	a	constitutionally	untouchable	Copyright	Act.	This	is	
the	case	even	in	light	of	the	growing	trend	towards	a	balance	between	copyright	
holders’	and	users’	rights,	and	also	towards	a	generous	and	liberal	interpretation	
of	fair	dealing	possibilities	not	as	mere	defences	against	authors’	rights	but	as	
users’	rights	in	themselves.
	 As	Elizabeth	Judge	and	Daniel	Gervais	accurately	affirm	 in	 their	book	
Intellectual	Property	Law:	The	Law	in	Canada,	“copyright	derives	from	positive	
rather	 than	 natural	 law	 and	 there	 is	 no	 common	 law	 copyright	 in	 Canada.”17		
Accordingly,	David	Vaver	points	out	that	such	understanding	“forestalls	arguments	
that	common	or	civil	law	principles	automatically	solve	a	copyright	dispute,	or	that	
the	Copyright	Act	is	merely	a	backdrop	for	such	principles.	Instead,	courts	must	
resolve	disputes	first	by	reading	and	construing	the	Act,	without	presupposing	
what	result	the	common	or	civil	law	would	have	reached.”18
	 This	concept	was	originally	set	down	in	Compo	v	Blue	Crest,	where	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	asserted	 that	copyright	 law	 in	Canada	 is	“statutory	
law”;	 that	 it	 simply	“creates	 rights	and	obligations	upon	 the	 terms	and	 in	 the	
circumstances	set	out	in	the	statute”;	that	it	is	a	“creature	of	statute”	that	“the	
legislation	 speaks	 for	 itself,” and	users’	 actions	must	be	“measured	according	
to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 statute.”19	 	 In	 Bishop	 v	 Stevens,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Canada	revisited	such	understanding	to	state	that	copyright	 law	in	Canada	“is	
purely	statutory	law	which	simply	creates	rights	and	obligations	as	set	out	in	the	
statute.”20
	 More	recently,	the	Federal	Court	of	Canada	went	further	in	Michelin.	This	
case,	together	with	the	Lorimer21	case,	is	frequently	mentioned	by	commentators	
who	 address	 the	 interplay	 between	 copyright	 and	 freedom	 of	 expression	 in	
Canada,	and	criticize	the	tendency	of	Canadian	courts	to	disregard	constitutional	
rights	 on	 behalf	 of	 statutory	 rights.22	 The	 case	 involved	 the	 reproduction	 of	
Michelin’s	 Bibendum	man	 for	 parody	 purposes	 by	 the	 unionized	 employees	 of	
the	company.	The	Federal	Court	denied	 the	employees	 the	 right	of	parody	 for	
purposes	of	criticism,	which	is	not	expressly	recognized	in	the	Copyright	Act	itself.	
In	the	same	spirit	of	the	cases,	referred	to	above,	the	Court	went	on	to	affirm	that	
“American	case	 law	permitting	parody	as	criticism	under	the	American	doctrine	
of	‘fair	use’	is	not	applicable	nor	terribly	persuasive	in	the	Canadian	legal	context	
17.	 Elizabeth	F.	Judge	and	Daniel	Gervais,	Intellectual Property Law: The Law in Canada (Thomson-Carswell,	
2005)	at	p.	8.
18.	 David	Vaver,	Copyright Law	(Irwin	Law,	2000)	at	p.19.(emphasis	added).	
19.	 Compo v Blue Crest,	supra	note	11	at	p.	373	(emphasis	added).
20.	 Bishop v Stevens,	supra	note	12	at	p.	468.
21.	 R. v James Lorimer & Co. Ltd.,	1984:1	Canadian	Federal Court Reports	1065,	1984:77	Canadian Patent 
Reporter,	2d ser.	262.
22.	 See,	for	instance,	Ysolde	Gendreau,	“Copyright	and	Freedom	of	Expression	in	Canada,”	in	Paul	LC	
Torremans,	ed.,	Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression – Intellectual Property – Privacy”	
(Kluwer	Law,	2004)	21–36	at	p.	33.	See	also	Ysolde	Gendreau,	“Canadian	Copyright	Law	and	its	Charters,”	in	
Jonathan	Griffths	and	Uma	Suthersanen,	ed.,	Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International 
Analyses (Oxford	University	Press,	2005)	at	p.	251.	See	also	ES	Nwauche,	“Human	Rights	–	Relevant	
Considerations	in	respect	of	IP	and	Competition	Law,”	(2005)	2:4	SCRIPT-ed,	<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/
script-ed/vol2-4/enyinna.asp>	at	p.	470.	Also	mentioning	Michelin,	David	Vaver	noted	(in	2000)	that	
“Canadian	courts	have	...	not	been	much	impressed	so	far	by	Charter	arguments	in	copyright	cases”:	see	
Vaver,	Copyright Law,	supra	note	18	at	p.	22.	The	situation	has	not	shifted	since	then.	
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and	its	longstanding	trend	of	denying	parody	as	an	exception.	As	well,	exceptions	
to	 copyright	 infringement	 should	 be	 strictly	 interpreted,”23	 and	 thus	would	 not	
be	able	 to	cover	a	situation	which	was	not	described	 in	 the	precise	wording	of	
the	Copyright	Act.	But	besides	limiting	the	recognition	of	fair	dealing	“defences”	
to	the	strict	wording	of	the	Copyright	Act,	the	Court	was	even	more	rigorous	in	
asserting	that	such	strict	boundaries	of	fair	dealing	possibilities	delimited	by	the	
Act	“are	‘reasonable	limits	prescribed	by	law	.	.	.	demonstrably	justified	in	a	free	
and	democratic	society’,	within	the	meaning	of	section	1	of	the	Charter.”24
	 The	collation	of	these	decisions	leads	us	to	seven	important,	although	
not	happy,	conclusions.	 In	effect,	 from	the	moment	those	cases	were	decided:	
i)	there	was	a	positivist	understanding	of	Canadian	copyright	law	which	limited	
recourse	 to	 the	 common	 law	 as	 a	 last	 resort;	 ii)	 the	 interpretation	 of	 “safety	
valve”25	clauses,	such	as	fair	dealing	defences,	was	to	be	carried	out	in	a	narrow,	
strict	fashion;	iii)	defences	were	not	to	be	considered	users’	rights,	but	merely,	
as	defences;	iv)	more	than	a	positivist	approach,	the	decisions	tell	us	that	it	was	
not	 in	 any	 other	 statute	 that	 copyright	must	 be	 encountered,	 but	 only	 in	 the	
Copyright	Act	itself	–	it	is	in	this	sense	that	copyright	was	said	to	be	“neither	tort	
law	nor	property	law	in	classification,”	but	the	creature	of	a	statute	which	“has	
been	known	to	the	law	of	England	at	least	since	the	days	of	Queen	Anne	when	
the	first	copyright	statute	was	passed;”26)	being	mere	creatures	of	statutory	law,	
being	limited	to	the	boundaries	of	the	Copyright	Act,	being	narrowly	interpreted,	
and	not	being	even	acknowledged	as	 rights,	 it	would	be	quite	 surprising	 that	
the	Canadian	courts	would	have	recognized	the	human	rights	nature	of	users’	
rights,	as,	 in	 fact,	 they	did	not;	vi)	accordingly,	 constitutional	provisions	would	
not	 have	 a	 considerable	 impact	 in	 the	 delimitation	 of	 those	 rights,	 and	 there	
would	be	no	clear	 limits	 for	 the	 legislative	branch	 in	 tailoring	 (and	 restricting)	
the	dimensions	of	access	rights	in	Canadian	copyright	law;	vii)	last,	but	not	least,	
gluing	all	the	other	conclusions	together,	the	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	law,	
as	 fashioned	today,	was,	although	not	absent,	mistakenly	 interpreted	from	the	
utilitarian	principle,	and	linked	to	only	one	side	of	the	coin:	rewarding	authors.	
Indeed,	in	Bishop	v	Stevens,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	restated,	quoting	a	
1934	case,27	that	the	single	purpose	and	object	of	the	Canadian	Copyright	Act	
was	 that	of	 “[benefiting]	 authors	of	 all	 kinds,	whether	 the	works	were	 literary,	
dramatic	or	musical.”28
	 If	 these	conclusions	still	hold	true,	they	certainly	doom	users’	rights	 in	
light	of	current	trends	of	copyright	reform	in	Canada.	There	would	be	no	counter-
arguments	 to	 react	 to	 the	 powerful	 agenda	 of	 lobbyists	 and	 compromised	
23.	 Michelin,	supra	note	13	at	p.	351	(emphasis	added).
24.	 Michelin,	supra	note	13	at	p.	311.
25.	 See	Samuel	E	Trosow,	“The	Illusive	Search	for	Justificatory	Theories:	Copyright,	Commodification	and	
Capital”	(2003)	16	Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence	217–241	at	p.	220	(arguing	that	“[t]hroughout	
the	history	of	copyright	law,	...	the	tensions	between	the	limited	monopoly	and	the	free	flow	of	information	
became	evident	and	were	ameliorated	by	what	may	be	thought	of	as	a	set	of	safety	valves.	These	measures	
were	defined	in	a	print-based	world	and	generally	operated	to	temper	the	monopoly	granted	to	owners.	
Examples	of	these	safety	valves	are	the	fair use / fair dealing doctrines, the first sale doctrine, the idea / 
expression dichotomy, the originality requirement, the limitation on the duration of copyrights, and the 
concept of the public domain”).
26.	 Compo v Blue Crest,	supra	note	11	at	p.	373.
27.	 Performing Right Society, Ltd. v Hammond’s Bradford Brewery Co.,	1934:1	Law Reports, Chancery Division, 
3d ser.	121.
28.	 See	Bishop v Stevens,	supra	note	11	at	p.	479.	
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politicians	 who	 currently	 try	 to	 propel	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 big	 media	 in	 this	
country.	There	would	be	nothing	with	which	to	object	to	the	growing	trends	of	
strengthening	the	rights	not	of	authors,	but	of	intermediaries	who	are	completely	
outside	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 possible	 purpose	 or	 justification	 for	 copyright	 law.	
Fortunately,	subsequent	court	decisions	expunged	some	of	those	sins	from	the	
current	framework,	although	some	of	them	remain.	The	ones	which	remain,	as	
argued	below,	are	an	apparent	obstacle	for	reflecting	the	ideas	advocated	in	this	
paper	–	even	though	they	are	in	desperate	need	of	being	redressed	to	approach	
“a	large	view”	of	copyright	law	which	is	more	expressly	connected	to	the	broader	
framework	to	which	the	Copyright	Act	pertains.	
	 But,	first,	 I	will	examine	 the	decisions	 that	are	 frequently	 said	 to	have	
redefined	the	structure	of	Canadian	copyright	law.
	 The	Théberge29	 case	 was	 greeted	 by	 Canadian	 commentators	 as	 the	
bounteous	donor	of	what	Canadian	copyright	law	had	long	since	been	longing	
for:	a	purpose.30		Together	with	CCH31	and	SOCAN32	it	is	said	to	form	a	trilogy	
within	which	the	balance	of	the	system	is	to	be	from	now	on	understood.	Teresa	
Scassa	 describes	 the	 handing	 down	 of	 the	 decision	 in	 Théberge	 as	 “quite	 a	
dramatic	event.”33
 In	Théberge,	 an	 art	 gallery	 (la	Galerie	 d’Art	 du	 Petit	 Champlain)	 was	
purchasing	 cards,	 photolithographs	 and	 posters	 reflecting	 several	 works	 of	
Claude	Théberge,	a	famous	Canadian	painter,	and	then,	by	means	of	a	chemical	
process,	lifting	the	ink	from	those	copies	and	transferring	it	to	canvas,	without	any	
transformation	in	the	material.	When	Théberge	applied	for	an	injunction,	on	the	
basis	that	the	art	gallery	was	producing	unauthorized	reproductions	of	his	work,	
the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Canada,	 beyond	 its	more	 formal	 reasoning	 (that	moral	
rights	could	not	be	protected	by	the	chosen	means),	understood	that	the	images	
fixed	on	the	posters	had	not	been	reproduced,	but	merely	transferred	from	one	
display	to	another.	Hence,	the	Gallery	would	not	be	infringing	Théberge’s	rights	
in	the	works,	but	just	reselling	the	same	copies	it	had	lawfully	purchased.
 By	 denying	 the	 injunction,	 the	 court	 expressly	 recognized	 that	 the	
Copyright	 Act	 presents	 “a	 balance	 between	promoting	 the	 public	 interest	 in	
the	 encouragement	 and	 dissemination	 of	 works	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 intellect	 and	
obtaining	a	just	reward	for	the	creator.”34		Such	a	balance	would	lie	“not	only	in	
recognizing	the	creator’s	rights,	but	in	giving	due	weight	to	their	limited	nature,”	
for	“it	would	be	as	inefficient	to	overcompensate	artists	and	authors	for	the	right	
of	reproduction	as	it	would	be	self-defeating	to	undercompensate	them.”35
	 Moreover,	by	affirming	that	authors’	rights	are	not	 limitless,	that	there	
are	limitations	which	are	necessary	for	the	promotion	of	the	public	interest,	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	indeed	acknowledged	the	other	side	of	the	coin,	
which	was	missing	in	the	previous	copyright	decisions.	The	purpose	of	copyright	
law,	 the	 court	 recognized,	 has	 two	 dimensions:	 that	 of	 creators;	 and,	 that	 of	
29.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8.
30.	 See	Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law	in	Canada,”	supra	note	7.
31.	 See	CCH,	supra	note	9.
32.	 See	SOCAN,	supra	note	10.
33.	 Teresa	Scassa,	“Interests	in	the	Balance,”	in	Michael	Geist,	ed.,	In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian 
Copyright Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	41–	65,	<http://209.171.61.222/PublicInterest/One_02_Scassa.pdf>	at	p.	44.
34.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	30	(emphasis	added).
35.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	31.
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society	 in	 general.36	 The	 recognition	 of	 this	 two-fold	 purpose	 is	 essential	 for	
governing	the	future	of	Canadian	copyright	law,	be	it	in	the	ongoing	plans	for	its	
legislative	reformation,	or	with	respect	to	the	interpretation	of	its	boundaries	by	
the	Canadian	courts	–	to	the	extent	that	the	construction	of	the	common	law	is	
able	to	tackle	aspects	supposedly	reserved	exclusively	for	the	statute.
	 However,	 although	 it	 states	 the	 principle	 of	 balance	 in	 a	 very	
straightforward	 fashion,	 the	 decision	 has	 not	 shifted	 many	 other	 important	
aspects	 of	 the	 existing	 copyright	 framework	 in	 Canada	 –	 and	 even	 (perhaps	
unnoticeably)	contributed	to	the	development	of	a	growing	threat	to	users’	rights:	
the	production	of	copyright	restrictions	by	contractual	means.	Still	mesmerized	
with	the	positive	aspects	of	Théberge,	the	doctrine	has	not	yet	been	prospective	
in	addressing	the	gaps	in	the	decision.	But	the	fact	is	that	at	least	three	problems	
can	be	identified	in	Théberge.
	 First,	even	though	the	Court	recognized	the	need	to	give	due	weight	to	
the	limited	nature	of	creators’	rights,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	maintained	
the	old	perception	that	copyright	in	Canada	is	merely	a	creature	of	the	Copyright	
Act.	In	this	sense,	referring	to	the	cases	mentioned	above,	the	Court	reasserted	
that	“[c]opyright	in	this	country	is	a	creature	of	statute	and	the	rights	and	remedies	
it	provides	are	exhaustive.”37		Such	perception,	as	seen	above,	limits	the	resource	
of	natural	rights’	theories	as	a	justification	of	users’	rights	and	it	is	unclear	from	
where	the	generous	set	down	in	Théberge	derives.	Add	to	this,	the	fact	that	the	
only	 sources	of	 international	 law	 that	 the	majority	 acknowledged	 in	Théberge	
are	 the	 Berne	 Convention	 [Berne]38	 and	 the	 Universal	 Copyright	 Convention	
[UCC],39	while	other	international	instruments	or	norms	that	might	influence	the	
perception	and	definition	of	copyright	law	in	Canada	–	such	as	the	international	
human	rights	framework	–	were	completely	ignored.
	 One	could	argue,	of	course,	that	even	though	the	Berne	Convention	has	
as	its	sole	purpose	that	of	“[constituting]	a	Union	for	the	protection	of	the	rights	
of	 authors	 in	 their	 literary	 and	artistic	works,”40	 the	UCC	 foresees	 the	goal	of	
“[facilitating]	a	wider	dissemination	of	works	of	the	human	mind	and	increase[ing]	
international	 understanding.”41	 	 Also,	 as	 properly	 noted	 by	 Ruth	 Okediji,	 in	
relation	to	Berne	and	its	“long-standing,	single-minded	focus	on	the	maximum	
protection	 for	author	 rights,”	 the	UCC	“offered	weaker	multilateral	protection	
and	 ...	 resonated	 far	better	with	 the	 interests	of	developing	countries.”42	This	
36.	 Some	authors	also	argue	that,	because	it	protected	the	rights	of	the	“user”	of	a	copy	of	the	work,	the	
decision	in	Théberge	was	already	addressing	users’	rights.	In	this	sense,	see	Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	
Copyright	Law	in	Canada,”	supra	note	7	at	p.	320.	This	is	true.	However,	the	first	time	the	Court	used	the	
language	of	rights	with	respect	to	the	limitations	to	copyrights	was	in	CCH:	see	CHH, supra	note	9.
37.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	5.
38.	 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9	September	1886,	last	revised	in	Paris	
24	July	1971,	and	amended	28	September	1979),	<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_
wo001.pdf>,	828	United Nations Treaty Series 221,	1998:18	Canada Treaty Series	(entry	into	force	15	
December	1972,	accession	by	Canada	26	March	1998).
39.	 Universal Copyright Convention	(06	September	1952),	<http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/copyright/html_
eng/page1.shtml>,	216	United Nation Treaty Series 132,	1962:13	Canada Treaty Series	(entry	into	force	16	
September	1955,	ratification	by	Canada	5	October	1962)	[UCC].
40.	 Berne Convention,	supra note	38,	art.	1.
41.	 UCC,	supra note	39	in	the	preamble.
42.	 Ruth	L	Okediji,	“Sustainable	Access	to	Copyrighted	Digital	Information	Works	in	Developing	Countries,”	in	Jerome	
H	Reichman	and	Keith	E	Maskus,	eds.,	International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology: Under a Globalized 
Intellectual Property Regime	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2005)	142	at	pp.153,	158.	It	is,	in	this	sense	that	the	
Convention	speaks	of	“a	system	of	copyright	protection	appropriate to all nations of the world,”	and	which	
“encourage	the	development	of	literature,	the	sciences	and	the	arts”:	see	UCC,	supra	note	39	in	the	preamble.
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would	not	be	enough,	however,	to	outweigh	the	fact	that	the	UCC	understands	
such	a	goal	as	a	consequence	of	a	system	which	provides	“for	the	adequate	and	
effective	protection	of	the rights	of	authors	and	other	copyright	proprietors,”	and	
whose	provisions	“are	additional	to,	and	without	impairing	international	systems	
already	in	force.”43	
	 Hence,	even	though	Théberge	set	down	the	principle	of	balance	in	light	
of	a	concrete	case	presented	to	the	Court,	its	teleological	foundations	were	only	
abstractedly	posed,	without	any	express	and	substantial	reference	to	their	source	
and,	more	importantly	to	why	the	view	previously	sustained	by	the	Court	as	to	
the	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	law	was	so	drastically	changed	without	any	
concern	with	 respect	 to	 its	 dimension	of	 fit.	What	might	 have	 challenged	 the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	to	change	the	directions	of	this	chain	novel?		How	to	
reconcile	the	assumedly	happy	last	chapter	of	this	novel	with	the	gloominess	of	
the	previous	ones?
	 Second,	but	 indissolubly	 linked	to	 the	first	point,	 is	 the	persistence	of	
the	apparent	disconnection	between	Canadian	copyright	law	and	any	light	that	
could	be	shed	by	the	international	human	rights	system,	as	well	as	the	apparent	
dissociation	 from	 clear	 rules	 of	 constitutional	 filtration	 which	 could	 serve	 to	
internalize	such	a	system.	It	seems	that	the	“happy”	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	
law	was	thought	to	have	been	created	de	novo	(from	the	beginning),	as	much	as	
its	declared	connections	to	the	international	system	are	just	related	to	chapters	
in	which	the	purpose	is	forcefully	antagonistic	to	the	stated	one.	However,	the	
only	way	to	express	such	an	evolution	would	be	to	link	it	to	the	internal	rules	for	
reception	of	international	human	rights	norms,	and	thus	to	the	global	trends	of	
development	of	the	so-called	right	of	access	to	knowledge	within	the	scope	of	
those	norms	–	to	which	the	also	growing	international	intellectual	property	system	
has	been	a	foreign	element	with	tragic	inner	effects.	In	this	sense,	Théberge	has	
not	provided	copyright	in	Canada	with	a	purpose,	but	merely	declared	a	purpose	
that	was	already	latent	in	the	human	rights	norms	that	form	the	basis	for	a	human	
right	of	access	to	knowledge.
	 If	the	two	prior	problems,	just	examined,	were	no	more	than	a	reflection	
of	previous	case	 law,	 the	third	one	 is	a	 fresh	start,	until	now	unnoticed	by	the	
scholarly	literature	that	addresses	the	case.	The	point	is	that,	at	the	same	time	
Théberge	 established	 a	 new	 “safety	 valve”	 in	 Canadian	 copyright	 law,	 it	 also	
opened	a	“back	door”	 for	an	 increased	threat	 to	users’	 rights:	 the	creation	of	
new	 layers	 of	 restricting	 users’	 rights	 by	 contractual	means.	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 in	
this	 sense	 that	 the	majority	 in	Théberge	 created	an	 intended	 restriction	when	
impliedly	recognizing	the	application	of	the	first	sale	doctrine	in	Canada.
	 Indeed	the	reasoning	of	Binnie	J	can	be	read	like	this	 in	two	different	
excerpts	in	Théberge.	First,	in	the	core	passage	of	his	wording,	when	stating	the	
principle	of	balance,	he	said:
Once	an	authorized	copy	of	a	work	 is	sold	to	a	member	of	 the	public,	 it	 is	
generally	for	the	purchaser,	not	the	author,	to	determine	what	happens	to	it.	
	
43.	 UCC, supra	note	39,		art.	1	and	in	the	preamble	(emphasis	added).
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Excessive	 control	 by	 holders	 of	 copyright	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 intellectual	
property	may	unduly	limit	the	ability	of	the	public	domain	to	incorporate	and	
embellish	creative	innovation	in	the	long-term	interests	of	society	as	a	whole,	
or	create	obstacles	to	proper	utilization.44
	 In	 the	 second,	 and	 more	 straightforward	 passage,	 Binnie	 J	 not	 only	
allowed	for	the	establishment	of	a	contractual	restriction,	but	clarified	that	such	a	
restriction	can	be	propagated	through	a	chain	of	interrelated	agreements.	In	his	
words:
The	 respondent,	 as	 stated,	 says	 that	money	 is	not	 the	 issue.	 If	 it	were,	he	
could	 presumably	 amend	 his	 contract	 with	 É.G.I.	 to	 permit	 them	 to	 sell	
reproductions	 on	 canvas.	Equally,	 he	 could	 theoretically	 have	 insisted	 that	
É.G.I.	obtain	agreement	from	its	customers	not	to	engage	in	the	ink	transfer	
process,	and	so	on	down	the	line	of	vendors	and	purchasers,	thereby	dealing	
with	the	issue	of	control	through	a	chain	of	contracts.45
	 The	excerpts	are	strong.	As	no	superfluous	words	can	be	read	in	the	law,	
two	assumptions	can	be	extracted	from	the	ruling.	The	first,	is	that	by	saying	that	
“generally”	it	is	up	to	the	purchaser	to	determine	what	happens	to	an	acquired	
work,	the	court	admitted	that	specific	situations	exist	when	that	may	not	happen.	
The	second,	is	that	by	mentioning	that	the	copyright	owner	“could	theoretically	
have	insisted”	on	something	the	Court	had	a	particular	theoretical	framework	in	
mind,	according	to	which	the	copyright	owner	can	contractually	expand	his	or	
her	rights	and	avoid	having	the	legitimate	owner	of	a	copy	of	the	work	exploit	it	
economically.	
	 Hence,	 in	 what	 is	 arguably	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Canada	ever	addressed	the	users’	rights	audience	with	a	Canadian	equivalent	to	
the	United	States’	first	sale	doctrine,46	it	got,	perhaps,	too	close	to	the	southern	
borders	 and	 incorporated	 such	 a	 doctrine	 in	 a	 fashion	 quite	 characteristic	 of	
our	neighbours.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	United	States,	 the	first	 sale	doctrine	has	been	
increasingly	shrinking	throughout	the	years	due	to	the	recognition	by	the	courts	
of	 the	 possibility	 of	 its	 limitation	 through	 contractual	 means.47	 This	 reality	 is	
44. Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	31	(emphasis	added).
45.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	54.
46.	 It	is	symptomatic	that	the	only	cases	that	Vaver	quotes	about	the	first	sale	doctrine	are	foreign:	see	Vaver,	
Copyright Law,	supra	note	18	at	p.	122.	It	is	also	symptomatic	that,	having	written	after	Théberge,	the	only	
Canadian	case	that	George	Takach	mentions	about	the	first	sale	doctrine	in	his	book	about	Canadian	
computer	law	is	Théberge: 
	 It	should	also	be	noted	that,	under	what	is	sometimes	called	‘the	first	sale	doctrine,’	once	a	copy	
of	a	copyright	work	is	sold	with	the	permission	of	the	copyright	owner,	the	copyright	owner	cannot	
control	any	further	resale	of	such	copy	(so	long	as	no	further	copies	are	made)	because	the	right	to	
distribute	or	resell	a	work	is	not	included	in	the	bundle	of	rights	afforded	the	holder	of	a	copyright	
under	the	current	version	of	the	Canadian	Copyright	Act.	Similarly,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
has	recently	confirmed	that	once	an	artist	sells	a	paper-based	poster,	he	cannot	prevent	its	transfer	
to	a	canvas	backing	where	no	additional	copy	of	the	image	is	made;	this	decision	may	have	
interesting	repercussions	for	works	in	digital	form,	given	the	second	dynamic	of	computer	law,	
namely,	the	elusive	nature	of	information.
	 George	S	Takach,	Computer Law	(Irwin	Law,	2003)	at	p.	106.
47.	 See	John	A	Rothchild,	“The	Incredible	Shrinking	First-Sale	Rule:	Are	Software	Resale	Limits	Lawful?”	(2004)	
57:1	Rutgers Law Review	57–106,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=562203>.
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particularly	problematic	with	respect	to	digital	goods.48
	 For	 instance,	 in	MAI	 Systems	 Corp.	 v	 Peak	 Computer,	 Inc.,49	 the	 9th	
Circuit	found	that	the	fact	that	an	agreement	that	was	called	“sale”	or	“license”	
could	decide	whether	 the	 acquirer	 of	 a	 copy	of	 the	work	was	 its	 “owner”	 or	
not.	More	expressively,	in	DSC	Communications	Corp.	v	Pulse	Communications,	
Inc.,50	the	Federal	Circuit,	like	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	Théberge,	made	
an	express	distinction	between	“ownership	of	 the	work”	and	“ownership	of	a	
copy”	 and	 considered	 that	 a	 licensee	 can	 be	 the	 owner	 of	 a	 copy.	 However,	
still	in	the	same	fashion	as	Théberge,	the	Federal	Circuit	found	that	the	license	
agreements	can	impose	restrictions	on	the	rights	of	the	possessors	of	a	copy.	In	
the	words	of	the	court:
[t]he	 fact	 that	 the	 right	 of	 possession	 is	 perpetual,	 or	 that	 the	 possessor’s	
rights	 were	 obtained	 through	 a	 single	 payment,	 is	 certainly	 relevant	 to	
whether	 the	 possessor	 is	 an	 owner,	 but	 those	 factors	 are	 not	 necessarily	
dispositive	if	the	possessor’s	right	to	use	the	software	is	heavily	encumbered	
by	 other	 restrictions	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 status	 of	 owner.51
	 In	conclusion,	while	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	in	Théberge,	restated	
the	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	law,	declaring	that	the	important	dimension	
of	the	public	interest	was	also	to	be	found	in	it,	it	maintained	the	perception	that	
copyright	law	in	Canada	is	statutory	law	and	restricted	to	the	Copyright	Act.	The	
only	exception	would	lie	in	the	acknowledgement	of	international	treaties	on	the	
subject,	which	shall	be	given	attention	in	order	to	harmonize	the	interpretation	of	
“copyright	protection”	in	Canada	with	those	of	“other	like-minded	jurisdictions.”	
Moreover,	 besides	 apparently	 closing	 the	 doors	 of	 our	 legal	 system	 to	 its	
integration	by	norms	which	do	not	come	from	the	 international	 framework	for	
copyright	protection,	and	thus	to	customary	norms	and	principles	that	may	come	
from	the	 international	human	rights	 framework,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
in	Théberge	 allowed	 for	 the	 restriction	of	 users’	 rights	 by	means	of	 chains	 of	
contractual	 agreements	 that	 can	 build	 further	 layers	 of	 protection	 over	 those	
already	granted	by	 the	Copyright	Act.	Hence,	while	 the	purpose	of	Canadian	
copyright	law	was	restated	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	without	any	express	
reference	to	its	origins	and	in	apparent	isolation	from	other	legal	realms	where	
it	 could	be	 said	 to	 have	been	 found,	 its	 practical	 reach	was,	 to	 some	extent,	
flawed	 by	 the	 recognition	 of	 authorial	 possibilities	 that	 come	 in	 the	 opposite	
hand	of	what	would	be	expected	in	order	to	meet	the	purpose	declared.	This	
could	prompt	us	to	ask,	with	Myra	Tawfik,	“w[h]ither	user	rights?”52
48.	 See	R	Anthony	Reese,	“The	First	Sale	Doctrine	in	the	Era	of	Digital	Networks,”	(2003)	44	Boston College 
Law Review	577–652,	<	http://ssrn.com/abstract=463620>.
49.	 MAI Systems Corp. v Peak Computer, Inc.,	(USA,	9th	Cir,	1993), 991	Federal Reporters, 2d ser. 511,	<http://
www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/cases/991_F2d_511.htm>.
50.	 DSC Communications Corp. v Pulse Communications, Inc.,	(USA,	E	Dist	VA,	1997),	976	Federal Supplement	
359,	affirmed	in	part,	vacated	in	part,	revised	in	part,	(USA	Fed	Cir,	1999),	170 Federal Reporter, 3d ser 1354,	
<http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/98opinions/98-1024.html>,	certiorari	denied	
(USA	SC,	1999),	528	United States Reports	923	[DSC].
51.	 DSC,	ibid.
52.	 See	Myra	Tawfik,	“International	Copyright	Law:	W[h]ither	User	Rights?”	in	Michael	Geist,	ed.,	In the Public 
interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	66–85,	<http://209.171.61.222/
PublicInterest/One_03_Tawfik.pdf>	at	p.	66.
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	 This	situation	was	not	changed	very	much	in	CCH,53	a	case	that	involved	
a	dispute	between	the	Great	Library	of	the	Law	Society	of	Upper	Canada	and	
publishers	that	sued	it	for	copyright	infringement	with	respect	to	copies	done	for	
the	purpose	of	“research.”		The	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	CCH	is	important	for	
two	main	reasons.	First,	because	it	has	reconciled	different	theories	and	defined	
what	 shall	 be	 the	 threshold	 of	 originality	 adopted	 in	 Canadian	 copyright	 law	
from	then	on,	shifting	it	far	from	the	lower	standard	defined	in	the	University	of	
London	Press,	Ltd.	v	University	Tutorial	Press,	Ltd.,54	and	adopting	a	standard,	
which	Judge	and	Gervais	have	defined	as	“non-mechanical	and	non-trivial	effort,	
skill	and	labour.”55		Even	though	the	standard	of	originality	adopted	by	a	country	
is	 certainly	 important	 for	 defining	 which	 works	 will	 be	 entitled	 to	 copyright	
protection,	and	also	exerts	a	strong	influence	in	the	perception	of	which	creative	
uses	will	be	considered	infringement,	such	discussion	is	not	directly	connected	
to	 the	 scope	of	 this	 paper	 and	will	 thus	be	 set	 aside.	 In	what	 directly	 relates	
to	 the	 ideas	 advocated	herein,	 the	decision	of	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
in	CCH	 is	 important	 for	 the	 large	scope	 it	accords	 to	“users’	 rights.”	 	 Indeed,	
when	analysing	the	content	of	the	fair	dealing	defence	of	“research,”	the	court	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 term	 “‘[r]esearch’	 must	 be	 given	 a	 large	 and	 liberal	
interpretation	in	order	to	ensure	that	users’	rights	are	not	unduly	constrained…	
[and]	is	not	limited	to	non-commercial	or	private	contexts.”56		That	is	to	say,	the	
court	expressly	recognized	that:
[t]he	fair	dealing	exception,	 like	other	exceptions	 in	the	Copyright	Act,	 is	a	
user’s	right.	In	order	to	maintain	the	proper	balance	between	the	rights	of	a	
copyright	owner	and	user’s	interests,	it	must	not	be	interpreted	restrictively.	
As	Professor	Vaver	...	has	explained	...	‘User	rights	are	not	just	loopholes.	Both	
owner	rights	and	user	rights	should	therefore	be	given	the	fair	and	balanced	
reading	that	benefits	remedial	legislation.’57
	
	 However,	this	is	not	to	say	the	Court	in	CCH	has	admitted	an	unlimited	
extension	of	users’	 rights,	 for	 it	embraced	the	criteria	adopted	by	the	Federal	
Court	of	Appeal	 in	CCH for	determining	when	a	dealing	 is	to	be	deemed	fair.	
Moreover,	the	Court	also	understood	that	“the	fair	dealing	exception	is	perhaps	
more	properly	understood	as	an	integral	part	of	the	Copyright	Act	than	simply	
a	defence.”58		That	is	to	say,	it	is	within	the	scope	of	the	Copyright	Act	that	fair	
dealing	exceptions	must	be	interpreted.
	 For	more	cases	than	in	CCH,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	given	a	
higher	status	to	fair	dealing	defences,	which	now	must	be	understood	as	users’	
rights,	and	that	the	Court	admitted	that	the	interpretation	of	those	rights	must	
be	generous,	in	order	to	ensure	that	they	are	not	unduly	constrained	by	authors	
(or	intermediaries	–	as	was	the	case	in	CCH).	It	is	still	true	that	such	interpretation	
must	 be	 carried	 out	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	Copyright	Act	 itself.	 In	 this	
53.	 See	CCH,	supra	note	9.	
54.	 University of London Press, Ltd.	v	University Tutorial Press, Ltd.,	1916:2	Law Reports, Chancery Division, 3d 
ser.	601.
55.	 Judge	and	Gervais,	Intellectual Property,	supra	note	17	at	p.	25.
56.	 CCH,	supra	note	9	at	para.	51	(emphasis	added).
57.	 CCH,	supra	note	9	at	para.	48.
58.	 CCH,	supra	note	9	at	para.	48	(emphasis	added).
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sense,	the	Court	not	only	referred	to	Bishop	v	Stevens	and	Compo	v	Blue	Crest,	
as	seen	above,	but	it	also	incorporated	the	methodology	quoted	from	Driedger	
in	Bell	Express	Vu	Limited	Partnership	v	Rex,	according	to	which:	
the	 words	 of	 an	 Act	 are	 to	 be	 read	 in	 their	 entire	 context	 and	 in	 their	
grammatical	and	ordinary	sense	harmoniously	with	the	scheme	of	the	Act,	the	
object	of	the	Act,	and	the	intention	of	Parliament.59
	 This	situation	was	not	changed	in	SOCAN,60	where	the	issue	at	stake	was	
the	liability	of	internet	service	providers	for	infringement	actions	perpetrated	by	
users.	In	what	pertains	to	the	subject	of	this	article,	SOCAN	did	not	offer	any	new	
analysis	but	merely	revisited	the	principle	of	balance	already	stated	in	Théberge	
and	CCH,	and	alluded	to	“[t]he	capacity	of	the	Internet	to	disseminate	‘works	of	
the	arts	and	intellect’	[as]	one	of	the	great	innovations	of	the	information	age…
[,	whose]	use	should	be	facilitated	rather	than	discouraged.”61
	 Thus,	 what	 we	 can	 conclude	 is	 that	 many	 issues	 identified	 above	 as	
possible	 problems	 in	 the	 Canadian	 copyright	 framework	 were	 addressed	 by	
the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada.	Fair	dealing	defences	were	recognized	as	users’	
rights,	and	shall	now	be	given	a	large	and	liberal	interpretation.	The	purpose	of	
Canadian	 copyright	 law	was	 also	 shifted	 far	 away	 from	 the	original	 statement	
set	 forth	 in	 Bishop	 v	 Stevens	 and	 has,	 now,	 a	 balanced,	 three-dimensional	
perspective	that	addresses	the	interests	of	authors,	users	and	society	as	a	whole.	
Those	modifications,	however,	are	apparently	 irreconcilable	with	previous	case	
law,	and	indicate	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	even	involuntarily,	had	its	
thoughts	directed	to	other	sources.
	 Which	sources	were	these?	Could	they	originate	 from	an	 international	
shift	in	customary	international	law	with	respect	to	the	definition	of	a	human	right	
of	access	to	knowledge?	Could	the	words	of	 international	scholars	 in	 the	area	
have	anything	to	do	with	such	a	radical	redirection?	The	answer	to	those	questions	
will	depend	upon	the	perspective	from	which	we	consider	that	copyright	law	in	
Canada	 is	a	creature	of	 the	statute,	and	also	upon	our	understanding	of	what	
statutory	law	means	–	if	it	is	just	the	Copyright	Act	or	if	other	statutes	can	also	play	
a	role.	Building	on	Bishop	v	Stevens,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	already	
allowed	for	the	integration	of	copyright	protection	treaties	into	the	scheme.	Can	
such	an	allowance	be	extended	to	other	norms	of	the	international	arena?
	 Drawing	support	in	Canadian	case	law	and	human	rights	literature	I	will	
argue	in	the	next	section	that,	yes,	the	current	framework	for	the	incorporation	
of	human	rights	norms	does	have	a	 important	 role	 to	play,	and	that	Canadian	
copyright	law	cannot	live	in	isolation	from	a	system	which	can	so	advantageously	
contribute	to	stabilizing	copyright’s	purpose	and	contours.	Conversely,	the	linkage	
between	 Canadian	 copyright	 law	 and	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system	
might	help	us	avoid	the	two	main	threats	to	users’	rights	and	the	development	
of	a	right	of	access	to	knowledge	in	Canada:	i)	the	implementation	of	a	political	
59.	 Bell Express Vu Limited Partnership v Rex,	2002	SCC	42,		<http://	scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/
en/2002/2002scc42/2002scc42.html>,	2002:2	Supreme Court Reports	559	at	para.	26.
60.	 See	SOCAN,	supra	note	10.
61.	 See	SOCAN,	supra	note	10	at	para.	40.
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agenda	that	aims	at	strengthening	intellectual	property	rights	to	the	detriment	
of	users’	 rights	and	the	newly	stated	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	 law;	and,	
ii)	the	empowerment	of	big	media	to	pursue	its	proper	goals	by	means	of	the	
combination	of	contractual	agreements	and	technological	protection	measures	
creating	new	layers	of	protection	over	those	already	granted	by	the	Copyright	
Act	and	international	copyright	conventions	to	which	Canada	is	a	party.
	 The	 leading	argument	of	 this	paper	 is	 that	we	 shall	 look	at	 the	 chain	
novel	as	a	whole	–	that	we	shall	neither	treat	copyright	law	as	an	isolated	chapter,	
nor	specifically	arrive	at	the	conclusion	that	the	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	
law	was	created	de	novo	in	the	trilogy.	In	the	words	of	Dworkin:	
[t]he	adjudicative	principle	of	integrity	instructs	judges	to	identify	legal	rights	
and	duties,	so	far	as	possible,	on	the	assumption	that	they	were	all	created	by	
a	 single	 author	 –	 the	 community	 personified	 –	 expressing	 a	 coherent	
conception	of	justice	and	fairness.	...	[T]he	novelists	are	expected	to	take	their	
responsibilities	of	continuity	more	seriously;	they	aim	jointly	to	create	so	far	
as	they	can,	a	single	unified	novel	that	is	the	best	it	can	be.62
To	 say	 that	 continuity	 is	 important	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 old	 lessons	must	 be	
upheld	forever,	but	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	must	take	due	and	express	
account	of	all	the	hyperlinks to	which	its	statements	of	the	purpose	and	directions	
of	Canadian	copyright	law	are	virtually	interrelated,	in	the	search	of	its	decisions’	
dimension	 of	 fit.	 This	 has	 not	 happened	 so	 far	 –	 at	 least	 in	 a	 straightforward	
fashion.	We	must	 thus	 turn	 to	 understand	 what	 these	 hyperlinks	 are	 and	 the	
unsuspected	interpretive	avenues	they	provide	us	with.
*
3. ACTUALIZING THE LARGE VIEW: READING THE NOVEL THROUGH AN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS’ LENS
in the previous Chapter i argued that the deCisions	of	 the	Supreme	Court	of	
Canada	in	the	trilogy	apparently	closed	the	doors	of	our	system	to	norms	which	
are	foreign	to	the	international	framework	for	copyright	protection,	and	thus	to	
customary	norms	and	principles	that	may	come	from	the	international	human	
rights	 framework.	 I	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 shifts	 provoked	 by	 the	 trilogy	 with	
respect	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 Canadian	 copyright	 law	 and	 the	 extension	 and	
stature	of	fair	dealing	exceptions	were	apparently	irreconcilable	with	previous	
case	law.	I	concluded	by	saying	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada		must	take	
due	and	express	account	of	all	the	interconnections,	of	all	the	complex	fabric	
of	decisions	to	which	its	statement	of	the	purpose	and	directions	of	Canadian	
copyright	 law	 is	virtually	 interrelated,	 searching	 for	 a	dimension	of	 fit	 in	 this	
users’	rights	chain	novel.
	 The	words	apparently	and	virtually	were	not	used	heedlessly.	By	saying	
that	those	consequences	of	the	trilogy	are	merely	apparent,	I	mean	that	they	are	
62.	 Dworkin,	Taking Rights Seriously,	supra	note	4	at	p.	225.
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not	real	consequences.	Human	rights	customary	norms	and	principles	are	part	of	
Canadian	law.	They	must	be	considered	incorporated	into	the	legal	system	and	
are	immediately	applicable	as	part	of	the	common	law.	There	is	also	a	presumption	
that	Canadian	law	conforms	to	them.	In	the	same	sense,	providing	copyright	law	
with	a	purpose	and	adjusting	its	direction	not	a	complete	innovation	of	the	trilogy	
either.	Rather,	the	consequences	that	flow	from	the	trilogy	are	no	more	than	an	
acknowledgement	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	of	a	reality	that	was	just	not	
expressly	declared	in	its	decisions.
	 In	 this	sense,	 I	alluded	to	a	virtual	 interrelation	of	 the	decisions	 in	 the	
trilogy	and	before	it	with	other	hyperlinks	to	which	they	are	connected.	And	here	
we	must	briefly	allude	to	the	precise	sense	of	the	word	“virtual.”		First,	I	use	virtual	
because	 there	 is	much	 that	 common	 law	 jurisprudence	 shares	with	 the	 theory	
of	 virtuality.	 Second,	 I	 use	“virtual”	because	 the	other	 sources	 to	which	 those	
hyperlinks	are	connected	might	reveal	that	the	purpose	of	Canadian	copyright	
law	and	the	directions	it	now	follows	in	the	definition	of	users’	rights	were	not	a	
true	innovation	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	but	rather	the	recognition	of	a	
latent	reality,	which	was	merely	waiting	to	be	actualized.	
	 For	understanding	such	a	concept,	the	 lessons	of	famous	cyberculture	
philosopher	Pierre	Lévy	are	invaluable.	In	his	book	Qu’est-ce	que	le	virtuel?	Lévy	
explains	that	to	say	that	something	is	virtual	is	not	equivalent	to	saying	it	does	not	
exist.	The	virtual	does	not	oppose	itself	to	the	real,	but	to	the	actual.	The	virtual	
“is”	already	there,	merely	waiting	to	be	actualized.	His	 lyric	and	precise	words	
demand	a	lengthier	transcription:
[T]he	 virtual	 is	 like	 the	 problematic	 complex,	 the	 knot	 of	 tendencies	 or	
forces	 that	 follows	 a	 situation,	 an	 event,	 an	 object	 or	 an	 entity,	 and	which	
calls	 for	 a	 resolution	 process:	 the	 actualization.	 Such	 problematic	 concept	
pertains	to	the	entity	 in	 itself	considered,	and	constitutes	 inclusively	one	of	
its	greatest	dimensions.	The	problem	of	the	seed,	for	instance,	is	to	make	a	
tree	germinate.	The	seed	“is”	this	problem,	even	if	she	is	not	just	that.	This	
means	that	she	“knows”	exactly	the	shape	of	the	tree	that	will	finally	expand	
its	crown	above	her.	From	the	coercions	that	are	inherent	to	her,	she	will	have	
to	invent	the	tree,	to	co-produce	it	with	the	circumstances	she	meets.	On	the	
one	hand,	the	entity	carries	out	and	produces	 its	 ‘virtualities’:	an	event,	 for	
instance,	 reorganize	 a	 previous	 problematic	 and	 is	 susceptible	 of	 receiving	
different	interpretations.	On	the	other	hand,	the	virtual	constitutes	the	entity:	
the	 ‘virtualities’	 inherent	 to	 a	 being,	 its	 problematic,	 the	 knot	 of	 tensions,	
coercions	and	projects	that	animate	it,	the	issues	that	move	it,	are	an	essential	
part	of	its	determination.	63
	 The	theory	of	virtuality	intertwines	with	common	law	jurisprudence.	Be	
it	by	Dworkin’s	analogy	with	the	chain	novel,	or	by	Holmes’	famous	account	of	
the	 path	 of	 law,64	 we	 know	 by	 heart	 that	 the	 common	 law	 is	 a	 work	 of	 joint	
authorship,	that	it	 is	a	net	of	‘hyperconnections’	in	which	stories	from	the	past	
63.	 Pierre	Lévy,	“Qu’est-ce	que	le	virtuel?”	(Éditions	La	Découverte,	1995)	at	p.	16	(author’s	translation;	
emphasis	added).
64.	 Oliver	Wendell	Holmes	Jr.,	“The	Path	of	Law,”	(1897)	10:8	Harvard Law Review	457–478,	<http://www.
gutenberg.org/etext/2373>.
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progressively	unfold	into	new	ones.	These	new	stories	are	as	much	new	as	they	
are	the	concretization	of	old	prophecies.	In	Justice	Holmes’	words:
[i]n	these	sibylline	 leaves	are	gathered	the	scattered	prophecies	of	the	past	
upon	the	cases	in	which	the	axe	will	fall.	These	are	what	properly	have	been	
called	the	oracles	of	law.	Far	the	most	important	and	pretty	nearly	the	whole	
meaning	of	every	new	effort	of	legal	thought	is	to	make	these	prophecies	more	
precise,	and	to	generalize	them	into	a	thoroughly	connected	system.	[…]	It	is	
to	make	the	prophecies	easier	to	be	remembered	and	to	be	understood	that	
the	teachings	of	the	decisions	of	the	past	are	put	 into	general	propositions	
and	gathered	into	textbooks,	or	that	statutes	are	passed	in	a	general	form.	...	
The	primary	rights	and	duties	with	which	jurisprudence	busies	itself	again	are	
nothing	but	prophecies.65
	 To	say	that	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	the	trilogy	
were	 just	 revisiting	 the,	until	 then,	much	 ignored	history	of	Canadian	copyright	
law66	would	mean	the	same	as	to	say	that	prior	decisions	were	completely	wrong	
in	ignoring	such	history.	The	history	of	Canadian	copyright	law	is,	to	a	great	extent,	
the	history	told	by	the	Canadian	courts	themselves.	To	say	that	before	the	trilogy	
the	courts	had	been	ignoring	a	history	which	has	been	always	before	them	would	
be	as	simplistic	and	 incorrect	as	to	say	that	 from	that	moment	on	the	Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	provoked	a	complete	shift	 in	the	grounds	for	its	 interpretation	
and	application	of	Canadian	copyright	law.	If	this	was	true,	the	new	chapter	written	
by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	would	not	fit	into	“a	single	unified	novel	that	is	
the	best	it	can	be.”67		It	would	lack	its	dimension	of	fit.	Hence,	I	prefer	to	say	that	
the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	merely	actualized	a	reality	which	was	already	virtually	
present	in	the	prophecies	of	the	common	law	–	a	reality	which	was	as	present	and	
inner	as	it	was	in	a	latent,	virtual	state,	waiting	for	its	final	definition	and	recognition	
by	the	best	jurisprudence.	As	acknowledged	by	Binnie	J	in	Théberge,	the	whole	
idea	of	a	balance	between	rewarding	authors	and	promoting	the	public	interest	“is	
not	new.”68		But	if	this	is	true,	where	has	this	apparently	new	purpose	of	Canadian	
copyright	law	been	hiding,	then?		Who	are	its	uncredited	prophets?
	 The	simple	answer	to	these	questions	is	that	the	purpose	and	directions	
now	 followed	by	Canadian	 copyright	 law	 have	 been	progressively	 growing	 in	
the	international	human	rights	system.	This,	consequentially,	may	or	should	be	
determining	the	interpretation	of	Canadian	copyright	law	by	the	Supreme	Court	
of	Canada.	To	point	out	the	sources	and	theoretical	justifications	of	a	so-called	
human	right	of	access	 to	knowledge	will	be	the	objective	of	 the	next	section.	
The	concern,	 in	 the	 lines	below,	 is	 to	show	that	 such	a	 right,	 if	present	 in	 the	
international	human	rights	framework,	must	also	be	found	within	the	layers	that	
provide	for	the	incorporation	of	that	framework	in	Canadian	human	rights	law	–	
an	 interconnected	system	of	constitutional	and	quasi-constitutional	norms	that	
directly	 flows	 from	 the	Charter	 to	 the	 common	 law;	 a	 system,	 I	might	 argue,	
65.	 Holmes,	supra	note	64	at	p.	653.
66.	 See	Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law	in	Canada,”	supra	note	7	at	pp.	326–332.	Accordingly,	the	only	
explicit	explanation	given	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	Théberge	for	acknowledging	the	principle	of	
balance	is	a	ruling	of	an	English	court	in	1769.
67.	 Dworkin,	Law’s Empire, supra	note	3.	
68.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	para.	30.
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which	virtually	brings	users’	rights	to	an	even	higher	hierarchy	than	that	previously	
recognized	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	up	to	the	present	moment.
	 I	will	 begin	with	 an	example	 that	 very	eloquently	portrays	my	 theory.	
The	precautionary	principle	is	a	general	and	customary	principle	of	international	
environmental	 law.	 It	 is	 linked	to	a	third	generation	human	right,	which	 is	 that	
of	 a	 healthy	environment	 for	present	 and	 future	generations.	 Its	 core	 content	
is	not	defined	in	any	treaty,	although	the	principle	is	generally	present	in	many	
international	documents	that	set	down	obligations	with	respect	to	specific	aspects	
of	environmental	protection.	The	University	of	Manchester’s	Owen	McIntyre	and	
Thomas	Mosedale	 acknowledge	 that	 “its	 adoption	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	more	
recent	 international	 instruments	and	its	elaboration	in	the	Rio	Declaration	as	a	
[…]	guiding	principle	for	taking	action	to	protect	the	environment	lend	weight	
to	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 has	 crystallised	 into	 a	 principle	 of	 general	 customary	
international	 law.”69	 	 Indeed,	 in	 the	1992	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	
Development	the	state	parties	declared	that:
In	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 environment,	 the	 precautionary	 approach	 shall	 be	
widely	 applied	 by	 States	 according	 to	 their	 capabilities.	 Where	 there	 are	
threats	of	serious	or	irreversible	damage,	lack	of	full	scientific	certainty	shall	
not	be	used	as	a	 reason	 for	postponing	cost-effective	measures	 to	prevent	
environmental	degradation.70
Notwithstanding	its	customary	status,	the	principle	was	recognized	by	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	as	part	of	Canadian	law,	in	a	matter	reserved	for	the	
sphere	of	statutory	law.71	Indeed,	in	Spraytech	et	al	v	Town	of	Hudson,	the	court	
evaluated	whether	the	town	had	acted	ultra	vires	by	enacting	municipal	by-laws	
that	“[restricted]	the	use	of	pesticides	within	 its	perimeter	to	specified	locations	
and	for	enumerated	activities.”72	 	One	of	 the	aspects	assessed	by	the	Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	was	whether	 the	by-law’s	 interpretation	adopted	by	the	 lower	
court	“respects	international	law’s	‘precautionary	principle’.”73		L’Heureux-Dubé	J,	
for	the	majority,	referred	to	her	reasons	in	Baker	v	Canada,74	observing	that	“the	
values	reflected	in	international	human	rights	law	may	help	inform	the	contextual	
approach	to	statutory	interpretation	and	judicial	review.”75		Furthermore,	L’Heureux-
Dubé	J	quoted	Driedger	on	the	Construction	of	Statutes,	to	explain:	
[T]he	legislature	is	presumed	to	respect	the	values	and	principles	enshrined	in	
international	law,	both	customary	and	conventional.	These	constitute	a	part	of	
the	legal	context	in	which	legislation	is	enacted	and	read.76
69.	 Owen	McIntyre	and	Thomas	Mosedale,	“The	Precautionary	Principle	as	a	Norm	of	Customary	International	
Law,”	(1997)	9:1	Journal of Environmental Law	221–241	at	pp.	222–223.
70.	 United	Nations	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development,	Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,	
UN	Doc.	A/CONF.151/26/REV1,	<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1.htm>	at	Principle	15.
71.	 We	might	observe	that	in	copyright	decisions	this	has	not	happened.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	albeit	
allowing	for	a	large	and	liberal	interpretation	of	the	Canadian	Copyright Act	continues	to	understand	
copyright	as	merely	a	creature	of	statutory	law.
72.	 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town),	2001	SCC	40,	<http://scc.lexum.
umontreal.ca/en/2001/2001scc40/2001scc40.pdf>,	2001:2	Supreme Court Reports	241	at	para.	6	[Spraytech].
73.	 Spraytech,	supra	note	72	at	para.	31.
74.	 See	Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),	1999	SCC	699,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.
ca/en/1999/1999rcs2-817/1999rcs2-817.pdf>,	1999:2	Supreme Court Reports	817	[Baker v Canada].
75.	 Spraytech, supra note	72	at	para.	30.
76.	 Spraytech, supra note	72	at	para.	30	(emphasis	added).
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	 Among	the	many	reasons	mentioned	by	L’Heureux-Dubé	J	for	endorsing	
the	status	of	the	precautionary	principle	as	customary	international	law	was	the	
advocacy	of	the	principle	by	Canada	during	the	Bergen	Conference	negotiations,77	
the	codification	of	the	principle	in	specific	items	of	domestic	legislation78 and	its	
documentation	by	specialized	scholarly	literature.”79	
	 Because	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	acknowledged	the	status	of	the	
precautionary	principle	as	a	customary	principle	of	 international	 law,	and	 from	
this	conclusion	also	acknowledged	its	inherent	presence	in	Canadian	law,	there	
would	be	no	grounds	for	not	reaching	the	same	conclusions	with	respect	to	an	
eventual	customary	nature	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	providing	that	
the	 same	 circumstances	 were	 present.	 If	 reflected	 in	 the	 scholarly	 literature,	
statements	made	by	Canada	before	 international	 bodies	 and	other	 countries,	
items	of	our	legislation	from	where	it	can	be	inferred,	and	other	possible	sources	
which	 portray	 its	 recognition	 as	 a	 normative	 value	 entrenched	 in	 customary	
international	human	rights	law,	the	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge	would	
be	part	of	Canadian	law.
	 International	law	is	part	of	Canadian	law	and	frames	the	interpretation	
and	 application	 of	 other	 norms	 in	 our	 legal	 system.	 Even	when	 not	 expressly	
declared,	albeit	virtually,	 international	law	is	already	incorporated	in	the	law	of	
the	land.	As	Mark	Freeman	and	Gibran	Van	Ert	point	out,	quoting	Higgins,	“[the]	
distinction	between	foreign	law	and	international	law	is	not	peculiar	to	Canada	
and	other	common	law	countries.	‘There	is	not	a	legal	system	in	the	world	where	
international	law	is	treated	as	‘foreign	law’.	It	is	everywhere	part	of	the	law	of	the	
land;	as	much	as	contracts,	 labour	 law	or	administrative	 law’”80	–	and,	 I	would	
add,	as	much	as	copyright	law.
	 Besides	 Baker	 v	 Canada,	 mentioned	 above,81	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Canada	 has	 a	 vast	 jurisprudence	 prompting	 Canadian	 courts	 to	 presume	 the	
compliance	of	our	 legislation	with	 international	 law.	 In	Ordon	Estate	v	Grail,82	
a	 case	 involving	 negligence	 actions	 in	 relation	 to	 two	 boating	 accidents	 that	
occurred	 on	 navigable	 waters	 within	 Ontario,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	
provided	to	some	extent	for	the	primacy	of	statutory	law,	but	acknowledged	the	
importance	of	the	common	law	and	of	customary	sources	of	international	law.	
	 The	Court	said:	
Canadian	maritime	law	is	uniform	throughout	Canada,	and	it	is	not	the	law	of	
any	province	of	Canada.	All	of	its	principles	constitute	federal	law	and	not	an	
incidental	application	of	provincial	law.	...	In	those	instances	where	Parliament	
77.	 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Developments,	UN	Doc.	A/CONF.151/PC/10,	(1990)	1	
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 429	at	para.	7.
78.	 This	included	the	principle’s	application	at	the	federal	level	under	s.2(1)(a)	of	the	Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (which,	however,	was	not	at	stake	in	the	decision).	See	Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act,	1999	Statutes	of	Canada	ch.	33,	s.2(1)(a),	<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-15.31/>.
79.	 Amongst	these	were	the	lessons	of	James	Cameron	and	Julie	Abouchar	teaching	that	there	may	be	
“currently	sufficient	state	practice	to	allow	a	good	argument	that	the	precautionary	principle	is	a	principle	of	
customary	international	law	(James	Cameron	and	Julie	Abouchar,	“The	Status	of	the	Precautionary	Principle	
in	International	Law,”	in	David	Freestone	and	Ellen	Hey,	eds.,	The Precautionary Principle and International 
Law	(Kluwer	Law	International,	1996)	29–52	at	p.	52).
80.	 Mark	Freeman	and	Gibran	Van	Ert,	International Human Rights Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	at	p.	149.
81.	 See	Baker v Canada,	supra	note	74.
82.	 Ordon Estate v Grail,	1998	SCC	771,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs3-437/1998rcs3-437.
pdf>,	1998:3	Supreme Court Reports	437.
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has	not	passed	legislation	dealing	with	a	maritime	matter,	the	inherited	non-
statutory	 principles	 embodied	 in	 Canadian	 maritime	 law	 as	 developed	 by	
Canadian	courts	remain	applicable.83
Further,	Iacobucci	and	Major	JJ,	for	the	majority,	quoted	McLachlin	CJ	in	Watkins	
v	Olafson84	to	assert	that:	
in	a	constitutional	democracy	such	as	ours	it	is	the	legislature	and	not	the	courts	
which	has	the	major	responsibility	for	law	reform;	and	for	any	changes	to	the	
law	which	may	have	complex	ramifications,	however	necessary	or	desirable	such	
changes	may	be,	 they	 should	be	 left	 to	 the	 legislature.	 The	 judiciary	 should	
confine	 itself	 to	 those	 incremental	 changes	which	are	necessary	 to	keep	 the	
common	law	in	step	with	the	dynamic	and	evolving	fabric	of	our	society.85
	
	 Hence,	we	see	 that	albeit	 recognizing	 that	complex	changes	 in	 rights	
and	obligations	generally	flow	first	from	the	law,	in	fields	reserved	to	statutory	
construction	–	not	very	differently	in	this	sense	from	the	old	dictum	of	Compo	v	
Blue	Crest86	about	copyright	being	a	creature	of	the	statute,	the	Court	in	Baker	
v	Canada	had	registered	that	 the	common	 law	also	plays	an	 important	 role	 in	
providing	for	the	progressive	development	of	our	legal	system	even	in	the	fields	
reserved	to	statutory	construction.	The	same	is	true	for	norms	that	come	from	
the	 international	 law.	 It	was	 in	 this	sense	that	 the	Court	 in	Ordon	Estate,	with	
respect	 to	 maritime	 law,	 said,	 “[w]hen	 applying	 the	 above	 framework	 in	 the	
maritime	law	context,	a	court	should	be	careful	to	ensure	that	it	considers	not	
only	the	social,	moral	and	economic	fabric	of	Canadian	society,	but	also	the	fabric	
of	the	broader	international	community	of	maritime	states.”87	For	such	reason,	
indicated	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Canada,	Canadian	 courts	must	 presume	 that	
national	 legislation	 is	 intended	to	comply	with	 the	country’s	obligations	 in	 the	
international	stage:
Although	 international	 law	 is	not	binding	upon	Parliament	or	 the	provincial	
legislatures,	a	court	must	presume	that	legislation	is	intended	to	comply	with	
Canada’s	 obligations	 under	 international	 instruments	 and	 as	 a	 member	 of	
the	 international	community.	 In	choosing	among	possible	 interpretations	of	
a	 statute,	 the	 court	 should	 avoid	 interpretations	 that	would	put	Canada	 in	
breach	of	such	obligations[.]88
	
In	Zingre	v	The	Queen,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	provided	that	a	section	
of	the	Canada	Evidence	Act	and	an	Anglo-Swiss	treaty	of	1880	which	regulates	
the	prosecution	of	fugitives	should	be	“fairly	and	liberally	interpreted	with	a	view	
to	fulfilling	Canada’s	international	treaty	obligation.”89		Such	wording	resembles	
83.	 Ordon Estate,	supra	note	82	at	p.	443.	
84.	 See Watkins v Olafson,	1989	SCC	36,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1989/1989rcs2-750/1989rcs2-750.
pdf>,	1989:2	Supreme Court Reports	750.
85.	 Ordon Estate,	supra	note	82	at	para.	78	(emphasis	added).
86.	 Compo v Blue Crest,	supra	note	11.
87.	 Ordon Estate,	supra	note	82	at	para.	79.
88.	 Ordon Estate,	supra	note	82	at	para.	137.
89.	 Zingre v The Queen,	1981	SCC	32,	<http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1981/1981canlii32/1981canlii32.
html>,	1981:2	Supreme Court Reports	392	at	p.	394	[Zingre].
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that	of	CCH,	when	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	stated	that	an	expression	of	the	
Copyright	Act	should	be	given	a	large	and	liberal	interpretation.	The	difference	
is	that	here	the	sources	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	reasons	were	openly	and	clearly	
conveyed	(“with	a	view	to	fulfilling	Canada’s	international	treaty	obligation”90),	in	
contrast	with	the	trilogy,	where,	as	seen	above,	there	was	a	shift	in	the	Court’s	
interpretation	without	any	apparent	motivation	being	added	with	respect	to	the	
sources	of	the	shift.
	 Such	a	principle,	which	commands	Canadian	courts	to	interpret	the	rules	
of	our	legal	system	in	a	large	and	liberal	way	in	order	to	comply	with	international	
law,	is	the	doctrine	of	the	presumption	of	conformity	with	international	law.	Its	
context,	 as	 seen	above	 in	Spraytech,91	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 international	 norms	
“incorporated	by	Act	of	the	Parliament	into	Canadian	law.”92	As	commentators	
point	 out,	 “the	 presumption	 of	 conformity	 applies	 in	 respect	 of	 any	 rule	 of	
international	law	binding	on	Canada.	...	[B]inding	international	laws	may...	derive	
from	customary	 international	 law,	and	the	presumption	applies	equally	 in	such	
instances.”93		Indeed,	“[i]t	is	a	well-established,	though	rarely	invoked,	doctrine	
that	 norms	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 are	 directly	 enforceable	 as	 rules	 of	
the	common	law.	The	doctrine	 is	known	as	 incorporation.”94	Freeman	and	Van	
Ert	quote	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	Saint	John	v	Fraser-Brace	Overseas,95	
which	they	acknowledge	as	a	“powerful	affirmation”96	of	such	doctrine:
If	 in	1767	Lord	Mansfield,	as	 in	Heathfield	v	Chilton	could	say,	“The	 law	of	
nations	will	be	carried	as	far	in	England,	as	any	where,”	in	the	country,	in	the	
20th	 century,	 in	 the	presence	of	 the	United	Nations	and	 the	multiplicity	of	
impacts	with	which	technical	developments	have	entwined	the	entire	globe,	
we	cannot	say	anything	less.	[...]	[T]o	say	that	precedent	is	now	required	for	
every	proposed	application	to	matter	which	differs	only	 in	accidentals,	 that	
new	concrete	instances	must	be	left	to	legislation	or	convention,	would	be	a	
virtual	 repudiation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 inherent	 adaptability	 which	 has	
maintained	the	life	of	the	common	law,	and	a	retrograde	step	in	evolving	the	
rules	of	international	intercourse.97
	
	 I	will	 turn	 to	 the	sources	of	 international	human	rights	 law	 in	 the	next	
section	when	I	argue	for	a	human	rights	status	or	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	
In	this	section	I	wish	to	portray:	the	existing	(rather	than	expanding)	methodology	
for	acknowledging	the	already	expanded	dimension	of	users’	rights	in	Canada;	
and,	 that	 this	 chain	 novel	 already	 has	 its	 gates,	 where	 international	 human	
rights	 norms	might	 have	 its	 ubiquitous	 presence	 readily	 recognized	 –	 as	 they	
permanently	do.	But	such	a	portrait	would	be	incomplete	if	I	did	not	briefly	refer	
to	how	constitutional	law	is	embedded	in	the	mechanisms	that	provide	for	the	
90.	 Zingre, supra note	89	at	p.	393.	
91.	 See Spraytech,	supra	note	72.
92.	 Ramahan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),	2002	FCA	89	<http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/
fca/doc/2002/2002fca89/2002fca89.html>,	2002:3	Canadian Federal Court Reports	537	at	para	35.
93.	 Freeman	and	Van	Ert,	International Human Rights Law,	supra	note	80	at	p.	159.
94.	 Freeman	and	Van	Ert,	International Human Rights Law,	supra	note	80	at	p.	156.
95.	 Saint John (City) v Fraser-Brace Overseas (Can	SC	1957),	1958	Supreme Court Reports	263,	<http://www.
pinetreeline.org/misc/other/misc6j.html>	[Saint John].
96.	 Freeman	and	Van	Ert,	International Human Rights Law,	supra	note	80	at	p.	160.
97.	 Saint John, supra	note	95	at	pp.	268–269.
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incorporation	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 norms	 in	Canada.	 I	 do	 not	 intend	
here	to	make	any	thorough	and	substantial	analysis	of	the	Canadian	Copyright	
Act	and	its	intended	reforms	in	light	of	the	Charter.	Such	an	analysis	was	already	
successfully	done	by	intellectual	property	scholars	here98	and	elsewhere.99		What	
I	want	to	point	out	in	these	lines	is	how	the	international	human	rights	framework	
pervades	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	Charter	 in	 such	 assessment	of	 constitutionality,	 and	
how,	in	response,	the	Charter	“[u]ndoubtedly	...	gives	effect	to	many	of	Canada’s	
obligations	under	international	law.”100
	 The	 current	 Supreme	 Court’s	 approach	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 interplay	
between	the	Charter	and	the	international	human	rights	system	is	two-fold.	On	
the	one	hand,	it	is	understood	that	“the	Charter	should	be	presumed	to	provide	
protection	at	least	as	great	as	that	afforded	by	similar	provisions	in	international	
human	rights	documents	which	Canada	has	ratified.”101		On	the	other	hand,	those	
rights	which	do	not	derive	directly	from	binding	international	instruments	must	
still	 be	 considered	 “relevant	 and	 persuasive	 sources	 for	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Charter’s	provisions.”102	 	Among	the	sources	of	 international	human	rights	 law	
identified	by	the	Court	in	these	cases	are	“declarations,	covenants,	conventions,	
judicial	and	quasi-judicial	decisions	of	international	tribunals,	customary	norms”103	
which	are	non-binding	for	Canada.	Customary	obligations,	covenants	and	other	
instruments	which	are	binding,	however,	must	frame	a	presumption	of	conformity	
between	the	Charter	and	the	international	human	rights	framework.104	
	 In	addition,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	also	reached	some	specific	
conclusions	with	respect	to	the	interplay	between	section	1	of	the	Charter	and	
the	international	human	rights	system.	
		 As	argued	above	in	the	Michelin	case,	the	Federal	Court	concluded	that	
the	limits	set	down	by	the	Copyright	Act’s	sections	which	deal	with	fair	dealing	
“defences”	are	reasonable	and	justified	in	a	free	and	democratic	society	–	that	
is	to	say,	the	Federal	Court	understood	that	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	
as	defined	by	subsection	2(d)	of	the	Charter	 is	not	impaired	by	the	restrictions	
prescribed	 by	 the	Act,	 and	 that	 the	Act,	 thus,	meets	 the	 design	 of	 section	 1	
of	 the	 Charter	 (which	 provides	 that	 “[t]he	 Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	
Freedoms	guarantees	the	rights	and	freedoms	set	out	in	it	subject	only	to	such	
reasonable	 limits	prescribed	by	 law	as	 can	be	demonstrably	 justified	 in	 a	 free	
and	democratic	society”).105		In	spite	of	the	conclusions	reached	by	the	Supreme	
Court	 in	 the	 trilogy,	 these	 reasons	 in	Michelin	 remain	untouched	by	Canadian	
courts.	 Fair	 dealing	 defences	 are	 now	 users’	 rights	 which	 demand	 large	 and	
98.	 See	Bailey,	“Deflating	the	Michelin	Man,”	supra	note	14.	For	a	procedural	approach	with	respect	to	the	
constitutional	distribution	of	legislative	competences	among	the	Federal	Government	and	the	Provinces,	
see	Jeremy	F	deBeer,	“Constitutional	Jurisdiction	Over	Paracopyright	Laws”	in	Michael	Geist,	ed.,	In the 
Public interest: the Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	89–124,	<http://209.171.61.222/
PublicInterest/Two_01_deBeer.pdf>	at	p.	89.
99.	 See	Yochai	Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass:	Alice	and	the	Constitutional	Foundations	of	the	Public	
Domain,”	(2003)	66:1&2	Law & Contemporary Problems	173–224,		<http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/
benkler.pdf>.
100.	 Mack v Canada (Attorney General), (ON	Sup.	Ct.,	2001),	(2001)	55	Ontario Reports, 3d ser. 113.
101.	 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.)	(Can	SC,	1987),	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/
en/1987/1987rcs1-313/1987rcs1-313.html>,	1987:1	Supreme Court Reports	313	at	p.	349	[Re	PSERA].	Such	
notion	was	reaffirmed	in	Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson (Can	SC	1989),	<http://www.canlii.org/en/
ca/scc/doc/1989/1989canlii92/1989canlii92.html>,	1989:1	Supreme Court Reports 1038	[Slaight].
102.	 Re PSERA, supra	note	101	at	p.348.
103.	 Re PSERA, supra	note	101	at	p.	348.
104.	 Freeman	and	Van	Ert,	International Human Rights Law,	supra	note	80	at	p.	195.
105.	 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,	(1985)	Revised Statutes of Canada	App.	II,	no.	44,	Sched.	B,	
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html>	[Charter].
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liberal	interpretation,	but	there	is	no	ruling	of	the	Supreme	Court	that	specifically	
assesses	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 Copyright	 Act	 per	 se.	 In	 her	 “Deflating	
the	Michelin	 Man,”	 Jane	 Bailey	 does	 a	 wonderful	 job	 of	 demonstrating	 how	
a	 strengthened	Copyright	Act	would	 fail	 to	meet	 the	 four-step	 test	 set	out	 in	
Oakes,106	 and	 thus	 violate	 section	1	of	 the	Charter.	My	argument	here	 is	 that	
such	an	analysis	could	be	complemented	by	showing	how	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Canada	has	opened	constitutional	inquiry	with	respect	to	section	1	of	the	Charter	
to	the	incorporation	of	international	human	rights	norms	–	and	thus	how	Bailey’s	
own	 conclusion	 that	 current	 trends	 of	 reformation	 reflects	 undue	 “constraints	
on	 access	 to	 and	use	of	 information,	which	 form	an	 integral	 part	 of	Canada’s	
international	human	rights	obligations.”107
	 In	Oakes,	Chief	Justice	Dickson	writing	for	a	unanimous	court,	understood	
that	section	1	of	the	Charter	has	a	dual	function.	On	the	one	hand,	“it	guarantees	
the	rights	and	freedoms	set	out	in	the	provisions	which	follow	it.”108		On	the	other	
hand,	 “it	 states	 explicitly	 the	 exclusive	 justificatory	 criteria	 (outside	 of	 section	
33	 of	 the	Constitutional	 Act,	 1982)	 against	 which	 limitations	 on	 those	 rights	
and	 freedoms	may	 be	measured.”109	 	 In	Slaight,	besides	 echoing	 the	 reasons	
of	 Reference	 Re	 Public	 Service	 Employee	 Relations	 Act	 (Alta.),110	 Dickson	 CJ	
stressed	that:	
[g]iven	 the	dual	 function	of	 s.	 1	 identified	 in	Oakes,	Canada’s	 international	
human	 rights	 obligations	 should	 inform	 not	 only	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
content	of	the	rights	guaranteed	by	the	Charter	but	also	the	interpretation	of	
what	can	constitute	pressing	and	substantial	s.	1	objectives	which	may	justify	
restrictions	upon	those	rights.	Furthermore,	for	purposes	of	this	stage	of	the	
proportionality	inquiry,	the	fact	that	a	value	has	the	status	of	an	international	
human	right,	either	in	customary	international	law	or	under	a	treaty	to	which	
Canada	 is	a	State	Party,	 should	generally	be	 indicative	of	a	high	degree	of	
importance	attached	to	that	objective.111
	
106.	 See	Bailey,	“Deflating	the	Michelin	Man,”	supra	note	14	at	p.	145.	Bailey	refers	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Canada	decision	in	Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v N.A.P.E.,	2004	SCC	66,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.
ca/en/2004/2004scc66/2004scc66.html>,	2004:3	Supreme Court Reports	381.	The	four-step	test,	however,	
was	originally	prescribed	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	R v Oakes (Can	SC	1986),	<http://scc.lexum.
umontreal.ca/en/1986/1986rcs1-103/1986rcs1-103.pdf>,	1986:1	Supreme Court Reports	103	[Oakes,	cited	to	
Supreme Court Reports].	It	consists	of	2	core	criteria,	the	second	of	which	is	divided	in	3	subsets:	
	 Two	central	criteria	must	be	satisfied	to	establish	that	a	limit	is	reasonable	and	demonstrably	justified	
in	a	free	and	democratic	society.	First,	the	objective	to	be	served	by	the	measures	limiting	a	Charter	
right	 must	 be	 sufficiently	 important	 to	 warrant	 overriding	 a	 constitutionally	 protected	 right	 or	
freedom.	The	standard	must	be	high	 to	ensure	 that	 trivial	objectives	or	 those	discordant	with	 the	
principles	of	a	free	and	democratic	society	do	not	gain	protection.	At	a	minimum,	an	objective	must	
relate	to	societal	concerns	which	are	pressing	and	substantial	in	a	free	and	democratic	society	before	
it	can	be	characterized	as	sufficiently	important.	Second,	the	party	invoking	s.	1	must	show	the	means	
to	be	 reasonable	and	demonstrably	 justified.	This	 involves	a	 form	of	proportionality	 test	 involving	
three	 important	 components.	 To	 begin,	 the	 measures	 must	 be	 fair	 and	 not	 arbitrary,	 carefully	
designed	to	achieve	the	objective	in	question	and	rationally	connected	to	that	objective.	In	addition,	
the	 means	 should	 impair	 the	 right	 in	 question	 as	 little	 as	 possible.	 Lastly,	 there	 must	 be	 a	
proportionality	between	the	effects	of	the	limiting	measure	and	the	objective	--	the	more	severe	the	
deleterious	effects	of	a	measure,	the	more	important	the	objective	must	be.
		 See	Oakes	at	pp.	105–106.
107.	 Bailey,	“Deflating	the	Michelin	Man,”	supra	note	14	at	p.	133.
108.	 Oakes,	supra	note	106	at	p.	105.	That	would	be	the	case,	for	instance,	of	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	
(s.2(d)),	as	seen	above.
109.	 Oakes,	supra	note	106	at	p.	105.
110.	 Re PSERA,	supra	note	101.
111.	 Slaight, supra	note	101	at	pp.	1056–1057.
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Hence,	we	see	that	an	assessment	of	the	boundaries	of	the	Copyright	Act	and	
its	 intended	 reform	 in	 light	 of	 section	 1	 of	 the	Charter	 would	 be	 incomplete	
without	a	thorough	understanding	of	how	the	values	and	principles	entrenched	
in	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system	 may	 help	 to	 shape	 users’	 rights	 in	
Canada.	As	 restated	by	Dickson	CJ	 in	R	v	Keegstra,	 the	norms	that	flow	from	
such	system	“reflect	the	values	and	principles	of	a	free	and	democratic	society,	
and	thus	the	values	and	principles	that	underlie	the	Charter	itself.”112		They	are	
part	of	the	“scattered	prophecies”	of	the	path	of	Canadian	law,	they	are	virtually	
within	it,	and	even	though	not	expressly	acknowledged	by	the	Supreme	Court	
in	 the	trilogy,	 it	 is	very	 likely	 that	 they	were	at	 least	subliminally	considered	 in	
those	cases,	as	they	have	been	generally	considered	by	the	copyright	community	
around	the	world,	and	even	by	the	common	man,	who	increasingly	acknowledges	
that	there	might	be	something	wrong	with	a	system	which	rejects	things	that	the	
general	public	would	normally	understand	as	fair;	that	the	general	public	would	
normally	understand	to	be	“rights.”
	 To	understand	what	“rights”	are	would	be	 too	complex	a	venture	 for	
the	 limits	 of	 this	work.	My	 less	 ambitious	quest	 in	 the	next	 section	will	 be	 to	
answer	a	simpler	question,	which	is:	are	users’	rights	human	rights?		I	will	do	so	
by	analysing	a	growing	creature	in	the	human	rights	narrative:	the	so-called	right	
of	access	to	knowledge.
*
4. ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE: HUMAN RIGHT OR MYTHICAL BEAST?
it was his last leCture. Overcoming	his	 life-long	blindness,	 James	W.	Harris	of	
University	of	Oxford’s	Faculty	of	Law	has	achieved	a	 rare	position	 in	 the	 legal	
scholar’s	pantheon.	His	remarkable	works	on	both	property	law	and	jurisprudence	
will	 fill	 in,	 for	many	generations,	 the	empty	space	 that	his	esteemed	presence	
now	leaves	among	his	disciples.	Terminally	ill,	Harris	rose	from	his	deathbed	to	
address	a	vast	audience	with	his	hindmost	academic	words,	which	would	later	be	
transformed	 into	 a	 groundbreaking	 article	 published	 in	 the	 respected	 Law	
Quarterly	Review.113	Harris	sought	to	portray	the	ontology	of	human	rights.	Like	
a	zoologist	explaining	the	difference	between	a	mythical	creature	and	a	species	
found	 in	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 natural	 world,	 Harris	 shined	 in	 contradicting	 a	 not	
infrequent	suspicion	with	respect	to	human	rights:	that	of	ghostliness.114
Reflecting	upon	his	theory,	I	will	try,	by	the	end	of	this	section,	to	have	
accomplished	at	least	a	fraction	of	Harris’s	feat	in	portraying	what	I	will	call	a	multi-
layered	background	for	the	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	Understanding	
the	ontology	of	this	right	and	grasping	its	ethical	and	conventional	dimensions	
in	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 framework,	 will	 enable	 us	 to	 recognize	 its	
connection	with	 the	 recent	 decisions	 of	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Canada	 in	 the	
112.	 R v Keegstra,	1990	SCC	24,	<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1996/1996rcs1-458/1996rcs1-458.pdf>,	1990:3	
Supreme Court Reports	697	at	p.	750	(emphasis	added).
113.	 James	W	Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	(2004)	120:3	Law Quarterly Review	428–456.
114.	 The	original	words	were	“spookiness”	for	the	adjective,	and	“spooks”	for	the	noun.	Such	eccentricity	might	
be	allowed	to	Harris.	However,	alerted	by	the	marvellous	work	of	Philip	Roth	in	his	The Human Stain	
(Houghton	Mifflin,	2000),	I	will	rephrase	my	wording	to	“ghostliness”	and	“ghosts.”
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trilogy	–	and	the	 immediate	consequences	that	 follow	from	the	recognition	of	
users’	rights	as	human	rights.
First,	 however,	 I	 will	 turn	 my	 attention	 to	 an	 unsuspected	 class	 of	
ghosts	that	has	long	since	been	haunting	the	international	human	rights	system:	
intellectual	property	rights.	My	ultimate	goal	in	the	next	section	will	be	to	expel	
this	 ghostly	 class	 from	 a	 place	 where	 it	 does	 not	 belong.	 The	 most	 obvious	
reason	for	doing	so	 is	 that	 intellectual	property	rights’	holders,	 in	general,	are	
not	 merely	 humans.	 Mostly,	 they	 are	 fantastic	 entities	 whose	 core	 business	
is	 not	 that	 of	 authorship,	 but	 that	 of	 ownership	 and	 trade.115	 This	 idea	might	
subdue	any	favourable	arguments	to	the	understanding	of	intellectual	property	
rights	as	human	rights,	and	conversely,	might	contribute	to	our	understanding	
of	the	clearly	stronger	status	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	in	the	human	
rights	 system.	 If	 copyright	 is	 not	 a	 human	 right,	 eventual	 limits	 for	 a	 right	 of	
access	 to	 knowledge	 shall	 not	be	 strictly	 found	within	 the	 context	of	 national	
or	international	intellectual	property	instruments,	but	mostly	extracted	from	the	
holistic	framework	of	the	international	human	rights	system	–	as	proposed	in	the	
sections	above.
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
4.1. Is Copyright a Human Right?
There	is	a	growing	trend	towards	studying	the	impacts	of	 intellectual	property	
rights	 on	other	 rights	 protected	by	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system.	As	
picturesquely	noted	by	Laurence	Helfer,	“[h]uman	rights	and	intellectual	property,	
two	 bodies	 of	 law	 that	 were	 once	 strangers,	 are	 now	 becoming	 increasingly	
intimate	bedfellows.”116		That	is	not	to	say	they	live	in	peace,	that	they	do	not	
have	a	troubled	relationship,	or	that	they	live	in	such	an	in-depth	alliance	that	we	
can	perceive	a	great	measure	of	unity	or	identity	between	them.	In	effect,	such	
a	marriage	has	not	been	exactly	happy,	and	only	in	very	rare	circumstances	have	
both	bodies	of	law	happened	to	conjoin	into	a	single	one.
In	 spite	 of	 that,	 some	 intellectual	 property	 scholars	 insist	 on	 rushing	
towards	 the	conclusion	 that	 copyright	 is	 a	human	 right.	 In	general,	 they	 look	at	
Article	27(2)	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,117	then	at	Article	15(1)(c)	
of	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,118	and	finally	
conclude	that	the	“right	to	benefit	from	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	
interests	resulting	from	any	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he	is	the	
author”	(which	is	similarly	set	down	in	both	instruments)	is	a	human	right.	That	is	
exactly	what	Ysolde	Gendreau	does	in	her	“Copyright	and	Freedom	of	Expression	
in	Canada,”	saying	that	“in	this	light	[referring	to	the	articles	above],	copyright	has	
become	a	human	right	equal	to	freedom	of	expression.”119
115.	 Let	us	not	forget	that	only	in	rare	and	bizarre	occasions	can	a	legal	entity	be	considered	the	author	of	a	
work	–	as	it	is	the	case	of	photographic	works	in	Canada,	which	are	considered	to	be	authored	by	the	owner	
of	the	plate	of	the	photograph,	according	to	s.10(2)	of	the	Copyright Act:	see Copyright Act, supra	note	15	
at	s.	10(2).
116.	 Laurence	Helfer,	“Human	Rights	and	Intellectual	Property:	Conflict	or	Coexistence?”	(2003)	5:1	Minnesota 
Intellectual Property Review	47-62	<http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n1/Helfer.pdf>	at	p.47.
117.	 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,	UN	Doc.	A/810	(1948)	71,	<http://www.udhr.org/UDHR/udhr.HTM>	[UDHR].
118.	 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	(16	December	1966),	<http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/intlinst.htm>,	993	United Nations Treaty Series (entry	into	force	3	January	1976,	accession	by	
Canada	19	May	1976)	[ICESCR].
119.	 Gendreau,	“Copyright	and	Freedom	of	Expression,”	supra	note	22	at	p.	22.	
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This	 conclusion,	 however,	 does	 not	 follow	 so	 clearly	 from	 a	 literal	
interpretation	 of	 those	 provisions.	 Nothing	 which	 is	 written	 in	 those	 articles	
seems	to	 lead	us	 to	the	understanding	that	 the	current	expression	of	copyright	
and	paracopyright	provisions	in	international	law	were	envisioned	by	the	drafters	
of	 those	 articles.	 First,	 the	 provisions	 speak	 of	 “interests	 resulting	 from	 any	…	
production,”	while	 intellectual	property	 rights	are	known	to	result	 from	the	 law.	
Different	from	the	right	to	life,	the	right	not	to	be	tortured,	or	the	right	to	freedom	
of	expression,	 intellectual	property	 rights	do	not	exist	 in	 nature.	Copyright	 is	 a	
“creature	of	statute,”	said	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada;120	it	is	an	artificial	creation	
of	law	to	cope	with	something	that	in	economics	is	called	“a	market	failure.”121		As	
famously	noted	by	Thomas	Jefferson	in	his	letter	to	Isaac	McPherson:
If	nature	has	made	any	one	thing	less	susceptible	than	all	others	of	exclusive	
property,	 it	 is	 the	 action	 of	 the	 thinking	 power	 called	 an	 idea,	 which	 an	
individual	may	exclusively	possess	as	long	as	he	keeps	it	to	himself	;	but	the	
moment	it	is	divulged,	it	forces	itself	into	the	possession	of	every	one,	and	the	
receiver	cannot	dispossess	himself	of	it.	Its	peculiar	character,	too,	is	that	no	
one	possesses	the	less,	because	every	other	possesses	the	whole	of	it.	He	who	
receives	an	idea	from	me,	receives	instruction	himself	without	lessening	mine;	
as	he	who	lights	his	taper	at	mine,	receives	light	without	darkening	me.	That	
ideas	should	freely	spread	from	one	to	another	over	the	globe,	for	the	moral	
and	mutual	instruction	of	man,	and	improvement	of	his	condition,	seems	to	
have	been	peculiarly	and	benevolently	designed	by	nature,	when	she	made	
them,	like	fire,	expansible	over	all	space,	without	lessening	their	density	in	any	
point,	and	like	the	air	in	which	we	breathe,	move,	and	have	our	physical	being,	
incapable	of	confinement	or	exclusive	appropriation.	Inventions	then	cannot,	
in	nature,	be	a	subject	of	property.	Society	may	give	an	exclusive	right	to	the	
profits	arising	from	them,	as	an	encouragement	to	men	to	pursue	ideas	which	
may	produce	utility,	but	this	may	or	may	not	be	done,	according	to	the	will	
and	convenience	of	the	society,	without	claim	or	complaint	from	anybody.122
Second,	the	provisions	speak	of	‘authors,’	whereas	intellectual	property	
rights,	as	argued	above,	increasingly	belong	to	corporations	–	which	do	not	author	
works,	but	merely	own	them	in	the	context	of	trade.	Third,	while	the	provision	
120.	 Compo v Blue Crest	,	supra	note	11	at	p.	373.
121.	 This	is	true,	of	course,	for	those	who	consider	that	circulation	of	knowledge	is	a	market	failure	or,	in	other	
words,	for	those	who	consider	that	the	flow	of	knowledge	is	increased	when	we	have	strong	copyright	
provisions.	The	problem	of	market	failure	arises	when	the	hidden	hand	of	the	market	does	not	operate	with	
efficiency	in	the	allocation	and	production	of	resources,	which	is	particularly	sensed	in	the	case	of	non-rival	
goods,	such	as	immaterial	goods,	whose	possession	by	one	person	does	not	preclude	possession	by	other	
persons,	making	parasitic	appropriation	easier.	See	Tyler	Cowen,	ed.,	Public Goods and Market Failure: A 
Critical Examination	(Transaction	Publishers,	1992).	See	also	Bart	Verspagen,	“Intellectual	Property	Rights	in	
the	World	Economy”	in	Ove	Granstand,	ed.,	Economics, Law and Intellectual Property: Seeking Strategies 
for Research and Teaching in a Developing Field	(Kluwer	Academic	Press,	2003)	489–518	at	p.	495.	See	also	
Keith	E	Maskus	and	Jerome	H	Reichman,	“The	Globalization	of	Private	Knowledge	Goods	and	the	
Privatization	of	Global	Public	Goods,”	in	Keith	E.	Maskus	and	Jerome	H.	Reichman,	eds.,	International 
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology: Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime	(Cambridge	
University	Press,	2005)	3–45,	<http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/search?fulltext=Maskus>	at	p.	8.	See	also	
John	Buckley,	Telecommunications Regulation	(The	Institute	of	Electrical	Engineers,	2003)	at	p.	11.
122.	 Thomas	Jefferson,	“Letter	to	Isaac	McPherson”	in	Andrew	A	Lipscomb	and	Albert	Ellery	Bergh,	ed.	The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson	13:	1903-1904 (Thomas	Jefferson	Memorial	Association	of	America,	1903–
1904),	<http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff13.txt>	at	p.	333–334	(emphasis	added).	If	it	is	much	of	a	common	
place	to	quote	this	excerpt	from	Jefferson	in	scholarly	publications,	perhaps	it	is	so	because	no	text	
parallels	the	eloquence	of	his	words	to	portray	this	reality.
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does	not	speak	of	any	exclusive	right,	copyright	is	a	temporary	monopoly,	during	
which	no	one	else	can	use,	exploit	or	dispose	of	the	work	of	an	owner	without	
his	consent.	Hence,	 it	 follows	that	any	other	benefit	that	accrued	for	a	person	
in	result	of	her	creation123	would	also	fit	those	dispositions	–	as	much	as	would,	
simply,	a	negative	obligation	of	the	state	or	its	citizens	not	to	interfere	with	the	
regular	exploitation	of	a	work	by	its	author.	This,	from	a	literal	interpretation,	does	
not	necessarily	include	the	obligation	of	others	not	to	use,	exploit	or	dispose	of	
the	work	at	the	same	time	as	the	author.
Other	 authors	 extract	 from	 the	 drafting	 history	 of	 those	 dispositions,	
information	 that	 is	 clearly	 not	 reflected	 in	 them,	 and	 thus	 understand	 that	
copyright	 is	 a	 human	 right.	 Paul	 Torremans,	 for	 instance,	 after	 assessing	 the	
text	of	 the	UDHR	and	the	 ICESCR,	as	well	as	the	discussions	preceding	them,	
concluded	that	“copyright	really	has	a	claim	to	human	rights	status,”	that	“there	
clearly	is	a	basis	for	such	a	claim	in	the	international	human	rights	instruments,”	
although	“the	copyright	clauses	do	not	define	the	substance	of	copyright	in	any	
detail,”	and	such	claim	is	“relatively	…	weak,”	as	the	inclusion	of	copyright	in	the	
international	human	rights	instruments	“proved	to	be	highly	controversial.”124
Torreman’s	 reasoning	which	 leads	 to	 this	 conclusion	draws	 substantially	
upon	an	article	by	Maria	Green,	a	professor	of	human	rights	at	Brandeis	University,	
which	was	submitted	as	a	background	paper	on	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR	for	a	
day	of	general	discussion	at	the	UN’s	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	
Rights.125		In	her	paper,	Green	shows	that	in	the	discussions	that	led	to	the	current	
wording	of	both	instruments	there	was	no	opposition	with	respect	to	the	right	of	
access,	as	this	article	is	going	to	examine	soon.	However,	with	respect	to	authors’	
rights	the	discussion	“was	more	fraught,	and	more	complex,”	she	says.126	Strangely,	
in	the	debates	concerning	both	instruments,	the	most	enthusiastic	supporters	of	
authors’	rights	were	developing	countries	from	Latin	America.127
With	respect	to	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR,	the	original	proposition	
failed	 being	 approved	 in	 the	 two	 pertinent	 sessions	 of	 the	 Commission	 on	
Human	Rights.	It	was	then	reintroduced	by	Uruguay	in	the	General	Assembly’s	
twelfth	session	discussions,	which	took	place	in	late	1957.	The	Czechoslovakia’s	
representative	at	the	Assembly	said	“[s]he	was	puzzled	by	the	sponsors’	motives	
in	 submitting	 their	 amendment,”	 arguing	 that	 “if	 they	 found	 the	 existing	
agreements	on	the	subject	unsatisfactory,	it	was	difficult	to	see	why	they	had	not	
123.	 A	grant	in	money,	for	instance.
124.	 Paul	C.	Torremans,	“Copyright	as	a	Human	Right”	in	Paul	L.C.	Torremans,	ed.,	Copyright and Human Rights: 
Freedom of Expression – Intellectual Property – Privacy”	(Kluwer	Law,	2004)		1–20	at	p.	9.
125.	 United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Council,	“Drafting	History	of	the	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	International	
Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,”	(9	October	2000),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
872a8f7775c9823cc1256999005c3088?Opendocument>,	E/C.	12/2000/15,	[ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History”].
126.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra note	125	at		para.	5.
127.	 Control	of	developing	countries	by	the	United	States’	foreign	policy	is	not	rare.	In	the	last	minute	of	the	2nd	
session	of	WIPO’s	Provisional	Committee	for	a	Development	Agenda,	as	discussed	bellow,	Kyrgyzstan,	
former	country	of	the	extinct	USSR,	for	undisclosed	reasons,	introduced	a	proposal	which	was	contrary	to	
that	of	the	13	countries	that	form	the	so-called	Group	of	the	Friends	of	Development,	and	identical	to	that	
of	the	WIPO’s	Chairman,	which,	quite	interestingly,	was	also	very	similar	to	that	of	the	United	States.	The	
result	is	that	the	minimalist	Chairman’s	proposal	will	then	be	assessed	by	WIPO’s	General	Assembly,	as	a	
proposal	of	a	member	country.	See	Pedro	de	Paranagua	Moniz,	“OMPI:	Reuniao	Encerrada	com	Tensao”	
available	at	<http://www.culturalivre.org.br/index.php?	option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Ite
mid=58>	It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	during	the	debates	which	led	to	the	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR,	
the	United	States,	represented	by	Eleanor	Roosevelt,	made	strong	opposition	to	the	inclusion	of	a	provision	
on	authors’	rights,	which	were	reputed	as	“too	complex	to	be	dealt	with	in	the	Covenant	[…].”	ECOSOC,	
“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	129	at	para.	28.
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insisted	on	a	full	debate	on	what	was	a	very	delicate	and	complicated	question,	
instead	of	trying	to	push	through	a	hastily	drafted	and	unsatisfactory	text,	which	
might	well	be	misinterpreted”128	–	as	seems	to	have	been	the	case,	almost	fifty	
years	later,	when	some	scholars	insist	upon	reading	something	that	is	not	written	
on	the	Covenant’s	text.
Some	points	are	quite	interesting	to	note,	as	they	seem	to	meet	our	observations	
above	with	 respect	 to	a	supposed	human	rights	status	of	copyright.	First,	as	
per	Green’s	account,	we	see	that	the	language	used	in	the	ICESCR	discussions	
concerned	 the	 human	 rights	 nature	 of	 authors’	 rights,	 and	 not	 merely	 of	
copyrights.	In	this	sense,	in	the	first	of	both	related	sessions	of	the	Commission	
on	Human	Rights,	 “[t]he	UNESCO	delegation	considered	 that	 recognition	of	
authors’	rights	should	find	a	place	in	the	Covenant,	since	it	had	already	been	
included	 in	 the	 Universal	 Declaration[...].”129	 Also,	 “[t]he	 French	 delegation,	
which	 was	 strongly	 pushing	 the	 authors’	 rights	 language,	 argued	 that	 ‘[t]he	
relevant	passages	…	merely	stressed	that	the	moral	and	material	 interests	of	
persons	 taking	 part	 in	 cultural	 and	 scientific	 life	 should	 be	 safeguarded.”130	
In	 the	 second	 of	 those	 sessions,	 the	 French	 delegation	 remarked	 that	 “the	
scientist	and	artist	had	a	moral	right	to	the	protection	of	his	work.”131		Later	on,	
in	the	General	Assembly	(Third	Committee)	Twelfth	Session,	reintroducing	the	
discussion	which	had	been	overcome	in	the	Commission’s	two	prior	sessions,	
Uruguay’s	 delegates	 stated	 that	 it	 “considered	 that	 a	 reference	 to	 author’s	
copyright	was	imperative,”	and	that	“the	right	of	the	author	and	the	right	of	
the	public	were	not	opposed	to	but	complemented	each	other.”132	Following	
Uruguay,	 Israel	 pointed	 out	 that	 “[i]t	 would	 be	 impossible	 to	 give	 effective	
encouragement	to	the	development	of	culture	unless	the	rights	of	authors	and	
scientists	 were	 protected.”133	 Dominican	 Republic	 also	 noted	 the	 need	 “to	
ensure	 that	men	and	women	 should	enjoy	 the	 fruits	 of	 their	 intellectual	 and	
artistic	efforts	 […],”	and,	 inclusively,	 the	need	 to	avoid	piracy	or	exploitation	
“by	unprincipled	editors	and	publishers.”134		Hence,	as	Green	observes:	
[i]n	all	cases…	it	is	noticeable	that	the	drafters	appeared	to	be	thinking	almost	
exclusively	 of	 authors	 as	 individuals.	 Perhaps	 it	 was	 obvious	 from	 the	 fact	
that	this	was	a	“human	rights”	treaty,	but	the	drafters	do	not	seem	to	have	
been	thinking	in	terms	of	the	corporation-held	patent,	or	the	situation	where	
the	creator	is	simply	an	employee	of	the	entity	that	holds	the	patent	or	the	
copyright.135
Second,	having	in	mind	that	some	protection	was	envisioned	for	authors,	
from	 the	 cacophony	 of	 discourses	 that	 preceded	 the	 final	 adoption	 of	 the	
Covenant	it	does	not	follow	that	such	protection	need	necessarily	mean	copyright.	
	
128.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	40	(emphasis	added).
129.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	21	(emphasis	added).
130.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	22	(emphasis	added).
131.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	27	(emphasis	added).
132.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	35	(emphasis	added).
133.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	38	(emphasis	added).
134.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	38	(emphasis	added).
135.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	45.
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Green	 observes	 that	Article	 15(1)(c)	 “does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 been	written	 as	
an	 intentional	 limit	on	 the	 rights	of	all	 to	benefit.”136	 	Hence,	as	noted	above,	
another	kind	of	grant,	or	simply	the	abstention	of	state	parties	from	depriving	
authors	of	the	right	to	exploit	their	work,	followed	by	negative	correlative	duties	
of	 its	citizens,	could	very	well	meet	 the	wording	of	 that	disposition.	This	 rests	
even	more	evident	when	one	observes	the	context	 in	which	the	provision	was	
approved.	Green	points	out	that	states	of	the	Eastern	Bloc	wanted	to	include	a	
limitation	on	Article	15(1)(b)	–	the	right	to	enjoy	the	benefits	of	scientific	progress	
and	its	applications,	registering	that	such	right	should	take	place	“in	the	interest	
of	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	cooperation	among	nations[…].”		Hence,	she	
says,	“the	subtext	to	the	entire	discussion	was	the	issue	of	government	control	
over	science	and	art,	and	scientists	and	artists.”137
Third,	we	can	see	that	 if	copyright	has	a	claim	to	being	a	human	right	
–	 in	 which,	 with	 due	 respect,	 I	 do	 not	 agree	 with	 Torremans,	 it	 would	 have,	
as	he	acknowledges,	a	 lower	 status	 than	 that	of	 the	human	 right	of	access	 to	
knowledge.	This	is	clearly	reflected	in	the	much	discussed	presence	of	authors’	
rights	in	the	ICESCR,	and,	conversely,	in	the	pacific	acceptance	of	the	presence	
of	users’	rights	in	it	from	the	beginning.
ES	 Nwauche	 brings	 a	 different	 and	 attractive	 argument.	 He	 raises	 a	
clever	 distinction	 between	 intellectual	 property	 rights,	 which	would	 be	 trade-
related	rights,	and	what	he	calls	a	right	to	intellectual	property,	which	would	be	a	
human	right.	This	distinction,	although	with	a	different	“branding,”	is	very	close	
to	 the	Committee	on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights’	 view	with	 respect	
to	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICSECR,	reflected	in	its	General	Comment	17,138	which	
I	will	examine,	below.	For	Nwauche,	whereas	“the	right	to	intellectual	property	
represents	 the	 ideal	 …,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 represent	 national	 and	
international	manifestations	of	the	right	to	intellectual	property,	albeit	in	different	
degrees.	 Accordingly,	 what	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 ‘tension’	 between	 intellectual	
property	and	human	rights	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	intellectual	property	rights	in	
question	may	not	correctly	manifest	the	right	to	intellectual	property.”139
What	is	important	to	note	here	is	that,	according	to	Nwauche,	the	human	
right	to	intellectual	property,	as	he	calls	it,	would	not	coincide	with	the	property	
right	per	se.	I	agree	with	Nwauche	that	we	could	think	of	a	framework	with	two	
different	instances,	although	I	disagree	with	the	terminology	he	uses.	Those	two	
instances,	as	he	proposes,	would	be	that	of	intellectual	property	law	as	defined	
in	international	treaties,	among	them	those	that	deal	with	copyright;	and,	that	of	
the	human	right	to	benefit	from	the	protection	of	interests.	The	former	instance	
(intellectual	property	rights)	would	detail	in	a	more	refined	level	the	rights	that	
can	find	their	 root	 in	 the	 latter	 (the	right	 to	 intellectual	property).	 In	 the	 latter	
instance,	 the	 right	 to	 intellectual	 property	 would	 find	 a	 balance	 between	 the	
136.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History”,	supra	note	125	at	para.	46	(emphasis	added).
137.	 ECOSOC,	“Drafting	History,”	supra	note	125	at	para.	42.
138.	 United	Nations	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	“The	right	of	everyone	to	benefit	from	
the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	resulting	from	any	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	
of	which	he	or	she	is	the	author	(Article	15,	paragraph	1	(c),	of	the	Covenant):	General	Comment	No.	17	
(2005)”	(12	January	2006),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.GC.17.En?OpenDocument>,	
UN	Doc.	E/C.12/GC/17	[ECOSOC,	General Comment	No.	17	(2005)].	For	the	Committee	the	right	to	
benefit,	as	reflected	in	Article	15(1)(c),	would	be	one	thing,	and	intellectual	property	rights	would	be	other.
139.	 Nwauche,	“Human	Rights,”	supra	note	22	at	p.	468.	
	 Property	Enforcement	or	Retrogressive	Measure?	 193(2007)	4:1&2		UOLTJ	163
different	subsections	of	Article	15(1)	of	the	ICESCR,	which	reads:
1.	 The	States	Parties	recognize	the	right	of	everyone:
	 (a)		To	take	part	in	cultural	life;
	 (b)		To	enjoy	the	benefits	of	scientific	progress	and	its	applications;
	 (c)		To	benefit	from	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests		
	 	 resulting	from	any	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he		
	 	 is	the	author.140
That	 is	 to	 say,	according	 to	him,	 subsection	 (c),	which	deals	with	 the	
private	reward	component	of	the	right	to	intellectual	property,	and	subsection	
(b),	which	deals	with	the	public	benefits	(an	unintended	omission	of	subsection	
(a),	I	suppose)	of	science	and	its	applications	would	constitute	the	core	of	the	
right	to	intellectual	property.	The	balance	among	these	different	components	
would	be	inherent	to	such	a	right.	There	would	be	an	“equal	priority”	among	
them,	 none	 of	 which	 would	 be	 superior	 to	 the	 others.141	 With	 respect	 to	
intellectual	property	rights,	conversely,	such	a	balance	would	not	be	inherent,	
but,	as	I	would	name	it,	accidental.	As	Nwauche	observes:
The	nature	of	 [the]	balance	 in	 intellectual	property	 regimes	varies.	 In	many	
instances	…	it	is	in	favour	of	the	rights	of	the	author	and	inventor,	(for	example	
in	TRIPS	…,	and	also	in	many	national	intellectual	property	regimes).	Thus	the	
common	model	 of	 national	 intellectual	 property	 regimes	 is	 such	 that	while	
the	 rights	 of	 authors/inventors	 are	 elaborated	 in	 detail,	 the	 public	 benefit	
component	 of	 these	 regimes	 is	 found	 in	 exceptions	 and	 limitations…,	 in	
certain	restricted	cases	which	are	often	restrictively	interpreted…	In	fact	it	can	
be	argued	that	the	twin	components	of	article	15(1)	and	its	defining	feature	of	
equality	represents	the	utopia	which	intellectual	property	rights	regimes	with	
its	unequal	characteristic	should	strive	to	attain.142
The	question	of	a	balance	between	authors’	 rights	and	users’	 rights	 is	
crucial	to	our	discussion,	and	I	will	turn	to	it	with	more	detail	in	the	next	session.	
Nwauche’s	theory	is	very	eloquent	in	portraying	an	important	difference	between	
the	 rights	 present	 at	Article	 15(1)	 and	 intellectual	 property	 rights.	 Yet,	 I	must	
disagree	with	his	proposition	pertaining	to	the	terminology.	For	the	reasons	seen	
above	with	respect	to	the	drafting	history	of	the	ICESCR,	I	do	not	see	that	we	can	
speak	of	a	right	to	intellectual	property	as	something	present	in	the	ICESCR.	The	
right	to	benefit	does	not	necessarily	mean,	for	instance,	the	right	to	copyright.	
Speaking	of	 a	 right	 to	 intellectual	 property	 expresses	 a	 necessary	 situation	 in	
which	 such	 right	 might	 unfold	 into	 an	 intellectual	 property	 right	 –	 whenever	
the	 intellectual	property	 system	correspondingly	 succeeds	 in	 striking	 the	 right	
balance	between	authors’	and	users’	rights.	However,	if	that	was	the	intention	of	
the	drafters,	that	would	be	said	in	the	text,	or	at	least	would	have	prevailed	in	the	
discussions	which	led	to	it.	And	this	was	not	the	case.
One	might	notice	 that	Nwache’s	proposition	 is	extremely	close	 to	 the	
wording	of	Article	17	of	the	UDHR,	which	prescribes	the	human	rights	status	of	the	
140.	 ICESCR,	supra	note	118,	art.	15(1).
141.	 Nwauche,	“Human	Rights,”	supra	note	22	at	p.470.	
142.	 Nwauche,	“Human	Rights,”	supra	note	22	at	pp.470-471.	
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right	to	own	property.143		One	could	also	argue	that	property	rights,	as	set	down	
in	many	codifications	around	 the	world,	are	 too	severe	and	would	not	exactly	
meet	the	UDHR’s	definition.	It	is	curious,	however,	that	the	right	to	own	property	
was	not	transposed	either	to	the	ICESCR	or	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	
and	Political	Rights	–	ICCPR.	This	was	a	result	of	the	contingencies	under	which	
both	instruments	were	approved,	and	of	the	strong	debates	between	Western	
states	and	socialist	 states,	which	were	also	well	 reflected	 in	 the	discussions	of	
Article	15(1)(c),	as	seen	above.	As	William	Shabas	points	out:
Western	states	argued	that	attempts	to	include	economic,	social	and	cultural	
rights	in	the	covenant	was	(sic)	merely	a	communist	ruse.	The	socialist	States,	
supported	 by	 allies	 in	 the	 emerging	 underdeveloped	 world,	 refused	 to	
abandon	recognition	of	such	rights.	 In	reply,	 they	argued	that	the	so-called	
liberal	 freedoms	 were	 an	 antiquated	 concept,	 and	 of	 little	 significance	 to	
those	suffering	from	malnutrition,	illiteracy	and	unemployment.	A	compromise	
was	 reached,	 and	 it	 was	 agreed	 to	 divide	 the	 covenant	 into	 two	 distinct	
instruments,	 the	 [ICCPR	and	the	 ICESCR].	…	[T]he	drafters	could	not	agree	
on	how	to	define	and	where	to	put	the	right	to	property,	which	is	article	17	of	
the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	and	they	eventually	omitted	this	
important	right.144
But	 if	the	right	to	own	property	was	not	transposed,	the	right	defined	
in	Article	15(1)(c)	was,	and	this	could	be	enough	to	understand	the	dissociation	
between	both.145		Yet,	this	is	not	to	say	that	a	perfectly	balanced	form	of	intellectual	
property	would	not	meet	Article	15(1)(c),	as	can	be	the	case.146		What	I	do	not	
agree	with	is	the	proposition	that	an	intellectual	property	right	might	necessarily	
follow	from	such	an	Article,	as	it	is	implied	in	the	diction	of	a	right	to	intellectual	
property	–	as	much	as	a	property	right	is	implied	in	the	diction	of	a	right	to	own	
property.	This	conclusion	would	be	further	reinforced	by	an	assessment	of	the	
completely	different	wordings	of	Articles	17	and	27(2)	o	 f	 the	UHDR,	and	 the	
consequent	understanding	that	 if	they	were	 like	rights,	they	should	have	been	
written	in	a	like	manner.
All	this	discussion	now	comes	a	latere	to	the	Committee	on	Economic,	
Social	 and	Cultural	Rights’	 view	on	Article	15(1)(c)	of	 the	 ICESCR,	 reflected	 in	
its	“General	Comment	No.	17,”	as	finally	adopted	on	November	21,	2005.	The	
words	used	by	the	Committee,	which	is	the	United	Nations’	body	that	administers	
the	ICESCR,	are	striking	in	sharply	defining	the	theoretical	boundaries	between	
intellectual	property	rights	and	the	human	right	in	comment.	I	will	refer	again	to	
143.	 UDHR,	supra	note	117,	art.	17.
144.	 William	Shabas,	International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter	(Carswell,	1996)	at	p.	66.
145.	 This	is	not	to	say	that	the	right	to	own	property	is	not	a	human	right	–	even	existing	a	strong	discussion	with	
respect	to	the	human	rights	status	of	the	right	to	property:	see	James	W.	Harris,	“Is	Property	a	Human	
Right?”	in	Janet	McLean,	ed.,	Property and the Constitution	(Hart	Publishing,	1999)	64–87.	I	do	not	deny	
that	it	is	pacifically	accepted	that	the	UDHR	is	the	single	most	authoritative	source	of	customary	
international	human	rights	law.	See	Shabas,	International Human Rights Law, supra note	144	at	p.	64.
146.	 In	this	sense,	I	agree	with	Elizabeth	Judge	and	Daniel	Gervais	in	their	understanding	of	both	subsections	of	
Article	27	of	the	UDHR.	“As	these	goals	recognize,”	they	say,	“it	is	in	the	public	interest	to	protect	and	
encourage	creation	and	to	protect	and	permit	access	to	creation.	Ideally,	intellectual	property	laws	do	
both.”	See	Judge	and	Gervais,	Intellectual Property, supra	note	17	at	p.	5	(emphasis	added).	Accurately,	the	
authors	do	not	acknowledge	the	human	rights	status	of	intellectual	property	rights,	albeit	Gervais,	when	
writing	alone,	does:	“As	a	human	right,	copyright	has	special	status	and	can	not	easily	be	limited	by	the	
State,	politically	or	legally.”	Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law,” supra	note	7	at	p.	326.
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this	document	when	assessing	the	sources	for	defining	the	human	rights	status	
of	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge.	Here	 I	 stress	 its	main	points	 in	 correctly	
separating	intellectual	property	rights	from	that	of	Article	15(1)(c).	Even	though	
one	might	argue	that	the	general	comments	of	the	Committee	are	not	binding,	
there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 they	 are	 authoritative	 sources	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	
ICESCR	dispositions.147
The	Committee	began	by	stating	very	straightforwardly	that,	as	Article	
15(1)(c)	deals	with	a	“human	 right,	which	derives	 from	 the	 inherent	dignity	
and	worth	of	all	persons,”	this	would	distinguish	it,	and	other	human	rights,	
“from	most	 legal	entitlements	recognized	 in	 intellectual	property	systems;”	
that	“[h]uman	rights	are	fundamental,	 inalienable	and	universal	entitlements	
belonging	to	individuals	and,	under	certain	circumstances,	groups	of	individuals	
and	 communities,”	 and,	 “[i]n	 contrast	 to	 human	 rights,	 intellectual	 property	
rights	 are	 generally	 of	 a	 temporary	 nature,	 and	 can	 be	 revoked,	 licensed	 or	
assigned	to	someone	else.”148	Furthermore,	it	stressed	that:
[w]hereas	 the	human	 right	 to	benefit	 from	 the	protection	of	 the	moral	and	
material	interests	resulting	from	one’s	scientific,	literary	and	artistic	production	
safeguards	 the	 personal	 link	 between	 authors	 and	 their	 creations	 and	
between	peoples,	communities,	or	other	groups	and	their	collective	cultural	
heritage,	as	well	as	their	basic	material	interests	which	are	necessary	to	enable	
authors	to	enjoy	an	adequate	standard	of	living,	intellectual	property	regimes	
primarily	protect	business	and	corporate	interests	and	investments.	Moreover,	
the	 scope	 of	 protection	 of	 the	moral	 and	material	 interests	 of	 the	 author	
provided	for	by	article	15,	paragraph	1(c),	does	not	necessarily	coincide	with	
what	is	referred	to	as	intellectual	property	rights	under	national	legislation	or	
international	agreements.149
Hence,	it	follows	that	in	line	with	my	comments	above,	the	Committee	stated	
that	intellectual	property	rights	do	not	necessarily	derive	from	the	right	defined	
in	the	covenant,	for	reasons	of	three	different	orders.	First,	the	Committee	
noted	the	temporary	and	alienable	nature	of	intellectual	property	rights,	
in	contrast	to	the	fundamentality,	universality	and	inalienability	of	human	
rights.	Second,	the	Committee	noted	that	intellectual	property	rights	do	not	
necessarily	focus	on	persons	and	the	adequate	standards	they	may	demand	
for	a	living,	but	mostly	on	businesses,	corporations	and	their	profits.	Third,	
the	Committee	did	not	link	any	exclusive	right	to	the	right	in	comment,	and	
clearly	distinguished	it	from	intellectual	property	rights	which	are	exclusive	
rights.	Indeed,	further	in	the	General	Comment,	the	Committee	noted	that	
the	protection	granted	by	the	Covenant	need	not	be	equal	in	level	and	
means	with	the	exclusive	rights	ensured	by	intellectual	property	laws,	and	
that	any	strengthening	of	those	laws	by	states	cannot	“unjustifiably	limit	the	
enjoyment	by	others	of	their	rights	under	the	Covenant”150	–	that	is	to	say,	any	
retrogressive	measure	towards	exclusiveness	must	be	justified.	Reinforcing	this	
147.	 Henry	Steiner	and	Philip	Alston,	International Human Rights in Context: law, politics, morals: text and materials	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2000)	at	p.	265	[Steiner	and	Alston,	International Human Rights in Context].	
148.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	2.
149.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	2.
150.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	11	(emphasis	added).
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third	point	it	must	still	be	stressed	that,	speaking	of	the	dependency	of	Article	
15,	paragraph	1	(c)	upon	other	human	rights,	one	of	the	rights	underlined	by	
the	Committee	was	the	right	to	own	property	alone	as	well	as	in	association	
with	others	(Article	17	of	the	UDHR)151	–	a	possible	reference	to	the	dependency	
of	intellectual	property	rights	in	relation	to	an	idea	I	will	further	examine	in	this	
paper:	the	idea	of	a	commons.
However,	with	 respect	 to	 the	 issue	of	exclusive	 rights,	 the	Committee	
pointed	 out	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 close	 linkage	 of	 the	 expression	 “material	
interests”	in	the	text	with	the	right	to	own	property,	and	the	right	of	any	worker	
to	adequate	remuneration,	granting	an	exclusive	right	is	not	the	only	alternative,	
as	 the	 same	 result	 can	 also	be	 achieved	 through	one-time	payments.	 Thus,	 it	
could	seem	that,	contrarily	to	what	I	defended	above,	the	Committee	does	see	
the	 issue	of	 a	positive	 fulfilment	of	 such	a	 right	 as	 something	 inherent	 to	 it	 –	
that	is	to	say,	that	the	mere	abstention	of	the	state	or	its	citizens	from	hindering	
the	exploitation	of	a	work	by	its	authors	would	not	fit	the	normative	content	of	
Article	15,	paragraph	1	(c);	that	an	exclusive	right	or	some	kind	of	payment	for	
the	future	uses	of	a	work	would	be	needed.	Yet,	it	is	not	very	clearly	defined	in	
the	comments	that	these	would	be	the	only	alternatives,	and	this	 is	certainly	a	
subject	for	further	discussion,	as	soon	as	the	right	to	work	or	to	own	property	
derived	from	the	results	of	a	non-exclusive	use	or	exploitation	of	a	copyrighted	
work	could	also	be	deemed	to	meet	such	normative	content.
I	do	not	see	good	musicians	who	license	their	works	under	open	licenses	
such	 as	Creative	Commons’	 failing	 to	 be	 invited	 to	 outstanding	 concerts	 and	
shows;	 likewise,	 I	do	not	see	programmers	who	write	free	software	starving	or	
failing	to	meet	an	adequate	standard	of	living;	nor	do	I	see	academics	who	make	
publicly	available	 the	 results	of	 their	dense	and	demanding	 research	 failing	 to	
be	 invited	 to	 conferences	or	 to	hold	busy	 and	well	paid	positions	 in	 the	best	
universities	 around	 the	world.	 If	more	 is	 desired,	 it	 is	 at	 least	 doubtful	 that	 it	
can	be	 found	within	 the	boundaries	of	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system,	
especially	as	part	of	 the	core	of	states’	obligations	toward	the	human	right	 to	
benefit,	as	defined	in	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR.
Two	 last	 points	 might	 still	 be	 underlined	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 UNESC	
General	 Comment	 No.	 17.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 prohibition	 of	 taking	 retrogressive	
measures	in	relation	to	Article	15(1)(c),	and	the	need	to	distinguish	it	from	any	
prohibition	of	taking	retrogressive	measures	in	relation	to	copyrights.	Paragraph	
27	 of	 the	 General	 Comment	 registers	 that	 “retrogressive	 measures	 taken	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 right	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 moral	 and	material	 interests	 of	
the	 author	 are	 not	 permissible,”	 and	 that	 “[i]f	 any	 deliberately	 retrogressive	
measures	are	 taken,	 the	State	party	has	 the	burden	of	proving	 that	 they	have	
been	introduced	after	careful	consideration	of	all	alternatives	and	that	they	are	
duly	justified	in	light	of	the	totality	of	the	rights	recognized	in	the	Covenant.”152	
As	seen	above,	Daniel	Gervais	argues	that	“[a]s	a	human	right,	copyright	
151.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	4.	
152.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	27.	The	presumption	that	retrogressive	
measures	are	not	permissible	is	defined	in	the	General	Comment	No.	3	of	the	ICESCR,	on	the	nature	of	the	
state	parties	obligations	at	para.	27.	See ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	infra	note	173,	and	
accompanying	text.
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has	special	status	and	can	not	easily	be	limited	by	the	State,	politically	or	legally.”153	
I	should	note,	however,	 that	this	 is	a	safeguard	which	 is	proper	of	the	right	to	
benefit,	as	a	human	right	defined	 in	Article	15(1)(c)	of	 the	 ICESCR,	but	not	of	
copyright,	which	distinguishes	itself	from	such	right,	and	does	not	hold	the	status	
of	a	human	right.	In	this	sense,	if	protecting,	respecting	and	fulfilling	the	human	
right	of	access	to	knowledge,	as	I	will	argue	below,	demands	any	restriction	of	
copyrights	in	themselves,	the	same	presumption	against	retrogressive	measures	
does	not	necessarily	take	place,	as	copyright	does	not	count	upon	such	safeguard,	
which	is	proper	of	human	rights.	Also,	there	is	not	an	inversion	of	any	burden	of	
proof	if	the	restriction	to	copyright	is	not	likely	to	imply	any	retrogressive	measure	
in	relation	to	the	right	defined	in	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	Covenant.
As	a	good	example,	we	can	see	that	the	incorporation	of	any	disposition	
in	Canadian	law	against	the	use	of	technological	protection	measures	(TPMs)	for	
restricting	users’	rights	is	not	likely	to	be	considered	a	violation	of	Article	15(1)
(c).	Even	 though	 it	might	 reflect	a	clear	 retrogressive	measure	with	 respect	 to	
the	current	 international	standards	of	copyright	protection,	as	set	down	 in	the	
WIPO	Internet	Treaties,154	it	does	not	implicate	any	likely	restriction	to	the	right	to	
benefit,	which	must	be	seen	as	inherently	balanced	with	respect	to	users’	rights.	
This	 is	 so	 because	 those	 treaties	 create	 additional	 layers	 of	 protection	 which	
are,	in	themselves,	incompatible	with	the	intrinsic	balance	amongst	the	different	
rights	of	the	Covenant	(including	those	defined	in	Article	15(1)),	and	thus	cannot	
be	understood	as	included	in	the	core	obligations	of	the	states	with	respect	to	
the	 right	 to	 benefit.	 Conversely,	 any	 inclusion	 of	 a	 TPM	provision,	 because	 it	
harms	the	balance	of	the	system,	is	very	likely	to	be	considered	a	retrogressive	
measure	with	respect	to	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	and	must	thus	obey	
all	 the	 safeguards	 comprehended	 in	 the	 presumption	 against	 retrogressive	
measures:	that	is	to	say,	if	the	Canadian	government	intends	to	incorporate	TPM	
provisions	in	its	reform	of	Canadian	copyright	law	it	has	the	burden	of	proving	
“that	they	have	been	introduced	after	careful	consideration	of	all	alternatives	and	
that	they	are	duly	justified	in	the	light	of	the	totality	of	the	rights	recognized	in	
the	Covenant.”155
The	second	point	I	would	like	to	make	intertwines	with	the	first.	On	the	
one	hand,	the	Committee	acknowledges	that	“[t]he	protection	under	Article	15,	
paragraph	1(c),	need	not	necessarily	 reflect	 the	 level	and	means	of	protection	
found	in	present	copyright,	patent	and	other	intellectual	property	regimes;”156	it	
speaks	of	a	dependency	of	Article	15,	paragraph	1(c),	with	respect	to	the	right	
to	own	property	 alone	 as	well	 as	 in	 association	with	others	 –	 that	might	 lead	
to	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 commons;	 and	 it	 admits	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 realization	 of	 the	
right	to	benefit	than	that	of	an	exclusive	right.157		On	the	other	hand,	however,	
in	 paragraph	 31,	 the	Committee	 brings	 a	 comment	 that	 seems	 quite	 hard	 to	
reconcile	with	the	overall	 framework	of	 the	document,	and	 its	underlying	 idea	
153.	 Gervais,	“The	Purpose	of	Copyright	Law,”	supra	note	7.
154.	 WIPO Copyright Treaty (20	December,	1996),	<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/>,	2186	United 
Nations Treaty Series	152	[WCT];	WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (20	December,	1996),	<http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html>,	2186	Nations Treaty Series 245	[WPPT].	These	two	
treaties	are	collectively	referred	to		as	WIPO	Internet	Treaties	[WIPO Internet Treaties].	
155.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005), supra 	note	138	at	para.	27.
156.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138		at	para.	10.
157.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	 at	para.	16.
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that	 the	 right	 to	 benefit,	 as	 set	 down	 in	 Article	 15,	 paragraph	 1(c),	 is	 not	 an	
exclusive	copyright.	In	this	sense,	the	Committee	affirms	that:	
States	 parties	must	 prevent	 the	 unauthorized	 use	 of	 scientific,	 literary	 and	
artistic	productions	which	are	easily	accessible	or	reproducible	through	modern	
communication	and	reproduction	technologies,	e.g.	by	establishing	systems	
of	 collective	 administration	 of	 authors’	 rights	 or	 by	 adopting	 legislation,	
requiring	users	to	 inform	authors	of	any	use	made	of	their	productions	and	
to	remunerate	them	adequately.	States	parties	must	ensure	that	third	parties	
adequately	compensate	authors	for	any	unreasonable	prejudice	suffered	as	a	
consequence	of	the	unauthorized	use	of	their	productions.158
	 The	 correct	 way	 to	 engulf	 such	 provision	 in	 the	 document’s	 general	
framework	must	be	found	out.	One	might	notice	that	the	paragraph	at	least	speaks	
of	authors’,	and	not	of	owners	–	and	thus	it	should	clearly	not	be	understood	as	a	
kind	of	flattery	for	the	recording	industry’s	policies.	Copyright,	with	the	extension	
it	progressively	acquires,	with	all	its	owners,	with	all	its	layers,	with	the	whole	circle	
of	exclusion	and	prohibitions	it	creates,	I	hope	to	have	proved	in	this	chapter,	is	
certainly	not	a	human	right.	In	relation	to	the	international	human	rights	system	
and	its	instruments,	copyright	is	a	progressively	growing	ghost	–	and	we	shall	find	
a	good	spell	to	deal	with	it
4.2. Systematizing the Balance, and the Progressive Realization of Access  
to Knowledge
In	chapter	2	of	 this	paper,	 I	argued	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	 in	the	
trilogy,	 when	 affirming	 the	 principle	 of	 balance	 between	 authors’	 rights	 and	
users’	 rights,	 did	 not	 change	 the	 conception,	 expressed	 in	 prior	 cases,	 that	
copyright	 in	Canada	 is	a	creature	of	 the	statute.	Hence,	 for	all	 that	 it	allowed	
for	 a	 large	 and	 liberal	 interpretation	 of	 users’	 rights,	 it	 was	 only	 within	 the	
boundaries	of	 the	Copyright	Act	 that	 the	announced	principle	of	balance	was	
understood.	In	addition,	judging	by	the	Federal	Court	decision	in	Michelin,	the	
legislative	branch	conserved	a	certain	margin	of	discretion	for	defining	the	way	
those	different	sets	of	rights	are	expected	to	intertwine	within	the	Copyright	Act,	
which	was	considered	to	be	“well	tailored”	and	compatible	with	the	Canadian	
Charter,	 even	without	 receiving	 a	more	 detailed	 appreciation	with	 respect	 to	
its	constitutionality	or	to	its	communication	with	the	international	human	rights	
system.	It	follows	that,	with	respect	to	the	underlying	ratio	and	the	boundaries	
of	 the	Canadian	Copyright	Act,	 the	only	 link	 established	by	 courts	 in	Canada	
was	 with	 the	 international	 intellectual	 property	 system	 and	 the	 proprietary	
logics	of	Berne	and	the	Universal	Copyright	Convention.	 I	 recommended,	that	
the	Copyright	Act	 should	be	read	through	a	human	rights’	 lens,	and	provided	
a	framework	which	allows	us	to	affirm	that	the	rules	of	the	international	human	
rights	system	are	already	present,	albeit	virtually,	within	the	chain	novel	of	our	
common	law	–	and	that	they	form	a	presumption	of	conformity	of	Canadian	law	
with	the	international	human	rights	system.
158.	 ECOSOC, General	Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	31.
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	 After	having	found	in	the	last	section	that	copyrights	are	not	necessarily	
human	rights,	even	though	both	systems	might	 intertwine	 in	direct	proportion	
and	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 copyright	 law	 adequately	 measures	 and	 reflects	 the	
balance	between	authors’	rights	and	users’	rights,	we	now	have	a	broader	and	
complex	framework.	Within	it,	we	can	understand	that	two	different	systems	in	
the	international	stage	compete	to	incorporate	its	values	in	the	domestic	system.	
A	graphic	might	help	in	the	comprehension	of	that	framework.
Figure	1.
	 In	 Figure	 1,	 “ICL”	 means	 international	 copyright	 law.	 “IHRL”	 means	
international	human	rights	 law.	“CCL”	means	Canadian	copyright	 law.	“U”	are	
users’	rights.	“A”	are	authors’	rights.	“O”	are	owners’	rights.	The	vectors	“x”	and	
“y”	reflect	the	internalization	of	each	system	into	Canadian	law.	
ICL	 and	 IHRL	 have	 a	 zone	 of	 coincidence	 with	 respect	 to	 A	 and	 U.	
Not	all	 the	values	entrenched	 in	 the	 IHRL’s	understanding	of	U	are	present	 in	
ICL.	Conversely,	there	is	a	tendency	for	A	to	grow	towards	ICL,	contemplating	
elements	that	are	not	found	within	IHRL.	O	has	a	small	intersection	with	A,	and	in	
this	sense	also	with	the	boundaries	of	IHRL.	However,	the	influence	of	O	towards	
IHRL	 is	 much	 wider	 than	 this	 small	 intersection.	 The	 growing	 circle	 from	 A	
towards	O	tilts	the	whole	balance	of	the	system,	and	irradiates	its	effects	towards	
U,	and	toward	other	rights	which	are	instrumentalized	by	U.	The	perception	of	
a	balance,	 in	both	systems,	 is	 thus	different,	meaning	that	 ICL	may	 favour	 the	
holders	of	O,	in	detriment	of	the	holders	of	U.	Those	two	balances	compete	for	
being	 internalized	within	CCL.	The	big	media	pushes	 for	 strengthening	vector	
y.	 Scholars	 argue	 that	 this	would	 frustrate	 the	presumptions	 that	might	guide	
Canadian	courts	in	conforming	to	the	vector	x.	Seeming	to	ignore	such	conflict,	
the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 announces	 a	 purpose	 and	 a	 balance	 for	 CCL.	
Some	legal	scholars	cheer	the	balance	and	cheer	the	purpose	as	a	new	one.	The	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	does	not	mention	the	vector	x,	which	could	be	said	
to	be	enlightening	its	perception	of	the	overarching	scheme	of	the	principle	of	
balance.	It	does	mention,	though,	the	vector	y,	and	the	international	instruments	
which	are	related	to	it.	However,	all	its	reasoning,	as	seen	above,	is	much	closer	
to	the	dynamic	of	forces	transmitted	by	the	vector	x.	
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It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 in	 Théberge	
speaks	 of	 “obtaining	 a	 just	 reward	 for	 the	 creator,”	 of	 the	 inefficiency	 of	
“overcompensate[ing]	artists	and	authors,”	and	of	the	possibility	that	“[e]xcessive	
control	 by	 holders	 of	 copyrights	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 intellectual	 property	 may	
unduly	limit	the	ability	of	the	public	domain	to	incorporate	and	embellish	creative	
innovation	 in	 the	 long-term	 interests	 of	 society	 as	 a	whole,	 or	 create	 practical	
obstacles	to	proper	utilization.”159		Thus,	even	without	acknowledging	it	expressly,	
the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	seems	to	have	implicitly	understood	the	prevalence	
of	the	forces	irradiated	by	the	vector	x,	and	submitted	CCL	to	the	supremacy	of	
the	 rights	present	 in	 IHRL.	What	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	seems	 to	have	
done	in	the	trilogy	was	to	dislocate	the	vector	that	stems	from	a	system	whose	
inner	equilibrium	is	increasingly	incompatible	with	the	supremacy	of	human	rights,	
and	with	the	values	and	principles	which	are	expected	to	be	found	in	a	free	and	
democratic	society.
It	 follows	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada,	 even	 without	 saying	 it	
expressly,	 embodied	 a	 proposition	which	many	 scholars	 currently	 advance	 for	
the	international	stage:	that	of	recognizing	the	supremacy	of	human	rights	over	
intellectual	property	rights,	and	thus	providing	for	an	adequate	balance	between	
authors’	rights	and	users’	rights,	and	for	the	supremacy	of	users’	human	rights	
over	other	copyrights	which	do	not	belong	to	the	core	of	authors’	human	rights.	
Perhaps	 the	most	eloquent	 theorist	 today	 in	 the	advocacy	of	 such	an	
inversion	of	paradigms	is	Peter	Drahos,	Director	of	the	Centre	for	Governance	of	
Knowledge	and	Development,	at	the	Australian	National	University.	In	a	recent	
paper,	Drahos	advances	his	proposition	of	 “An	Alternative	Framework	 for	 the	
Global	Regulation	of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights.”160	His	paper	 focuses	on	the	
importance	of	endowing	developing	countries	with	freedom	to	design	their	own	
intellectual	property	rights	systems,	and	eventually	move	to	lower	standards	of	
protection	to	cope	with	their	developmental	needs	–	similar	to	what	the	currently	
developed	countries	did	when	the	present	institutions	of	the	intellectual	property	
system	were	not	yet	raised.161	The	international	human	rights	system	would	be	a	
very	important	ally	for	those	countries	in	this	intent.
As	Drahos	argues:
countries	must	choose	their	system	for	 regulating	 intellectual	property	with	
an	 eye	 to	 how	 it	 will	 fit	 other	 crucial	 legal	 and	 industry	 policy	 institutions	
from	 competition	policy	 to	 labour	market	policy.	 Property	 and	 these	other	
institutions	form	an	organic	whole.	Whether	or	not	particular	property	rights	
contribute	to	the	well	being	of	the	whole	is	a	matter	of	careful	diagnosis.162
159.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8	at	paras.	31–33.	
160.	 Peter	Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework	for	the	Global	Regulation	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights,”	(2005)	
Center	for	Governance	of	Knowledge	and	Development,	[forthcoming	publication]	Austrian Journal of 
Development Studies,	<http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/PDFs/DrahosAustrian%20JDS%20-%20
Alternative%20IPv2.pdf>.
161.	 Ha-Joon	Chang,	Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective	(Anthem	Press,	
2002)	“There	is	currently	great	pressure	on	developing	countries	from	the	developed	world,	and	the	
international	development	policy	establishment	that	it	controls,	to	adopt	a	set	of	‘good	policies’	and	‘good	
institutions’	to	foster	their	economic	development.”	But	“[h]ow	did	the	rich	countries	really	become	rich?	
The	short	answer	to	this	question	is	that	the	developed	countries	did	not	get	where	they	are	now	through	
the	policies	and	the	institutions	that	they	recommend	to	developing	countries	today”:	Ha-	Joon	Chang,	
supra note	161	at	pp.	1–2.
162.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	pp.	13–14.
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Hence,	if	“it	will	be	the	growth	and	use	of	knowledge	and	ideas	that	will	drive	
the	economies	of	the	twenty-first	century	[…].”163	As	some	argue,	an	international	
framework	that	fosters	the	circulation	of	knowledge	should	be	crucial	for	striking	
an	 accurate	 balance	 within	 an	 increasingly	 unbalanced	 intellectual	 property	
system,	and	thus	for	aiding	developing	countries	to	catch	up.
Drahos’s	 simple,	 but	 innovative	 and	 powerful	 ideas	 demand	 a	 more	
detailed	and	extensive	analysis.	His	theory	is	grounded	in	a	basic	assumption.	In	
his	view,	there	are	two	different	functions	that	might	be	dealt	with	by	a	framework	
which	seeks	to	effectively	provide	a	balanced	conception	of	intellectual	property	
rights:	one	of	establishing	general	principles,	which	he	calls	“the	principles	task”;	
and	the	other	of	establishing	detailed	rules,	which	he	calls	“the	rules	task.”164		The	
former	would	be	concerned	with	setting	up	the	normative	core,	which	the	latter	
would	then	specify	in	detail	and	with	a	reasonable	margin	of	discretion,	respecting	
some	prohibitions	and	presumptions.	The	former,	I	add,	would	be	like	the	spirit,	and	
the	latter	would	be	like	the	body	–	the	Cartesian	idea	of	a	“ghost	in	the	machine”	
in	Gilbert	Ryle’s	derision.165		The	“principles	task”	is	the	virtual;	the	“rules	task”	is	
the	actual.	That	normative	core,	Drahos	argues,	shall	be	linked	to	the	international	
human	rights	system,	and	must	not	consist	of	detailed	rules,	which	could	hamper	
the	operationality	of	the	system,	as	it	would	be	difficult	to	reach	consensus	about	
them.	“Intellectual	property	rules,”	he	argues,	typically	“create	winners	and	losers	
and	so	veto	coalitions	are	more	or	less	certain	to	form.”166
He	 advocates	 for	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 principles	 task	 with	 the	
international	human	rights	system	and	the	establishment	of	a	key	principle	which,	
he	 argues,	 “directly	 follows	 from	key	 human	 rights	 treaties	 that	deal	with	 the	
general	rights	of	property”167	–	a	kind	of	grundnorm	of	his	framework.	For	this	
principle	we	should	understand	that	intellectual	property	rights	are	subordinate	
and	 instrumental	 to	 human	 rights.	 Hence,	 governments	 would	 have	 a	 duty	
to	 discipline	 the	 intellectual	 property	 system	 such	 as	 to	 meet	 the	 standards	
prescribed	by	the	international	human	rights	framework.	Linking	it	to	Figure	1,	
above,	 the	key	principle	means	that	vector	x	dislocates	vector	y	 to	the	extent	
necessary	to	make	ICL	meet	the	values	and	principles	inherent	to	IHRL.
According	to	his	theory,	such	a	principle	would	be	reflected	in	a	treaty	
on	access	to	knowledge,	which	would	also	outline	the	core	rights	which	the	right	
of	access	to	knowledge	should	instrumentalize	–	amongst	which	are	the	rights	to	
health,	to	education,	and	to	food.	This	treaty	would	need	domestic	mechanisms	
for	 its	 implementation.	Besides	declaring	 the	subordinate	status	of	 intellectual	
property	rights	and	the	basic	rights	that	it	might	serve,	Drahos	suggests	that	the	
treaty	provides	 for	a	 three-step	 test,	 to	be	 followed	by	 the	state	parties	 in	 its	
implementation.	Those	steps	would	consist	of	respecting	a	list	of	prohibitions	and	
presumptions,	and	also	of	adopting	a	procedure	for	rendering	those	prohibitions	
and	presumptions	operational.168
163.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra note	160	at	p.	14.
164.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	16.
165.	 Gilbert	Ryle,	The Concept of Mind	(Barnes	and	Nobel,	1949)	at	pp.	15-16.
166.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	16.
167.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	16.
168.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	17.
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The	 core	 prohibition,	 which	 would	 automatically	 derive	 from	 both	
declarations,	 would	 be	 that	 “[n]o	 rule	 of	 intellectual	 property	 regulation	 can	
contradict	or	undermine	a	basic	human	rights	norm.”169	Other	prohibitions	could	
be	added,	but	are	not	necessary.	
The	presumptions	 which	 should	 be	 respected	 by	 state	 parties	 by	 the	
occasion	 of	 any	 modification	 in	 their	 intellectual	 property	 laws	 would	 be	 the	
following:
i)	 Presumption	 against	 the	 criminalization	 of	 infringement	 of	 intellectual	
property;
ii)	Presumption	against	the	creation	of	new	areas	of	intellectual	property;	
iii)	Presumption	against	 the	extension	of	existing	privileges	of	 intellectual	
property	rights	holders;
iv)	 Presumption	 against	 making	 it	 easier	 to	 prove	 intellectual	 property	
infringement	or	extending	the	scope	of	tests	of	infringement;	
v)	 Presumption	 against	 extending	 the	 duration	 of	 intellectual	 property	
rights;	and,	
vi)	Presumption	against	being	able	to	contract	out	of	statutory	provisions	
that	lift	the	restrictions	that	enable	the	use	of	intellectual	property.170
The	 procedure	 which	 should	 be	 adopted	 in	 order	 to	 render	 the	
presumptions	and	prohibitions	operational	is	as	follows:
i)		 Prohibitions	are	to	be	read	absolutely;
ii)		 Presumptions	apply	to	all	forms	of	intellectual	property	regulation,	but	
they	may	be	rebutted;
iii)		Presumptions	may	be	rebutted	if	and	only	if	an	evidence-based	analysis	
of	 real-world	costs	clearly	demonstrates	that	such	rebuttal	will	 lead	to	
gains	 in	 intellectual	 property	 regulation	 that	 promote	 the	 exercise	 of	
basic	rights	of	citizens;	and,
iv)		The	burden	of	rebutting	a	presumption	lies	on	those	public	and	private	
actors	that	advocate	changes	in	intellectual	property	regulation.171
Drahos’	ideas	do	an	outstanding	job	in	detailing	something	that	I,	however,	
believe	is	already	found	within	the	international	human	rights	framework	itself.	My	
perception	is	that,	if	there	is	a	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge	and	such	a	right	
is	an	unequivocal	instrument	for	fulfilling	several	other	rights	which	are	provided	
for	in	the	ICESCR	(and	also	in	the	ICCPR,	as	this	paper	will	argue	later),	the	whole	
framework	proposed	by	Drahos	would	be	already	inherent	to	the	nature	of	the	state	
parties’	obligations,	as	defined	in	Article	2	of	the	ICESCR,	and	linked	to	the	idea	
which	is	in	the	very	nucleus	of	this	paper:	the	presumption	against	retrogressive	
measures	 towards	 human	 rights.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 his	 proposition	 is	 not	
meritorious.	 It	does	indeed	unfold	the	core	of	state	parties’	obligations	in	many	
objective	provisions	 that	 are	extremely	useful	 in	helping	 to	 strike	 the	adequate	
169.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	17	(emphasis	added).
170.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	18	(number	formatting	added).
171.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra	note	160	at	p.	19.
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balance	 between	 authors’	 human	 rights	 and	 users’	 human	 rights,	 and	 to	 bring	
such	a	balance	to	a	superior	level	with	respect	to	mere	intellectual	property	rights.	
That	is	to	say,	those	intellectual	property	rights	which	exist	out	of	the	intellectual	
property	system,	as	 is	normally	and	strongly	 the	case.	Doing	so,	 the	 framework	
provides	us	with	an	objective	instrumental	for	dislocating	vector	y	(see	Figure	1)	
and	its	distorted	perception	of	the	principle	of	balance.
The	presumption	against	retrogressive	measures	is	generally	affirmed	in	
paragraph	 9	 of	 the	General	Comment	 no.	 3	 of	 the	Committee	 on	 Economic,	
Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	on	the	nature	of	State	parties’	obligations,	as	defined	
in	Article	2	(1)	of	the	ICESCR:
Article	2	
1.	 Each	 State	 Party	 to	 the	 present	 Covenant	 undertakes	 to	 take	 steps,	
individually	and	through	international	assistance	and	co-operation,	especially	
economic	 and	 technical,	 to	 the	maximum	of	 its	 available	 resources,	with	 a	
view	 to	 achieving	progressively	 the	 full	 realization	of	 the	 rights	 recognized	
in	the	present	Covenant	by	all	appropriate	means,	including	particularly	the	
adoption	of	legislative	measures.172
The	relevant	excerpt	of	paragraph	9	reads:
9.	The	principal	obligation	of	result	reflected	in	article	2	(1)	 is	to	take	steps	
“with	 a	 view	 to	 achieving	 progressively	 the	 full	 realization	 of	 the	 rights	
recognized”	 in	 the	Covenant.	…	 [T]he	phrase	must	 be	 read	 in	 the	 light	 of	
the	overall	objective,	 indeed	the	 raison	d’être,	of	 the	Covenant	which	 is	 to	
establish	clear	obligations	for	States	parties	in	respect	of	the	full	realization	of	
the	rights	in	question.	It	thus	imposes	an	obligation	to	move	as	expeditiously	
and	 effectively	 as	 possible	 towards	 that	 goal.	 Moreover,	 any	 deliberately	
retrogressive	 measures	 in	 that	 regard	 would	 require	 the	 most	 careful	
consideration	and	would	need	to	be	fully	justified	by	reference	to	the	totality	
of	the	rights	provided	for	in	the	Covenant	and	in	the	context	of	the	full	use	of	
the	maximum	available	resources.173
	 Thus,	one	can	see,	that	the	presumptions	proposed	by	Drahos	in	reality	
outline	those	which	would	be	the	possible	retrogressive	measures	towards	the	
right	of	access,	and	the	procedural	rules	actually	reflect	an	inversion	of	the	burden	
of	proof,	which	equals	 the	understanding	of	 the	CESCR	that	any	retrogressive	
measure	might	be	 justified	 in	 light	of	 the	 totality	of	 rights	provided	 for	 in	 the	
international	human	rights	system.	That	 is	to	say,	the	impacts	of	strengthening	
the	 intellectual	 property	 system	 might	 be	 carefully	 measured	 against	 all	 the	
extension	of	 the	 right	of	 access	 to	 knowledge	and	 the	other	 rights	 it	 renders	
possible	to	fully	realize.	And	the	state	has	the	burden	of	proof	that	it	will	not	be	
frustrating	its	obligation	to	protect,	respect	and	fulfil	those	rights	–	which	is	the	
172.	 ICESCR,	supra	note118,	art.	2(1)	(emphasis	added).
173.	 United	Nations	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	“The	nature	of	States	parties	
obligations (Article.	2,	paragraph	1,	of	the	Covenant):	General	Comment	No.	3”	(14	December	1990),	
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument>,	UN	
Doc.	E/1991/23	(1991)	at	para.	9	[ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990)].
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core	content	of	the	obligation	to	fully	realize	them.174
	 To	understand	that	all	human	rights	deserve	to	be	protected,	respected	
and	fulfilled	is	an	idea	which	comes	straight	from	the	understanding	incorporated	
in	the	1993	Vienna	Declaration	and	Programme	of	Action,	approved	in	the	1993	
Vienna	World	Conference	on	Human	Rights,	that	“[a]ll	human	rights	are	universal,	
indivisible	 and	 interdependent	 and	 interrelated,”	 and	 that	 “[t]he	 international	
community	must	treat	human	rights	globally	in	a	fair	and	equal	manner,	on	the	
same	footing	and	with	the	same	emphasis.”175		As	University	of	Vienna’s	Manfred	
Nowak	 points	 out,	 “[o]nly	 since	 it	 was	made	 apparent	 that	 human	 rights	 are	
indivisible	 and	 interdependent	 …	 it	 has	 gradually	 become	 accepted	 that	 in	
principle	states	are	obliged	to	respect,	fulfil	and	protect	all	human	rights.”176	
In	 this	 context,	 one	 could	 argue	 that	 Abraham	 Drassinower’s	 rightful	
perception	of	the	intertextuality	of	creation177	as	a	reason	to	give	due	account	to	
the	principle	of	balance	between	authors’	rights	and	users’	rights	might	very	well	
be	understood	in	the	sense	that	the	fabric	of	rights	which	are	comprehended	under	
the	rubric	of	users’	rights	is	vast.	All	of	those	rights,	which	are	rendered	operational	
by	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	demand	to	be	carefully	considered	against	
retrogressive	measures,	and	progressively	protected,	respected	and	fulfilled.
Nonetheless,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 considering	 the	 principle	 of	
balance	 and	 providing	 against	 retrogressive	 measures	 towards	 the	 totality	 of	
174.	 The	obligation	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil	all	human	rights	is	incorporated	in	the	Maastricht	Guidelines	on	
Violations	of	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	which	was	approved	in	a	meeting	held	in	1996,	by	
occasion	of	the	10th	anniversary	on	the	Limburg	Principles	on	the	Implementation	of	the	ICESCR.	That	
meeting	was	held	at	the	Centre	for	Human	Rights	of	the	Faculty	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Maastricht,	in	
conjunction	with	the	Urban	Morgan	Institute	on	Human	Rights	and	the	International	Commission	of	Jurists	
[ICJ].	It is interesting to notice that one of the two Canadian Commissioners for the ICJ is Justice Ian Binnie, 
who was respectfully mentioned many times above in this paper.	Paragraph	6	of	those	Guidelines	reads:	
“Obligations	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil.	6.	Like	civil	and	political	rights,	economic,	social	and	cultural	
rights	impose	three	different	types	of	obligations	on	States:	the	obligations	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil.	
Failure	to	perform	any	one	of	these	three	obligations	constitutes	a	violation	of	such	rights.	The	obligation	to	
respect	requires	States	to	refrain	from	interfering	with	the	enjoyment	of	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights.	
Thus,	the	right	to	housing	is	violated	if	the	State	engages	in	arbitrary	forced	evictions.	The	obligation	to	
protect	requires	States	to	prevent	violations	of	such	rights	by	third	parties.	Thus,	the	failure	to	ensure	that	
private	employers	comply	with	basic	labour	standards	may	amount	to	a	violation	of	the	right	to	work	or	the	
right	to	just	and	favourable	conditions	of	work.	The	obligation	to	fulfil	requires	States	to	take	appropriate	
legislative,	administrative,	budgetary,	judicial	and	other	measures	towards	the	full	realization	of	such	rights.	
Thus,	the	failure	of	States	to	provide	essential	primary	health	care	to	those	in	need	may	amount	to	a	
violation.”	See	University	of	Maastricht,	International	Commission	of	Jurists	and	Urban	Morgan	Institute	on	
Human	Rights,	The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	(University	
of	Maastricht	1996),	<http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=2454>	at	para.	6.
175.	 United	Nations	General	Assembly	“Vienna	Declaration	and	Programme	of	Action”	(12	July	1993),	<http://
www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument>,	UN	Doc.	A/
CONF.157/23	(1993)	at	para	5.
176.	 Manfred	Nowak,	Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	2003)	
at	p.	48.
177.	 See	Abraham	Drassinower,	“Taking	Users’	Rights	Seriously,”	in	Michael	Geist,	ed.,	In the Public Interest: the 
Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Irwin	Law,	2005)	462–479,	<http://209.171.61.222/PublicInterest/
Three_02_Drassinower.pdf	>	at	pp.	466–467,	where	he	writes:
“Most	 grasp	 this	 proposition	 by	 saying	 that	 copyright	 law	 is	 about	 the	 ‘balance’	 to	 be	 struck	
between	 the	 rights	 of	 authors	 and	 the	 competing	 claims	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 flow	 of	
information	 and	 ideas,	 in	 the	 ongoing	 dialogues	 forming	 the	 substance	 of	 our	 knowledge	 and	
culture.	Yet	it	is	important	to	add	immediately	that	the	balance	in	question	is	less	about	invoking	
the	public	 interest	as	a	 ‘trump’	 that	deprives	 the	author	of	 rights	 she	may	otherwise	have,	 than	
about	trying	to	appreciate	that	the	author	is	herself	a	user,	and	that	therefore	the	rights	of	users	are	
not	so	much	exceptions	to	the	author’s	rights	as	much	as	themselves	central	aspects	of	copyright	
law	 inextricably	 embedded	 in	 authorship	 itself.	 Authorship	 is	 itself	 a	 mode	 of	 use[…].	 In	 this	
respect,	CCH	is	a	landmark	judgment	not	because	it	innovates	but	because	it	renders	manifest	the	
public’s	presence	inherent	in	the	very	formation	of	the	author’s	right.	The	invocation	of	user	rights	
as	central	to	copyright	is	also	an	evocation	of	the	author	as	user—an	affirmation	of	the	intertextuality	
of	creation.”
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users’	rights,	it	is	extremely	important	to	observe	that,	in	its	General	Comment	
17,	the	CESCR	acknowledges	that:
States	parties	are	therefore	obliged	to	strike	an	adequate	balance	between	
their	obligations	under	article	15,	paragraph	1	(c),	on	one	hand,	and	under	the	
other	provisions	of	the	Covenant,	on	the	other	hand,	with	a	view	to	promoting	
and	protecting	the	full	range	of	rights	guaranteed	in	the	Covenant.	In	striking	
this	balance,	the	private	interests	of	authors	should	not	be	unduly	favoured	
and	the	public	interest	in	enjoying	broad	access	to	their	productions	should	be	
given	due	consideration.	…	States	parties	should	therefore	ensure	that	their	
legal	or	other	regimes	for	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	
resulting	 from	 one’s	 scientific,	 literary	 or	 artistic	 productions	 constitute	 no	
impediment	to	their	ability	 to	comply	with	their	core	obligations	 in	 relation	
to	the	rights	to	food,	health	and	education,	as	well	as	to	take	part	in	cultural	
life	and	to	enjoy	the	benefits	of	scientific	progress	and	its	applications,	or	any	
other	right	enshrined	in	the	Covenant.	…	Ultimately,	 intellectual	property	is	
a	social	product	and	has	a	social	function.	…	States	parties	thus	have	a	duty	
to	prevent	unreasonably	high	costs	 for	access	 to	essential	medicines,	plant	
seeds	or	other	means	of	 food	production,	or	 for	 schoolbooks	and	 learning	
materials,	from	undermining	the	rights	of	large	segments	of	the	population	to	
health,	food	and	education.	…	States	parties	should	also	consider	undertaking	
human	rights	impact	assessments	prior	to	the	adoption	and	after	a	period	of	
implementation	 of	 legislation	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	moral	 and	material	
interests	resulting	from	one’s	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	productions.178
	 From	 this	 instrument,	which	 is	 an	 important	one	among	 the	group	of	
sources	we	shall	consider	for	understanding	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	as	
a	customary	right	of	international	human	rights	law,	we	see	that	the	Committee	
on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	itself	recognized	the	need	to	protect	and	
promote	the	full	range	of	rights	guaranteed	in	the	covenant,	and	thus	the	need	
to	strike	an	adequate	balance	between	authors’	rights	and	the	public	interest	to	
enjoy	broad	access	 to	 their	production.	Furthermore,	 the	Committee	adopted	
the	language	suggested	above	for	the	presumptions	and	procedural	rules	of	our	
framework	to	affirm	that	states	must	take	due	consideration	of	the	right	of	access	
to	knowledge	and	carry	out	impact	assessments	before	adopting	new	legislation	
for	protecting	authors’	rights.
	 It	follows	that	since	the	CESCR	endorsed	the	framework	advanced	above,	
now	 the	 domestic	 courts,	 legislators	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 have	 a	 powerful	
spell	 to	 deal	with	 the	 intellectual	 property	 ghosts.	Whether	 those	 agents	will	
implement	such	a	framework	remains	to	be	seen.	We	know	that	any	retrogressive	
measure	tilting	the	balance	towards	vector	y	would	hamper	the	legitimacy	of	the	
domestic	system.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	could	or	should	have	moved	
towards	 vector	 x	 when	 granting	 Canadian	 copyright	 law	 what	 some	 scholars	
understood	to	be	a	new	purpose.
	 One	last,	yet	important,	remark:	one	can	see	that	several	of	the	current	
situations	in	the	Canadian	copyright	reform	process	imply	different	retrogressive	
measures	 and	 violate	 different	 presumptions	 among	 those	 identified	 above.	
178.	 ECOSOC,	General Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	at	para.	35	(emphasis	added).
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On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 express	 permission	 for	 a	 contractual	 lifting	 of	 users’	
rights	 understood	 to	be	present	 in	 the	general	 scheme	of	 the	Copyright	Act,	
as	granted	by	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	 in	Théberge,	would	 consist	of	 a	
violation	of	presumption	vi).	One	could	say	 that	 that	 is	not	 true,	as	 it	was	 the	
first	time	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	was	directing	its	attention	towards	the	
first	 sale	doctrine	and	 incorporating	 it	 in	Canada.	This,	 however,	would	be	an	
inconsistent	 assumption,	 as	much	 of	what	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	Canada	was	
unsuspectingly	doing	 in	Théberge	was	confronting	 the	general	 scheme	of	 the	
Canadian	Copyright	Act	with	a	conception	of	balance,	with	a	spirit	that	can	be	
understood	as	flowing	from	nowhere	but	the	Charter	and	the	complex	fabric	of	
rulings	that	allow	for	the	presence	of	the	international	human	rights	framework	
within	 the	 domestic	 legal	 system.	 Hence,	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge	
was	 already	 present	 as	 a	 background	 right	 in	 the	 overarching	 scheme	 of	 the	
human	rights	system	and	followed	in	Canadian	copyright	law.	Allowing	for	some	
inconsequential	restriction	of	its	boundaries	by	contractual	means	is	certainly	a	
denial	of	protection	of	such	a	right,	and	consists	of	a	clear	retrogressive	measure	
that	tilts	the	balance	of	the	Canadian	law	in	favour	of	copyright	holders.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	government’s	commitment	in	signing	the	WIPO	Internet	Treaties	
and	its	push	for	the	ongoing	process	of	copyright	legislative	reform	in	Canada	
constitutes	a	clear	retrogressive	measure	towards	presumptions	i),	ii),	and	iii)	–	as	
much	as	further	endorsement	by	the	legislative	branch	would	then	render	all	the	
powers	in	this	country	jointly	committed	to	a	project	of	systematic	violation	of	the	
international	human	rights	system.
4.3. “X” v “Y”: The Problem of Justiciability
This	 paper	 explained	 in	 the	 section	 above	 that	 Article	 2(1)	 of	 the	 ICESCR	
demands	state	parties	to	“take	steps	…	with	a	view	to	achieving	progressively	
the	full	realization	of	the	rights	recognized	in	the…Covenant,”	and	that	this	idea,	
as	 expressed	 in	 our	 framework,	 implies	 a	 presumption	 against	 retrogressive	
measures	towards	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	It	should	also	be	understood	
that,	even	though	the	same	provision	limits	the	steps	to	be	taken	“to	the	maximum	
of	 [the]	 available	 resources,”179	 there	 is	 a	 clear	perception	 that	 states	have	an	
obligation	to	move	forward	and	take	concrete	steps	in	the	fulfilment	of	human	
rights.	As	said	by	the	ICESCR,	those	“steps	should	be	deliberate,	concrete	and	
targeted	as	clearly	as	possible	towards	meeting	the	obligations	recognized	in	the	
Covenant.”180
	 Our	concern	here	is	with	two	other	parts	of	the	same	Article	2(1):	one	
which	demands	that	those	steps	are	taken	“by	all	appropriate	means,	including	
particularly	 the	 adoption	 of	 legislative	measures,”	 and	 the	 other	 that	 stresses	
that	 this	might	 happen	 “individually	 and	 through	 international	 assistance	 and	
co-operation.”181	The	problem	is	that	a	historical	imbalance	with	respect	to	the	
availability	of	suitable	remedies	threatens	the	justiciability	of	the	right	of	access	
to	 knowledge,	 in	 the	 same	measure	 as	 different	 layers	 of	 protection	 overlap	
day	by	day	 towards	 an	 impressively	 thorough	 framework	 for	 the	 enforcement	
179.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra note	173	at	para	10
180.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra	note	173	at	para	2.
181.	 ECOSOC,	Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra note	173	at	para	8.
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of	 intellectual	property	rights.	This	situation	demands	to	be	 inverted,	and	that	
is	why	the	framework	above	must	find	some	means	to	be	reflected	in	a	binding	
instrument	that	commits	state	parties	to	the	fulfilment	of	the	right	to	access	–	a	
treaty	on	access	to	knowledge.	While	such	instrument	is	not	achieved,	however,	
states	should	find	the	proper	ways	to	 internalize	that	 framework	which,	as	will	
be	shown	in	further	sections,	is	already	grounded	in	other	customary	sources	of	
international	law.	In	Canada,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	must	expressly	link	
the	chain	novel	of	users’	rights	to	it,	as	this	will	reflect	its	commitment	towards	
both	 avoiding	 retrogressive	 measures	 and	 strengthening	 what	 James	 Harris	
describes	as	“the	enforcement	hinge.”182
		 As	 the	 CESCR	 points	 out,	 “in	 many	 instances	 legislation	 is	 highly	
desirable	 and	 in	 some	 cases	may	 even	be	 indispensable”183	 for	 fulfilling	 state	
parties	obligations	under	Article	2(1).	Transporting	this	to	the	international	scene,	
a	treaty	on	access	to	knowledge	would	be	important	to	undertake	“international	
assistance	and	co-operation”	in	relation	to	the	legislative	obligations	of	each	state	
party.	The	treaty	would	help	cope	with	the	harmful	conducts	of	some	agencies	
of	the	same	UN	System	(namely	WIPO	and	WTO)	which	paradoxically	insist	upon	
taking	 different	 paths.	 It	 would	 also	 provide	 that	 each	 state	 party	 satisfy	 the	
need	to	take	steps	through	all	the	available	means,	which	must	include	judicial	
enforcement	of	the	right	to	access,	against	any	abusive	measures	provided	for	in	
the	international	intellectual	property	framework	(e.g.	TPM/DRM	or	contractual	
lifting	of	fair	dealing	provisions).	In	the	words	of	the	CESCR,	“among	the	measures	
which	might	be	considered	appropriate,	in	addition	to	legislation,	is	the	provision	
of	 judicial	 remedies	with	 respect	 to	 rights	which	may,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	
national	legal	system,	be	considered	justiciable.”184
	 University	of	Edinburgh’s	researcher	Abbe	Brown	proposes	an	alternative	
way	to	muddle	through.	His	argument	is	that	Corporate	Social	Responsibility	might	
play	a	better	practical	role,	in	light	of	the	unlikelihood	that	courts	and	international	
dispute	 settlement	 systems	will	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 international	 human	 rights	
framework	 and	 take	 to	 fulfil	 the	 right	 to	 access	 when	 confronting	 intellectual	
property	rights.185		Brown	goes	on	to	defend	the	idea	that	in	reality	human	rights	
could	be	a	Pandora’s	box	for	the	argument	that	“[…]	IP	owning	corporations	have	
a	 right	 to	enjoy	 their	property	 […]”186	without	 sharing	 it	with	others.	Hence,	he	
argues,	 “[a]t	 the	 practical	 level	…	 a	more	 altruistic	 approach	 [could]	 have	 real	
impact,	by	IP	owning	corporations	taking	steps	which	they	are	not	required	to	take,	
sharing	 IP,	making	use	of	available	 tools,	and	not	arguing	 for	 the	boundaries	of	
infringement	to	be	further	extended,	or	those	defences	and	exceptions	limited.”187	
Such	an	approach	would	be	based	upon	an	overarching	layer	of	standardization	
norms,	such	as,	for	instance,	ISO’s	Social	Responsibility	Standards.188
	 Brown’s	suggestion	is	interesting.	However,	it	might	not	be	understood	
as	something	completely	apart	from	the	international	human	rights	framework.	
182.	 See	Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts”,	supra	note	113.
183.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra	note	173	at	para	3.
184.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra	note	173	at	para	5.
185.	 Abbe	EL	Brown,	“Socially	Responsible	Intellectual	Property:	a	Solution?”	(2005)	2:4	SCRIPT-ed	485–513,	
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-4/csr.pdf>.
186.	 Brown,	“Socially	Responsible	Intellectual	Property,” supra	note	185	at	p.	497.
187.	 Brown,	“Socially	Responsible	Intellectual	Property,” 	supra	note	185	at	pp.	488-499.	
188.	 Brown,	“Socially	Responsible	Intellectual	Property,” supra	note	185	at	p.	501.	
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It	is	not	only	through	enforcement	measures	that	the	fulfilment	of	human	rights	
can	be	made.	As	 the	CESCR	points	out,	“[o]ther	measures	which	may	also	be	
considered	 ‘appropriate’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 Article	 2(1)	 include,	 but	 are	 not	
limited	to,	administrative,	financial,	educational	and	social	measures.”189		Hence,	
it	follows	that	financial	and	other	inductive	means	could	also	be	used	to	foster	
and	 stimulate	 the	 adoption	 of	 standards	 of	Corporate	 Social	 Responsibility.	 If	
those	means	are	appropriate,	as	Brown	argues	they	are,	it	could	be	more	than	a	
possibility,	but	a	duty	to	implement	them.	The	CESCR	could,	inclusively,	provide	
for	the	encouragement	of	those	practices	within	the	State	parties.	Indeed,	as	it	
already	said:
the	adoption	of	legislative	measures,	as	specifically	foreseen	by	the	Covenant,	
is	 by	 no	means	 exhaustive	 of	 the	 obligations	 of	 States	 parties.	 Rather,	 the	
phrase	“by	all	appropriate	means”	must	be	given	its	full	and	natural	meaning.	
…	 It	 is	 therefore	 desirable	 that	 States	 parties’	 reports	 should	 indicate	 not	
only	the	measures	that	have	been	taken	but	also	the	basis	on	which	they	are	
considered	to	be	the	most	“appropriate”	under	the	circumstances.	However,	
the	ultimate	determination	as	to	whether	all	appropriate	measures	have	been	
taken	remains	one	for	the	Committee	to	make.190
	 Even	so,	another	desirable	approach	would	be	to	develop	a	more	refined	
perception	of	the	domestic	courts	and	local	and	global	stakeholders	regarding	
the	existing	conflict	between	both	frameworks	portrayed	in	the	section	above,	the	
authority	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	as	a	customary	right	in	international	
human	rights	law,	and	the	need	to	give	due	and	express	account	of	such	right	
in	our	domestic	statutory	and	common	laws,	as	well	as	in	international	binding	
instruments	and	dispute	settlement	procedures.	This	is	a	task	which	was	only	very	
recently	developed	by	the	scholarly	literature	and	is	still	far	from	reaching	a	more	
sophisticated	level	of	systematization.
Legislative	 and	 judicial	means	 are	 undoubtedly	 at	 the	 very	 core	 of	 the	
appropriate	measures	to	be	undertaken	by	state	parties	in	satisfying	their	human	
rights’	obligations.	It	is	for	no	other	reason,	for	instance,	that	legislative	measures	
are	listed	in	the	wording	of	Article	2(1)	of	the	ICESCR	itself.	As	stated	by	the	CESCR:
while	 the	 Covenant	 does	 not	 formally	 oblige	 States	 to	 incorporate	 its	
provisions	in	domestic	law,	such	an	approach	is	desirable.	Direct	incorporation	
avoids	problems	that	might	arise	in	the	translation	of	treaty	obligations	into	
national	 law,	and	provides	a	basis	for	the	direct	 invocation	of	the	Covenant	
rights	 by	 individuals	 in	 national	 courts.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 Committee	
strongly	 encourages	 formal	 adoption	 or	 incorporation	 of	 the	 Covenant	 in	
national	law.191
In	the	same	pace,	judicial	protection	must	be	in	place	for	the	rights	granted	under	
the	Covenant.	Indeed,	“the	Covenant	norms	must	be	recognized	in	appropriate	
189.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra	note	173	at	para	4.
190.	 ECOSOC, Comment	No.	3	(1990),	supra	note	173	at	para	7.
191.	 United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Council,	“The	domestic	application	of	the	Covenant:	General	
Comment	9”	(3	December	1998),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/4ceb75c5492497d9802566d50051603
6?Opendocument>,	UN	Doc.	E/C.12/1998/24	at	para.	8	[ECOSOC,	General	Comment	9].
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ways	within	the	domestic	legal	order,	appropriate	means	of	redress,	or	remedies,	
must	be	available	to	any	aggrieved	individual	or	group,	and	appropriate	means	
of	ensuring	governmental	accountability	must	be	put	in	place.”192
	 Those	measures,	however,	will	not	be	likely	to	give	due	expression	to	a	
right	of	access	to	knowledge	 if	an	ever	 increasing	 intellectual	property	system	
continues	to	flourish	in	the	international	stage	and,	conversely,	few	possibilities	
remain	 available	 for	 protecting	 users’	 rights	 at	 the	 national	 or	 international	
level.	Contrary	to	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights	and	their	much	debated	
justiciability,	 the	 intellectual	 property	 system	 has	 teeth,	 since	 the	 moment	
when	the	rights	and	obligations	set	down	in	Berne	were	attached	to	the	TRIPS	
agreement,	 and	 thus	 to	 the	 international	 framework	 of	 trade.193	 Ruth	Okediji	
notes,	accordingly,	that	“[a]s	a	result	of	the	 integration	of	 intellectual	property	
into	 the	 international	 trade	 regime,	 the	 traditional	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 welfare	
concept	in	intellectual	property	has	been	upended	by	the	paradoxical	tendency	
to	equate	 the	greatest	opportunities	 for	enhancing	welfare	with	 the	strongest	
levels	of	protection.”194
	 Hence,	it	follows	that	the	procedures	of	submitting	periodical	reports195	
to	the	Committees,	the	General	Comments	on	the	ICESCR	and	the	ICCPR,	and	
the	non-binding	 views	of	 the	Human	Rights	Committee196	with	 respect	 to	 the	
situations	in	which	the	right	to	access	serves	the	realization	of	Civil	and	Political	
Rights	 (as	 this	paper	will	 explain	below),	 are	not	equal	 in	 their	possibilities	 to	
the	enforcement	 through	trade	sanctions	of	 the	WTO,	with	which	any	country	
that	wants	to	have	a	place	in	the	international	market	 is	compelled	to	comply.	
In	an	occasion	in	which	the	WTO	dispute	settlement	panel	had	the	opportunity	
to	 comment	 on	 a	 provision	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement197	 that	 has	 important	
implications	to	our	framework,	namely	the	one	that	establishes	a	three-step	for	
the	“limitations	and	exceptions”	to	exclusive	rights	incorporated	in	the	domestic	
statutes,	the	interpretation	was	such	that	any	“special	cases”	set	down	in	those	
statutes	were	understood	as	needing	to	be	clearly	and	narrowly	defined.198	As	
Daniel	Gervais	explains:
192.	 ECOSOC,	General	Comment	9,	supra note	191	at	para.	2.
193.	 Helfer,	“Human	Rights	and	Intellectual	Property,”	supra note	116	at	p.	50.	“[U]nlike	earlier	intellectual	
property	agreements,	TRIPS	has	teeth.	Non-compliance	with	the	treaty	can	be	challenged	through	the	
WTO’s	hard-edge	dispute	settlement	system,	in	which	rulings	by	WTO	panels	and	Appellate	Body	are	
backed	up	by	the	threat	of	trade	sanctions”:	Helfer,	“Human	Rights	and	Intellectual	Property,”	supra note	
116	at	pp.	54–55.
194.	 Okediji,	“Sustainable	Access,”	supra	note	42	at		p.	151.
195.	 See	ICESCR,	supra	note118,	art.16.	See	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	(16	December	
1966),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm>,	999	United	Nation	Treaty	Series	171,	Canada	Treaty	
Series	1976	No.	47	(entered	into	force	23	March	1976,	accession	by	Canada,	19	May	1976),	art.	40	[ICCPR].
196.	 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	(19	December	1966),	
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_opt.htm>,	999	United	Nation	Treaty	Series	171,	Canada	Treaty	
Series	1976	No.	47	(entered	into	force	23	March	1976,	accession	by	Canada	19	May	1976),	art.	5(4).
197.	 See	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April 1994)	in	Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,	<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm>,	1869	United Nations Treaty Series 299,	(1993)	33 International Legal Materials	
81	[TRIPS],	art.	13:	“Limitations	and	Exceptions.	Members	shall	confine	limitations	or	exceptions	to	exclusive	
rights	to	certain	special	cases	which	do	not	conflict	with	a	normal	exploitation	of	the	work	and	do	not	
unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	right	holder.”
198.	 Report,	WT/DS160/R,	United States–Section 110(5) of the U.S Copyright Act—Complaint by European 
Communities (WTO	Panel,	15	June	2000),	<http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.
asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/160R-00.doc>	at	para.	6.112:	“In	our	view,	the	first	condition	of	Article	13	
requires	that	a	limitation	or	exception	in	national	legislation	should	be	clearly	defined	and	should	be	narrow	
in	its	scope	and	reach.”	
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[t]he	meaning	of	‘special’	in	this	context	can	be	interpreted	in	two	ways.	Based	
on	the	history	of	the	Berne	Convention,	it	seems	to	mean	that	the	exception	
must	have	a	(special)	public	policy	purpose.	Another	view	is	that	it	must	apply	
to	a	fairly	well	delineated	area	(with	or	without	specific	public	policy	objective).	
The	latter	view	reflects	the	normal	‘dictionary’	meaning	of	the	term	and	was	
adopted	by	the	panel	in	the	above-mentioned	case.199
No	allusion	to	human	rights	was	made.
	 One	should	add	to	this	the	gloomy	situation	that	under	Article	20	of	the	
Berne	Convention,	members	of	the	union	can	only	move	forward	in	establishing	
“more	extensive	rights	than	those	granted	by	the	Convention.”200		Hence,	one	can	
ironically	conclude	that	no	“retrogressive	measure”	with	respect	to	 intellectual	
property	rights	is	allowed	by	Berne	–	and,	thus,	by	TRIPS.	Also,	as	a	corollary,	no	
provision	in	TRIPS	can	be	“interpreted	in	a	way	detrimental	to	the	right	holders	
concerned.”201		Drahos	still	recalls	the	fact	that	the	principle	of	the	Most-Favored	
Nation	Treatment,202	present	 in	TRIPS,	allows	 for	 the	spread	of	 the	content	of	
several	 TRIPS-Plus	bilateral	 agreements	 that	have	been	pushed	by	 the	United	
States	among	member	states	of	the	WTO,	in	an	aggressive	attempt	of	imposing	
its	proprietary	agenda	to	the	rest	of	the	world.203
	 In	response	to	this	understanding	of	the	Berne	Convention	as	a	floor	of	
rights	which	can	be	expanded	by	means	of	bilateral	agreements,	Okediji	proposes	
“[t]he	 idea	 of	 establishing	 substantive	 maxima	 for	 copyright	 protection,”	 or	
what	she	calls	“positive	access	mechanisms,”	which	would	consist	of	a	minimum	
and	 a	maximum	bargain	 for	 construing	 negotiated	 agreements,	meaning	 that	
“states	are	prevented	from	negotiating	prospective	agreements	that	would	be	
inconsistent	with	 the	 legislated	access	mechanism	provisions.”204	 	Perhaps	 this	
could	be	advantageously	 inserted	 in	a	treaty	on	access	to	knowledge	–	a	new	
prohibition:	the	one	not	to	surpass	certain	maximum	standards	of	protection.	But	
then	it	would	reflect	an	excessive	detailing	of	those	standards,	transmuting	the	
treaty’s	formal	provisions	into	substantial	content	that	perhaps	would	be	better	if	
left	for	the	rules	task.	This	might	not	be	the	way	to	go.
	 What	 seems	 to	 be	 imperious	 of	 being	 carefully	 considered	 is	 how	 to	
reconcile	 this	 increasing	 scheme	 of	 intellectual	 property	 enforcement	 with	
the	 presumption	 this	 paper	 just	 examined	 in	 the	 section	 above	 –	 the	 strong	
presumption	 against	 retrogressive	 measures	 in	 relation	 to	 human	 rights.	 Is	 it	
really	possible	 to	understand	Article	20	of	Berne	as	 a	floor	of	 rights	 after	 the	
clarifications	brought	to	light	by	the	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	
Rights	with	respect	to	the	right	inserted	in	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR	which	
was	clearly	divided	from	intellectual	property	rights?		Is	the	TRIPS-Plus	agenda	
compatible	with	the	international	human	rights	framework?	Is	the	first	of	the	three-
199.	 Daniel	Gervais,	The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis	(Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2003)	at	p.	146.
200.	 Berne Convention,	supra note	38,	art.	20.
201.	 Gervais,	The TRIPS Agreement,	supra note	199	at	p.	95.
202.	 TRIPS,	supra	note	197,	art.	4:	“With	regard	to	the	protection	of	intellectual	property,	any	advantage,	favour,	
privilege	or	immunity	granted	by	a	Member	to	the	nationals	of	any	other	country	shall	be	accorded	
immediately	and	unconditionally	to	the	nationals	of	all	other	Members.”
203.	 Drahos,	“An	Alternative	Framework,”	supra note	160	at	pp.	6–7.
204.	 Okediji,	“Sustainable	Access,” supra	note	42.
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step	test	of	TRIPS	(Article	13)205	and	Berne	(Article	9(2))206	really	to	be	undertaken	
such	as	to	understand	that	exceptions	should	be	narrowly	defined	in	the	statutes,	
or	should	the	stakeholders	adopt	more	of	a	“CCH	fashion”	approach	to	such	an	
issue	–	a	large	and	liberal	construction	of	the	intellectual	property	framework	with	
respect	to	users’	rights?
The	adequate	measures	of	justiciability	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	
lie	in	the	response	to	these	questions.	If	there	is	a	customary	international	human	
right	of	access	to	knowledge,	it	should	be	considered	present	in	the	legal	system	
of	each	state,	and	also	 in	 the	 international	 stage.	A	positive	 framework	might	
help,	both	as	a	 treaty	on	access	 to	knowledge,	and	as	a	more	users’	oriented	
structure	of	domestic	 statutory	 law.	However,	we	 shall	 not	be	obliged	 to	wait	
for	 that	 if	 other	 norms	 and	 customs	 already	 bind.	 Indeed,	 “legally	 binding	
international	 human	 rights	 standards	 should	 operate	 directly	 and	 immediately	
within	the	domestic	legal	system	of	each	state	party,	thereby	enabling	individuals	
to	seek	enforcement	of	their	rights	before	national	courts	and	tribunals,”207	and,	
why	not	say,	before	dispute	settlement	bodies	of	the	same	United	Nations	that	
share	this	view.	The	right	to	access	must	be	considered	at	the	international	level,	
as	well	as	at	the	domestic	level.	Both	systems	are	not	dissociated.	On	the	one	
hand,	international	human	rights	law,	as	seen	in	the	preceding	sections,	frames	a	
presumption	of	conformity	of	the	domestic	laws	with	the	rights	that	flow	from	the	
practices	acted	upon	and	accepted	as	binding	by	the	international	community.	
On	the	other	hand,	Canadian	courts	are	no	more	than	nodes	of	an	international	
fabric	of	jurisprudence	that	is	also	influenced	by	their	decisions.	It	is	as	though	
the	vectors	defined	above	in	our	framework	had	corresponding	parallels	flowing	
in	opposite	directions.	Justiciability,	at	both	levels,	strengthens	this	fabric	and	is	
strengthened	accordingly,	in	a	wishful	expression	of	the	obligation	to	take	steps	
“individually	and	through	international	assistance	and	co-operation”	that	Article	
15(1)(c)	of	the	ICESCR	refers	to.
	 A	last	remark:	Weissbrodt	and	Schoff	raise	a	very	strong	argument,	which	
leads	us	to	ponder	whether	the	rules	of	TRIPS	–	as	the	rules	of	the	intellectual	
property	system	as	a	whole	–	can	be	practically	enforceable	in	spite	of	the	human	
rights	system.	Their	point	is	this:
A	nation	cannot	generally	absolve	itself	of	its	obligations	under	one	treaty	by	
ratifying	a	second	treaty	later.	In	a	situation	in	which	there	is	a	potential	conflict,	
the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Treaties	calls	for	the	interpretation	of	
the	two	treaties	so	as	to	give	effect	to	both.	It	might	be	argued	that	WTO	law,	
including	TRIPS,	qualifies	as	lex	specialis.	However,	that	argument	would	not	
exempt	nations	 from	their	human	rights	obligations	and	would	not	prevent	
205.	 TRIPS,	supra	note	197,	art.	13.
206.	 Berne Convention,	supra	note	38,	art.	9(2):
	 It	shall	be	a	matter	 for	 legislation	 in	 the	countries	of	 the	Union	to	permit	 the	reproduction	of	such	
works	 in	 certain	 special	 cases,	 provided	 that	 such	 reproduction	 does	 not	 conflict	 with	 a	 normal	
exploitation	of	the	work	and	does	not	unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	author.
207.	 ECOSOC,	General	Comment	9,	supra	note	191	at	para.	4.	It	is	also	important	to	consider	paragraph	15	of	
this	General	Comment,	which	reads:	“It	is	generally	accepted	that	domestic	law	should	be	interpreted	as	far	
as	possible	in	a	way	which	conforms	to	a	State’s	international	legal	obligations.	Thus,	when	a	domestic	
decision	maker	is	faced	with	a	choice	between	an	interpretation	of	domestic	law	that	would	place	the	State	
in	breach	of	the	Covenant	and	one	that	would	enable	the	State	to	comply	with	the	Covenant,	international	
law	requires	the	choice	of	the	latter.”
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human	rights	treaty	bodies	 from	assessing	the	human	rights	 implications	of	
intellectual	property	measures.208
If	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge	 was	 already	 present	 in	 the	 international	
human	 rights	 system	before	 TRIPS,	 as	 I	 am	 convinced	 it	was,	we	 should	 read	
the	enforcement	hinge	of	TRIPS	 in	 a	different	 fashion	 –	we	 shall	 consider	our	
framework	 and	 take	 due	 and	 express	 account	 of	 the	 right	 vector	 to	 render	
justiciable.
4.4. Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Knowledge
This	paper	has	thus	far	alluded	many	times	to	the	existence	of	a	human	right	of	
access	to	knowledge	and	argued	for	the	recognition	of	this	right	in	the	domestic	
and	international	human	rights	systems.	Here	I	will	go	further	in	conceptualizing	
such	a	right.	My	reader	may	have	already	grasped	its	existence	from	many	different	
sources	examined	above.	Be	it	by	the	reflection	of	such	right	by	the	Supreme	Court	
of	Canada	in	the	trilogy,	be	it	by	the	scrutiny	(and	denial)	of	any	supposed	human	
rights	nature	of	intellectual	property	rights,	inclusively	with	a	very	strong	comment	
on	authors’	rights	by	the	UN	body	in	charge	of	administering	the	International	
Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	be	it	by	the	proposition	of	a	
logical	 framework	 for	coping	with	 the	ever	 increasing	 international	 intellectual	
property	system	and,	conversely,	providing	for	the	fulfillment	and	justiciability	of	
users’	rights,	some	hints	were	already	given	above	on	the	existence	of	the	right	
to	access.	But	we	are	still	in	need	of	recognizing	its	more	direct	sources	and	its	
boundaries	as	a	manifestation	of	customary	international	human	rights	law.	
	 This	section	seeks	to	accomplish	two	different	tasks.	First,	 this	section	
will	portray	the	existence	of	the	right	to	access	in	some	formal	instruments	of	the	
UN	System	that	appear	to	be	at	the	very	core	of	what	I	will	call	its	conventional	
dimension.	 I	will	begin	with	a	slightly	more	theoretical	assessment	of	both	the	
Covenants	of	 the	UN	System,	and	then	will	 turn	 to	a	more	practical	approach	
of	instruments	of	the	UN	System	where	the	rights	of	access	to	knowledge	was	
expressly	 acknowledged	 to	 a	 lesser	or	greater	 extent.	 Second,	 this	paper	will	
confront	those	sources	with	a	brief	theoretical	scheme	in	which	I	will	explain	some	
characteristics	 I	can	see	as	defining	a	human	right	of	access	 to	knowledge:	 its	
multi-layered	nature	and	its	instrumental	nature	as	a	background	right,	a	measure	
of	measures	of	many	other	background	rights	recognized	in	international	human	
rights	 system.	 In	 doing	 so,	 this	 paper	will	 rely	 upon	 a	 brief	 analysis	 of	 James	
Harris’	human	rights	theory.
4.4.1.	The	Conventional	Dimension.
	 4.4.1.1.	The	Right	to	Access	in	the	ICCPR	and	in	the	ICESCR
The	two	instruments	from	which	we	can	capture	the	very	essence	of	the	right	to	
access	are	undoubtedly	the	two	international	covenants	which,	together	with	the	
208.	 David	Weissbrodt	and	Kell	Schoff,	“Human	Rights	Approach	to	Intellectual	Property	Protection:	The	Genesis	
and	Application	of	Sub-Commission	Resolution	2000/7,”	(2003)	5:1	Minnesota Intellectual Property Review	
1–46,	<http://mipr.umn.edu/archive/v5n1/Weissbrodt.pdf>	at	p.	13.
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Universal	Declaration	on	Human	Rights	and	two	other	protocols,	form	the	so-called	
International	Bill	of	Human	Rights	–	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	
Rights	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights.
	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 perceive	 that	 even	 though	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	
knowledge	 is	 not	 directly	 acknowledged	 in	 any	 of	 the	 dispositions	 of	 those	
instruments;	it	is	an	indispensable	tool	for	the	realization	of	the	rights	provided	
for	by	many	of	them.	In	this	sense,	we	could	say	that	the	right	to	access	at	the	
same	 time	underlies	and	distinguishes	 itself	 from	 the	 rights	entrenched	 in	 the	
ICCPR	and	the	ICESCR.	The	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	as	generally	affirmed,	
is	 neither	 the	 right	 to	 culture,	 the	 right	 to	education,	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	
information,	the	right	to	food,	nor	the	right	to	health,	and	at	the	same	time	it	is	
at	the	background	for	the	fulfillment	of	all	of	these	rights	–	it	is	as	basic	and	as	
essential	as	a	right	to	have	rights.	I	will	return	to	this	point	below.	The	importance	
here	is	to	take	into	account	that	the	realization	of	none	of	those	rights	referred	
to	below	would	be	possible	without	recognizing,	to	some	extent,	that	access	to	
knowledge	is	an	inherent	measure	for	respecting,	protecting	and	fulfilling	these	
rights.	 Their	 recognition,	 conversely,	 implies	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 adequate	
measures	for	their	implementation,	where	access	to	knowledge	is	perhaps	one	of	
the	most	essential.
	
4.4.1.1.1.	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights:	the	Importance	of	
Access	to	Knowledge	for	Self-Determination	and	the	Right	to	Take	Part	in	the	
Conduct	of	Public	Affairs
There	 are	 two	 common	 approaches	 when	 one	 analyzes	 the	 right	 to	 access	
in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 two	 covenants.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 address	 it	with	 respect	 to	
Article	15(1)	of	the	ICESCR,	as	a	natural	boundary	in	the	recognition	of	authors’	
rights.209	The	second	is	to	recognize	access	to	knowledge	in	the	context	of	the	
right	 to	 freedom	of	 expression,	 prescribed	by	Article	 19	 of	 the	 ICCPR,	which	
comprehends	the	“freedom	to	seek,	receive	and	impart	information	and	ideas	of	
all	kinds,	regardless	of	frontiers,	either	orally,	in	writing	or	in	print,	in	the	form	of	
art,	or	through	any	other	media	of	his	choice.”210		Some,	still,	such	as	Columbia	
University’s	Eben	Moglen,	speak	of	access	in	the	context	of	the	right	to	freedom	
of	thought	(Article	18	of	the	ICCPR).211
It	is	undeniable	that	those	(the	two	former,	at	least)	are	among	the	most	
important	 and	 evident	manifestations	 of	 a	 right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge,	 but	
others	may	be	thought	of	in	the	context	of	the	ICCPR.	Here	I	want	to	refer	to	two	
of	these,	which	are	almost	untouched	by	the	scholarly	literature	that	addresses	
the	 subject:	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 (Article	1	of	 the	 ICCPR)	and,	most	
unsuspectedly,	the	right	to	take	part	in	the	conduct	of	public	affairs	(Article	25	of	
the	ICCPR).	In	the	context	of	the	ICCPR,	both	of	these	rights,	as	I	explain	below,	
reflect	a	collective	and	an	individual	manifestation	of	political	rights.
To	 say	 that	 access	 to	 knowledge	 can	 definitely	 impact	 the	 realization	
of	political	 rights	 is	not	a	post-modern	vagary,	as	many	might	 think.	 It	 is	a	very	
209.	 See	Torremans,	“Copyright	as	a	Human	Right,”	supra	note	124.	
210.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	195,	art.	19.	See	Gendreau,	supra	note	22.	
211.	 Eben	Moglen,	“‘Die	Gedanken	Sind	Frei’:	Free	Software	and	the	Struggle	for	Free	Thought,	Opening	
Keynote,”	(2004) Wizards of OS 3,	<http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/berlin-keynote.html>.
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concrete	and	neglected	reality	of	the	information	age.	In	a	world	whose	immaterial	
borders	 and	 resources	 are	 as	 non-rivalrous	 as	 they	 are	 incessantly	 disputed,	 in	
which	minorities	strive	to	be	affirmed	at	the	same	time	as	the	powerful	touch	of	
the	global	networks	fragments	identities	and	allows	for	a	cacophony	of	discourses	
flowing	through	“cybercascades,”212	the	social-glue	of	our	peoples	and	the	very	
idea	of	nation	states	are	always	and	increasingly	at	stake.	In	the	same	pace,	the	
development	 of	 a	 media that	 in	 many	 cases	 turn	 to	 be	 much	 more	 powerful	
than	many	states	threatens	to	turn	life	in	society	into	a	kind	of	vassalage	of	their	
informational	feuds.213		The	power	will	lie	with	those	who	can	frame	collective	and	
individual	identity.	As	the	celebrated	sociologist	and	Berkeley	University’s	Manuel	
Castells	defines,	“the	social	construction	of	identity	always	takes	place	in	a	context	
marked	by	power	relationships.	[...]	[F]rom	a	sociological	perspective,	all	identities	
are	constructed.	[...]	[I]n	general	terms,	who	constructs	collective	identity,	and	for	
what,	largely	determines	the	symbolic	content	of	this	identity,	and	its	meaning	for	
those	identifying	with	it	or	placing	themselves	outside	of	it.”214
Access	 to	 knowledge,	 thus,	 matters	 not	 only	 for	 reasons	 of	 cultural	
indulgence	 and	 intellectual	 enrichment;	 it	 is	 part	 of	 the	 complex	 dynamic	 of	
power	in	the	contemporary	world.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	some	authors	call	for	the	
development	of	a	semiotic215	or	cultural	democracy,216	as	meaning	the	power	of	
individuals	to	actively	control	the	signs	and	symbols	that	will	ultimately	construe	
their	sources	of	meaning	and	experience	–	that	is	to	say,	their	identity.217	
As	Jack	Balkin	argues,	“[t]he	digital	revolution	places	freedom	of	speech	
in	a	new	light,”218	rendering	possible	an	amplified	participation	and	interaction	of	
individuals	in	the	construction	of	societal	meaning.	It	brings	a	democratic	culture	
into	existence.	Freedom	of	speech,	Balkin	defends,	 is	an	 important	 ingredient	
in	the	constitution	of	the	precise	idea	of	person	in	the	information	age	–	it	is	a	
process	that	is	at	the	same	time	interactive	and	appropriative,	which	benefits	from	
the	properties	of	routing	around	(reaching	audiences	directly)	and	glomming	on	
(appropriating	things	from	the	mass	media	as	raw	material	for	new	creations),219	
and	 therefore	 helps	 people	 to	 influence	 the	 semiological	 values	 of	 our	 time,	
collectively	taking	part	in	the	definition	of	who	they	are.
On	the	other	hand,	Balkin	presents	the	great	contradiction	of	the	digital	
age,	which	 lies	upon	the	twofold	nature	of	 information.	At	the	same	time	that	
new	information	technologies	aid	individual	participation	in	the	cultural	life,	they	
are	also	an	important	source	of	wealth	for	businesses,	which	seek	to	“[shut]	down	
and	 [circumscribe]	 the	exercise	of	 [...]	 freedom	and	participation.”220	 Trying	 to	
profit	from	this	twofold	nature,	media	corporations	invoke	the	constitution	both	
212.	 Cass	Sunstein,	Republic.com	(Princeton	University	Press,	2001)	at	p.	51.
213.	 Peter	Drahos,	Information Feudalism	(Earthscan	Publications	Ltd.,	2002).
214.	 Manuel	Castells,	The Power of Identity:	The Information age, Economy, Society, and Culture,	Volume	2 
(Blackwell	Publishers	Inc.,	2004)	at	p.	7.
215.	 See	William	W	Fisher	III,	Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment	(Stanford	
University	Press,	2004)	at	p.	28.	See	also	John	Fiske,	Television Culture: Popular Pleasures and Politics	
(Routledge,	2003)	at	p.	95.
216.	 Jack	M	Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture:	A	Theory	of	Freedom	of	Expression	for	the	
Information	Society”	(2004)	79:1	New York University Law Review	1–58,	<http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/
lawreview/issues/vol79/no1/NYU101.pdf>.
217.	 Castells,	The Power of Identity,	supra	note	214	at	p.	6.
218.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,”	supra	note	216	at	p.	2.
219.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,” supra	note	216	at	pp.	9–12.
220.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,” supra	note	216	at	p.	15.
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to	“[interpret]	the	free	speech	principle	broadly	to	combat	regulation	of	digital	
networks	and	narrowly	in	order	to	protect	and	expand	their	intellectual	property	
rights.”221		Regularly,	he	argues,	free	speech	doctrines	are	more	focused	on	the	
traditional	political	speech	process,	and	less	on	individual	autonomy	to	take	part	
on	the	cultural	process.	A	democratic	culture,	Balkin	argues,	is	much	more	than	a	
representative	democracy.	It	is	also	linked	to	the	protection	of	digital	speech	as	
“a	social	activity,	a	matter	of	interactivity,	of	give	and	take,”	which	“creates	new	
communities,	cultures	and	subcultures.”222		 In	the	information	age,	politics	and	
culture	overlap	and	intertwine	in	the	definition	of	the	democratic	discourse.
Thus,	 if	 free	 speech	 has	 to	 do	 with	 democracy,	 it	 is	 with	 a	 cultural	
democracy	much	broader	than	that	of	suffrage	or	mere	“deliberation	about	issues	
of	public	concern”	-	a	democracy	that	favors	the	possibilities	of	ordinary	people	
to	“gain	a	greater	say	over	the	 institutions	and	practices	that	shape	them	and	
their	 futures.”223 	The	protection	of	this	new	conception	of	 freedom	of	speech	
(and	democracy)	 also	demands	 a	 reinterpretation	of	 the	 role	of	governments,	
which	are	called	upon	to	promote	popular	participation,	open	designs	that	are	
suited	for	societal	control,	and	enforce	rights	against	censorship.	It	would	also	be	
necessary	to	change	a	rights-based	discourse	towards	a	perspective	of	values.	
That	is	to	say,	freedom	of	expression	should	be	protected	not	only	in	face	of	a	
possible	violation,	but	as	a	process	 per	se.	Then	we	would	be	able	to	speak	of	
free	speech	values	–	of	“participation,	access,	 interactivity,	democratic	control,	
and	the	ability	to	route	around	and	glom	on”224	-	which	would	be	embedded	in	
the	very	technological	infrastructure	of	our	society	itself.
There	are	some	 instances,	however,	of	debatable	direct	connection	to	
the	right	to	freedom	of	expression	(or	free	speech),	which	remain,	nonetheless,	of	
general	importance	to	all.	One	of	them	is	“code,”	the	software	that	computers	run.	
Code,	as	well	as	the	underlying	infrastructure	of	some	technologies	we	use	(e.g.	
the	internet),	or	some	possibilities	of	technological	uses	of	our	environment	(e.g.	
the	spectrum)	can	define	the	way	social	life	is	developing	in	the	information	age.	
It	can	define	the	way	by	which	legal	and	social	relationships	of	the	most	diverse	
kinds	are	carried	on,	and	it	can	influence	the	output	of	those	relationships.225	The	
simplest	example	that	has	an	 intrinsic	relation	with	democratic	practices	 is	 the	
code	of	a	voting	booth.	But	the	code	that	runs	in	our	personal	computers	and	
the	protocols	that	shape	the	internet	are	other	less-suspected	examples	of	how	
technology	can	frame	behavior.	Many	other	examples	can	be	thought	of.	
Some	 argue	 that	 code	 is	 speech,	 because	 “source	 code	 can	 be	 read	
or	understood	by	computer	programmers,	computer	hobbyists,	mathematicians,	
scientists,	and	other	professionals	who	are	trained	in	the	particular	programming	
221.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,”	supra	note	216	at	pp.	22-23.
222.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,”	supra	note	216	at	p.	3.
223.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,”	supra note	216	at	p.	35.
224.	 Balkin,	“Digital	Speech	and	Democratic	Culture,”	supra note	216	at	p.	54.
225.	 See	Lawrence	Lessig,	Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace	(Basic	Books,	1999),	arguing,	for	instance,	that	
“Code	constitutes	cyberspaces;	spaces	enable	and	disable	individuals	and	groups.	The	selections	about	
code	are	therefore	in	part	a	selection	about	who,	what,	and,	most	important,	what	ways	of	life	will	be	
enabled	and	disabled.”	at	p.88.	See	also	Neil	Postman,	Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to 
Technology	(Vintage	Books,	1993),	and	David	Post,	“The	‘Unsettled	Paradox’:	The	Internet,	the	State,	and	
the	Consent	of	the	Governed,”	(1998)	5:2	Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies	521,	<http://www.temple.
edu/lawschool/dpost/Sovhtml>.	See	also	Dan	L	Burk,	“Cyberlaw	and	the	Norms	of	Science,”	(1999)	Boston 
College Intellectual Property and Technology Forum,	<http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/
commentary/content/1999060502.html>.
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language	 in	 which	 the	 source	 code	 is	 written.”226	 	 Nonetheless,	 code	 is	 not	
directly	accessible	to	all	and,	at	least	in	an	intelligible	fashion,	does	not	regularly	
take	part	 in	 the	practical	 discourses	 of	 our	 society.	 It	 is	 a	 kind	of	 information	
of	universal	 relevance,	but	 it	 can	only	be	understood	by	a	 specialized	core	of	
people.	Thus,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 think	of	why	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	expression	
would	explain	the	overture	of	code	for	those	who	are	not	able	to	read	it.	Still,	
some	could	argue	that	those	who	are	not	able	to	read	it	could	eventually	learn	
to.	They	would	say	that	computer	software	is	not	so	old	an	invention	and	that	
digital	 literacy	is	 likely	to	increase	with	time.	Maybe	one	day	all	of	us	will	read	
and	write	code.	They	would	say	that,	in	a	nothing-forced	analogy,	we	may	think	
about	the	assimilation	of	written	literacy	throughout	history	and	the	privilege	that	
alphabetization,	during	many	centuries,	was.	We	could	also	analogize	code	 to	
law	and	conclude	that	even	though	not	every	citizen	is	instructed	in	legal	literacy,	
laws	must	be	written	in	a	clear	way,	such	that	those	who	want	to	study	the	law	can	
understand	it.	One	may	think	of	several	institutes	which	were	created	by	the	law,	
and	which	with	 time	 spread	 to	 common	understanding	and	defined	particular	
characteristics	of	particular	societies,227	and	which	suddenly	happened	to	define	
the	way	the	whole	world	is	established.	Hence,	not	only	the	present,	but	also	the	
possible	intelligibility	of	code	by	all	would	justify	the	idea	of	its	openness.
I	think	this	is	a	reasonable	argument,	and	I	have	sponsored	it	elsewhere,	
albeit	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 context.228	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 appear	 that,	 at	
the	present,	access	 to	code	can	be	 justified	simply	with	basis	 in	a	 freedom	of	
expression	 claim.	The	argument	 that	maybe	one	day	 its	cultural	and	 scientific	
aspects	 will	 be	 relevant	 to	 all	 does	 not	 explain	 why,	 already	 at	 the	 current	
moment,	code	does	practically	influence	their	lives.	The	situation	is	also	different	
from	those	where	human	rights	instruments	protect	minorities	or	certain	groups	
of	people	for	reasons	of	gender,	age	or	disability.	In	cases	like	these,	the	answer	
is	 that	 those	groups	 simply	 have	particular	 interests	 that	 are	 universal	 among	
them,	and	which	demand	protection	(at	least)	alike.	The	situation	also	differs	from	
others	of	contingent	universality,	like	those	of	fair	trial	defenses	for	criminals.	The	
argument	for	the	universality	of	human	rights	in	those	cases	is	that	everyone	who	
eventually	 falls	 into	 those	 categories	will	 be	protected	 in	 the	 same	 fashion.229	
With	 respect	 to	 code,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	All	 of	 us	 are	 already	 affected	 by	
code,	and	thus	may	have	an	interest	in	accessing	code	that	does	not	necessarily	
rely	upon	our	ability	 to	 read	the	 instructions	 it	contains;	we	may	hold	such	an	
interest	even	 if	we,	ourselves,	 are	 irremediably	 incompetent	 to	understand	 its	
instructions.	Whether	all	the	code	in	the	world	must	have	its	source	opened	is	
another	discussion	which	goes	too	far	for	this	paper.	What	we	must	notice	here	
is	that	the	right	to	access	code,	if	it	exists,	must	be	more	than	simply	the	right	to	
receive	or	impart	information,	even	though	it	also	involves	access	to	information	
226.	 Rod	Dixon,	“When	Efforts	to	Conceal	May	Actually	Reveal:	Whether	First	Amendment	Protection	of	
Encryption	Source	Code	and	the	Open	Source	Movement	Support	Re-Drawing	the	Constitutional	Line	
Between	the	First	Amendment	and	Copyright,”	(2000)	1	Columbia Science & Technology Law Review	3,	
<http://www.stlr.org/html/volume1/encryption.pdf>		at	p.	17.
227.	 For	a	formidable	account	on	how	the	identity	of	the	Roman	and	the	Greek	peoples	were	influenced	by	their	
laws	and	institutions,	see	Numa	Denis	Fustel	de	Coulanges,	The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws 
and Institutions of Greece and Rome	(The	John	Hopkins	University	Press,	1980).	
228.	 Marcelo	Thompson,	“The	Democracy	of	FLOSS:	Software	Procurement	under	the	Democratic	Principle”	
[forthcoming].	
229.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra note	113.
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in	many	cases.	Here	the	metaphor	of	law	is	useful	again.	Even	though	freedom	of	
information	justifies	access	to	law	to	some	extent,	something	more	than	freedom	
of	information	does	it	for	those	who	cannot	understand	law.
Code,	as	law,	must	be	accessible	for	democratic	reasons.	Code,	and	law,	
and	other	signs	and	symbols	of	the	information	age	must	be	accessible	because,	
in	 different	 fashions,	 they	 determine	 the	 political	 constitution	 of	 our	 world.	
They	determine	the	identity,	the	heritage,	the	contours	of	a	nation,	a	society,	a	
people	and	their	 individuals.	The	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	in	these	cases,	
is	connected	to	a	claim	of	a	second	order,	which	is	different	from	the	immediate	
capacity	of	receiving	or	 imparting	 information.	A	slightly	bizarre	but	functional	
example	 is	 the	 right	 to	 food.	Many	connect	 the	 right	of	access	 to	knowledge	
to	 the	 right	 to	 food.	 Even	 with	 respect	 to	 academics,	 it	 would	 be	 quite	 an	
exaggeration	to	speak	of	eating	knowledge.	But	access	to	knowledge	here	exists	
in	the	sense	that	patents	over	food	production	techniques	–	genetic	information,	
for	instance	–	cannot	be	used	against	those	who	are	starving.	Even	though	those	
who	have	the	right	to	food	will	not	read	the	ribosome	of	the	vegetables	they	eat,	
terminator	seeds	cannot	be	used	to	impede	husbandmen	to	auto-generate	their	
subsequent	crops,	and	thus	to	prejudice	those	who	are	affected	by	the	control	
of	 the	knowledge	which	 is	embedded	 in	 them.	The	same	happens	with	code.	
Even	those	who	are	not	able	to	read	it,	and	thus	do	not	have	an	interest	in	it	as	
expression,	are	affected	by	it.
Access	 to	 knowledge	 is	 instrumental	 to	 the	 right	 to	 food,	 as	 it	 is	
instrumental	 to	 the	exercise	of	democracy	 in	 the	 so-called	“information	age.”	
In	the	latter	case,	excessive	protection	of	knowledge	on	behalf	of	rights-holders	
is	harmful	to	the	democratic	discourse.	As	Yochai	Benkler	points	out,	with	two	
important	conclusions	for	us:
[t]he	strongest	democratic	 justifications	of	highly	protective	copyright	serve	
what	 Baker	 has	 described	 as	 the	 elitist	 conception	 of	 democracy	 and	 one	
version	of	what	might	be	thought	of	as	a	republican	conception	of	democracy.	
Strong	protection	 is	 least	 attractive	when	measured	by	 its	 effect	on	 liberal	
conceptions	of	democracy	–	whether	one	holds	 some	version	of	a	pluralist	
conception,	 rather	 than	 republican,	 discourse-centered	 conception	 of	
democracy.230	 […]	 If	 democracy	 means	 something	 more	 than	 an	 oligarchy	
of	 large	 market	 actors	 interacting	 with	 government	 bureaucrats	 who	 are	
watched	by	a	 large	commercial	press	with	occasional	elections	in	which	the	
masses	select	from	among	the	elites	who	will	run	the	government,	then	this	
argument	 in	 favor	 of	 strong	 rights	 is	 insufficient	 to	 justify	 a	 preference	 for	
strong	exclusive	rights	in	information.231	Relying	on	a	set	of	actors	to	define	the	
common	agenda	and	culture	is	only	acceptable	if	these	actors	are	“virtuous”	
in	 the	 republican	 sense	 –	 that	 is,	 if	 they	 set	 the	 agenda	 and	 the	 common	
culture	with	reference	to	the	common	good.232	The	capacity	of	individuals	in	
small	and	large	groups	to	come	together	to	discuss	their	interests	is	central	
to	a	well-functioning	democracy	under	both	these	liberal	conceptions.	Also,	
the	capacity	of	non-proprietary	production	or	service-based	provision	of	the	
230.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	182.
231.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	184.
232.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	185.
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platforms	over	which	 individuals	meet	to	engage	 in	dialogue	and	collective	
self-definition	becomes	central	to	democratic	enterprise.233
Benkler’s	argument	of	the	democratic	principle,	thus,	involves	both	those	
instances	where	the	cultural	discourse	happens	within	the	flow	of	information,	and	
those	others	where	political	practices	happen	upon	such	a	flow	–	where,	albeit	not	
readable,	albeit	not	expressly, code	exerts	a	decisive	influence	on	these	practices.	
Control	of	information	can	determine	the	shape,	the	contours,	the	features	and	
characteristics	of	political	practices	in	both	the	cases.	Here	we	might	understand	
political	 practices	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 practices	 which	 should	 pertain	 to	 the	 polis,	
inclusively	those	referring	to	cultural	expressions,	and	practices,	which	increasingly	
come	to	be	dominated	by	powerful	owners	of	intellectual	property	rights.
Hence,	one	might	argue	that,	more	for	its	connection	with	political	rights	
in	this	broader	conception	than	merely	with	the	right	to	freedom	of	information,	
access	to	knowledge	matters.	Access	to	knowledge,	in	this	sense,	is	instrumental	
to	the	realization	of	both	the	right	to	self-determination	and	the	right	to	take	part	
in	the	conduct	of	public	affairs.	It	is	important,	thus,	to	understand	those	rights.
With	respect	to	the	right	to	self-determination,	authors	hesitate	to	classify	
it.	As	Freeman	and	Van	Ert	explain,	“[t]here	is	still	no	general	consensus	about	the	
nature	or	scope	of	the	right.	It	remains	unclear	how	the	right	can	be	legitimately	
exercised,	who	bears	what	obligations	and	 to	what	extent	 it	 is	a	 right	 subject	
to	public	limitations	or	derogation	during	a	national	emergency.”234		For	Javaid	
Rehman,	“[s]elf-determination	is	a	difficult	right	to	define	in	international	law	and	
there	is	significant	controversy	as	to	the	exact	parameters	of	this	right.”235	Still,	as	
we	are	dealing	with	expelling	ghosts	and	mythical	beasts,	very	appropriate	is	the	
question	raised	by	Rodolfo	Stavenhagen	whether	self-determination	is	“a	right	
or	a	demon.”236
Self-determination	is	a	right	that	many	times	appears	in	questions	linked	
to	the	autonomy	of	people	of	ethnic	minorities.	But	its	understanding	is	broader	
than	that.	It	was	already	considered	by	the	International	Court	of	Justice	as	“one	
of	 the	 essential	 principles	 of	 contemporary	 international	 law.”237	 For	 no	 other	
reason,	it	was	placed	in	Article	1	of	both	the	ICCPR	and	the	ICESCR	and	linked	to	
issues	of	political	status	as	well	as	of	economic,	social	and	cultural	development.	
Steiner	and	Alston	recognize	in	it	the	status	of	a	“super-rule”:	“a	concept	that	
stands	 apart	 from	 the	 normal	 discourse	 of	 rights	 and	 directly	 affects	 political	
power	and	organization	within	and	among	states.”238	
The	 right	 concerns	 issues	 of	 both	 “‘internal	 self-determination’	 –	 that	
is,	forms	of	self-government	and	separateness	within	a	state	and	‘external	self-
determination,’	meaning	separation	from	the	state.”239	It	is	a	right	that	refers	to	
peoples,	as	defined	in	Article	1	of	the	ICCPR,	and	in	this	sense	was	recognized	by	
233.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	187	(emphasis	added).
234.	 Freeman	and	VanErt,	International Human Rights Law,	supra	note	80	at	p.	82.
235.	 Javaid	Rehman,	International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach	(Longman,	2003)	at	p.	65.
236.	 Rodolfo	Stavenhagen	“Self-Determination:	Right	or	Demon?”	(1993)	67	IV Law and Society Trust	12	
reproduced	in	part	in	Henry	Steiner	and	Philip	Alston,	eds.,	International Human Rights in Context: law, 
politics, morals: text and materials	(Oxford	University	Press,	2000)	at	p.	986.	
237.	 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia),	1995	International	Courts	of	Justice	84,	<http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/84/6949.pdf>	at	p.102.
238.	 Steiner	and	Alston,	International Human Rights in Context, supra note	147	at	p.	1248.
239.	 Steiner	and	Alston, International Human Rights in Context, supra note	147	at	p.	1249.
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the	United	Nations	in	two	different	opportunities.240		In	its	core,	Article	1	reads:
(1)	All	peoples	have	the	right	of	self-determination.	By	virtue	of	that	right	they	
freely	determine	their	political	status	and	freely	pursue	their	economic,	social	
and	cultural	development.
(2)	All	peoples	may,	for	their	own	ends,	freely	dispose	of	their	natural	wealth	
and	resources	without	prejudice	to	any	obligations	arising	out	of	international	
economic	 co-operation,	 based	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	 mutual	 benefit,	 and	
international	law.	In	no	case	may	a	people	be	deprived	of	its	own	means	of	
subsistence.
	
In	its	General	Comment	23,	the	Human	Rights	Committee,	distinguishing	
the	right	to	self-determination	from	individual	human	rights	of	ethnic,	religious,	
and	linguistic	minorities	(Article	27	of	the	ICCPR),	stressed	that	“[t]he	Covenant	
draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	 and	 the	 rights	
protected	 under	 Article	 27.	 The	 former	 is	 expressed	 to	 be	 a	 right	belonging	
to	peoples	 and	 is	 dealt	with	 in	 a	 separate	part	 (Part	 I)	 of	 the	Covenant.	 Self-
determination	is	not	a	right	cognizable	under	the	Optional	Protocol.
The	same	parallel	which	 the	Committee	traced	between	Article	1	and	
Article	 27	 can	 be	 traced	 between	Article	 1	 and	Article	 25	 of	 the	 ICCPR:	 the	
right	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	conduct	of	public	 affairs.	Both	provisions,	 the	 former	
relating	 to	 peoples	 and	 the	 latter	 to	 individuals,	 deal	 with	 political	 rights	 in	
different	ways.	As	such,	they	are	respectively	related	to	collective	and	individual	
expressions	of	political	autonomy.	These	expressions	also	encounter	a	parallel	
in	 the	differentiation	between	 the	 idea	of	a	cultural	 self-determination	 (Article	
1	of	the	ICESCR)	and	the	content	of	the	rights	described	in	Article	15(1)(a)	and	
(b)	of	 the	 ICESCR,	as	 transcribed	 in	 section	4.1.241	 In	 this	 case,	while	 the	 idea	
of	 a	 cultural-self	 determination	 deals	 with	 a	 collective	 expression	 of	 cultural	
autonomy	 (also	 expressed	 by	 the	 word	 “peoples”),	 Article	 15	 deals	 with	 an	
individual	manifestation	of	it.	Autonomy,	however,	as	we	must	understand	it,	is	
not	necessarily	linked	to	one	or	the	other	of	its	dimensions	(political	or	cultural).	
As	Benkler	wisely	puts,	“[a]utonomy	is	a	distinctly	personal	and	humanistic	value.	
Autonomy	relates	to	a	capacity	or	condition	of	an	individual	qua	individual,	not	
as	a	citizen	of	a	state	or	constituent	of	a	community.”242	Nonetheless,	it	can	at	the	
same	time	be	linked	to	both	those	dimensions,	as	soon	as	they	are	as	different	
as	overlapping	manifestations	of	autonomy	as	a	background	for	the	expansion	of	
collective	and	individual	potentialities.
	 It	is	important	to	make	a	remark	at	this	point,	before	further	continuing	
to	address	how	the	 ideas	of	political	and	cultural	autonomy	 relate	to	the	right	
of	 access	 to	 knowledge.	When	 speaking	 about	 autonomy,	 I	 do	 not	 speak	 of	
autonomy	 regimes	 that	oppose	 the	 international	human	 rights	movement	and	
240.	 See	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	“The	rights	of	minorities	(Art.	27):	General	
Comment	No.	23”	(8	April	1994),<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?
Opendocument>,	U.N.	Doc.	CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add.5	at	para.	3.1.	See	also	Lubicon Lake Band v Canada,	
Communication	No.	167/1984	(26	March	1990),	U.N.	Doc.	Supp.	No.	40	(A/45/40),	<http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm>	at	para.	1	and	ICCPR,	supra	note	199,	art.	1	(emphasis	added).
241.	 See	ICESCR,	supra note	118,	art.	4.1.
242.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	189.
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develop	 atomistic	 conceptions	 of	 communities	 and	 individuals.	 This	 is	 not	 an	
essay	on	secession	or	 libertarianism.	In	the	same	manner,	 I	do	not	believe	in	a	
language	of	rights	that	can	undermine	individual	and	collective	autonomy.	It	 is	
important,	thus,	to	focus	on	autonomy	through	a	balanced	perspective.	
As	Henry	Steiner	explains,	on	the	one	hand:
To	a	lesser	or	greater	degree,	autonomy	schemes	frustrate	a	major	objective	
of	 the	 human	 rights	 movement	 of	 assuring	 that	 societies	 remain	 open	 to	
challenge	and	change.	That	movement	institutionalizes	no	one	ideal	of	social	
order.	…	To	the	extent	that	autonomy	regimes	protect	historical	differences	
but	 inhibit	 creation,	as	 it	were	of	 fresh	differences,	 they	would	convert	 the	
human	 rights	 movement’s	 framework	 of	 protection	 of	 open	 inquiry	 and	
advocacy	into	the	protection	of	static	traditions.”243
On	the	other	hand,	he	points	out	that	some	rights	have	a	collective	dimension	
due	 to	 the	need	 to	protect	 collective	 cohesion	as	a	means	of	 conserving	and	
transmitting	social	values,	and,	hence,	conserving	the	very	existence	of	diversity.	
In	those	cases,	autonomy	regimes	can	meet	such	a	purpose.	For	him,	“[g]roups	
and	communities,	not	isolated	individuals,	transmit	culture	from	one	generation	
to	the	next.	They	embody	and	give	significance	to	cultural	and	social	differences	
in	a	society.	Hence	we	see	the	link	between	autonomy	regimes	and	an	ideal	of	
maintaining	diversity.	Since	those	regimes	protect,	indeed	entrench,	diversity	in	
group	terms,	they	must	constitute	an	effective	means	to	realize	this	fundamental	
human	rights	ideal.”244
	 I	 should	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 the	 key	 for	 understanding	 the	
circumstances	in	which	autonomy	will	fit	a	human	rights	regime	is	not	subjective,	
i.e.	that	it	does	not	lie	in	a	quantitative	differentiation	among	subjects	(groups	or	
individuals).	I	believe	that	both	collective	and	individual	perspectives	of	autonomy	
might	find	their	spaces	in	the	complex	fabric	of	interdependent	autonomies	that	
must	characterize	the	human	rights	system.	Autonomy	offers	possibilities	for	both	
individual	and	collective	realization	of	human	rights.	The	key,	as	I	understand	it,	is	
objective.	The	key	has	to	do	with	balance	as	well	as	with	design.
It	is	important	to	balance	different	autonomies	that	intertwine	and	are	of	
mutual	importance.	The	natural	example	within	the	scope	of	this	paper	would	be	
to	find	balance	among	authors’	and	users’	rights	–	that,	on	the	one	hand,	both	
must	conserve	 their	autonomy	 to	a	certain	extent,	but	also	 that,	on	 the	other	
hand,	the	flow	of	control	and	access	to	knowledge	will	inherently	depend	upon	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 balance.	As	 Benkler	 explains,	 “[a]	widely	 dispersed	 system	
of	information	production,	which	produces	a	wide	range	of	diverse	information	
about	and	representations	of	how	life	can	be,	serves	autonomy	…	just	as	it	serves	
robust	 democratic	 discourse.	 Furthermore,	 large-scale	 commercial	media	 that	
occupy	most	of	the	channels	of	communications	and	control	most	of	the	cultural	
raw	materials	 from	which	expression	 is	made	have	substantial	power	 to	shape	
the	perception	of	alternative	 life	choices	available	to	many	 individuals.”245	 It	 is	
243.	 Henry	Steiner,	“Ideals	and	Counter-Ideals	in	the	Struggle	Over	Autonomy	Regimes	for	Minorities,”	(1991)	
66:5	Notre Dame Law Review	1539	at	p.	1552.	
244.	 	Steiner,	“Ideals	and	Counter-Ideals,”	supra	note	243	at	p.	1549.	
245.	 Benkler,	“Through	the	Looking	Glass,”	supra	note	99	at	p.	189.
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important	that	the	control	of	the	flux	of	knowledge	is	equidistant	of	authors	and	
users.	It	is	important	to	find	and	foster	the	balance.
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	design	 of	 the	 legal	 institutions	
of	 the	 international	and	domestic	 intellectual	property	 systems	 is	adequate	 to	
the	needs	of	each	people,	and	that	no	people	or	individuals	or	groups	within	a	
people	can	undermine	the	autonomy	of	other	people	or	 individuals	or	groups	
within	other	peoples	to	realize	their	right	of	access	to	knowledge	–	and	thus	to	
exercise	 their	political	 and	cultural	 autonomies,	both	at	 the	collective	and	 the	
individual	levels.
In	 sum,	my	 belief	 is	 that	 both	 collective	 and	 individual	 dimensions	 of	
political	rights	are	affected	by	the	design	of	intellectual	property	institutions	and	
the	 extent	 to	which	 these	 foster	 or	 restrict	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge.	
Autonomy,	 balanced	 autonomy,	 autonomy	 exercised	 in	 reciprocity,	 and	 with	
solidarity,	are	concepts	inherent	to	both	dimensions	of	political	rights.	Shaping	
intellectual	property	institutions	properly	and	allowing	for	an	accurate	expression	
of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	are	key	to	promote	autonomy	in	this	balanced	
sense,	and	thus	to	promote	the	fulfillment	of	both	the	rights	to	self-determination	
and	the	right	to	take	part	in	the	conduct	of	public	affairs	in	the	new	and	complex	
dynamics	of	power	in	the	information	age.	States	must	have	the	power	and	the	
duty	to	promote	the	realization	of	those	rights.
A	last	remark:	it	is	worth	considering	how	the	recognition	of	the	right	of	
access	to	knowledge	in	the	context	of	the	ICCPR	can	benefit	its	realization	and	
its	justiciability.	For	those	who,	even	after	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	
the	Treaties,	insist	on	understanding	that,	at	least	theoretically,	economic,	social	
and	cultural	rights	have	a	lesser	degree	of	priority	in	their	implementation,	maybe	
the	arguments	above	can	foster	a	different	and	more	robust	comprehension	with	
respect	to	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.
4.4.1.1.2.	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights
Much	 has	 been	 already	 said	 in	 previous	 sections	 about	 the	 relationship	 of	
intellectual	property	rights	and	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	
and	 Cultural	 Rights.	 I	 focused,	 particularly,	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
different	dimensions	of	the	right	present	in	Article	15	of	the	ICESCR,	especially	
in	light	of	the	discussions	of	a	possible	human	rights	nature	of	copyright.	The	last	
section	also	addressed	Article	1	of	the	ICECSR,	defending	the	importance	of	the	
right	of	access	to	knowledge	for	the	fulfillment	of	the	right	to	self-determination.	
I	 argued	 that	 both	 its	 political	 and	 cultural	 dimensions	 come	 to	 overlap	 and	
intertwine	in	the	information	age.	The	right	to	self-determination,	in	this	sense,	
with	 respect	 to	 the	 ICESCR,	 would	 be	 the	 collective	 expression	 of	 a	 cultural	
autonomy.	Such	a	cultural	autonomy	would	also	be	inherent	to	the	realization	of	
the	right	present	in	Article	15(1)(a)	and	(b),	albeit	in	this	case	we	would	be	dealing	
with	an	individual	expression	of	it	–	which	intertwines	with	that	individual	political	
autonomy	intrinsic	to	the	right	prescribed	in	Article	25	of	the	ICCPR	(the	right	to	
take	part	in	the	conduct	of	public	affairs).
But	 other	 rights	 present	 at	 the	 Covenant	 are	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	
right	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge.	 In	 his	 “Conceptualizing	 the	 Right	 of	 Access	 to	
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Technology,”246	Harvard	University’s	Professor	of	American	Legal	History,	Morton	
Horwitz,	 names	 four	 justifications	 for	 a	 right	 to	 access,	 namely:	 the	 right	 to	
education,	 the	right	to	 language,	the	right	to	tools,	and	the	right	to	property.	
It	 is	important	to	understand	that,	in	a	broad	perspective,	my	argument	in	this	
paper	on	behalf	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	must	be	extended	to	the	
technologies	that	are	inherent	to	the	realization	of	such	a	right	–	and	it	is	also	in	
this	sense	that,	in	the	end,	I	will	defend	its	nature	as	a	multi-layered	right.
The	 right	 to	education	 (Article	13	of	 the	 ICESCR)	does	not	demand	a	
lengthier	 analysis.	 Access	 to	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 has	 too	much	 of	 an	
obvious	 role	 in	education.	We	should	 just	point	out	 that	 this	could	have	been	
reflected	in	CCH,247	when	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	allowed	for	a	large	and	
liberal	interpretation	of	the	term	“research.”	I	will,	however,	refer	to	one	particular	
point	with	respect	to	Article	13	further	in	the	lines	below.
The	right	to	tools,	as	I	can	understand	from	Horwitz’s	reasoning,	can	be	
analogized	with	both	the	right	to	work	and	the	right	to	an	adequate	standard	of	
living	(Articles	6	and	7	of	the	ICESCR),	and	is	related	to	an	individual	agency	or,	
again,	autonomy	in	a	market	economy.	As	Horwitz	argues,	access	to	information	
technology	can	be	conceived	of	“as	a	 tool,	both	 literally	and	metaphorically.”	
Speaking	about	statutes	 that	exempt	mechanics’	 tools	 from	seizure	 in	debt	or	
bankruptcy,	he	explains	that:
if	workers’	tools	could	be	seized	workers	would	be	deprived	of	the	very	means	
of	staying	out	of	insolvency	in	the	future.	Our	interest	in	tools	as	an	analogy	
is	that	it	expresses	the	idea	that	the	acquisition	of	certain	things	like	“tools”	
may	be	specially	protected	because	 they	are	 regarded	as	a	prerequisite	 to	
workers	participating	 in	a	market	economy	without	 losing	all	of	their	actual	
autonomy	or	agency.	
To	extend	this	analogy,	can	books	be	thought	of	as	tools?	Are	there	similar	
exemptions	 for,	 say,	 the	 professional	 library	 of	 a	 doctor,	 lawyer,	 minister,	
or	 teacher?	 From	books,	 it	would	be	 a	 short	 step	 to	 including	 information	
technology	in	the	privileged	circle	of	tools.248
The	 following	 right,	 the	 right	 to	 language,	 from	 my	 reading	 of	 his	
conception,	has	more	complex	understanding	within	the	human	rights	framework,	
as	 language	 is	 generally	 framed	within	 both	 the	 ICCPR	 and	 the	 ICESCR	 as	 a	
safeguard	against	discrimination	and,	in	one	situation	pertaining	to	the	ICCPR,	
an	 individual	 right	 corresponding	 to	 the	 collective	 right	 of	 self-determination	
(Article	 27	 of	 the	 ICCPR).249	 Language,	 with	 respect	 to	 technology,	 is	 for	
Horwitz	 something	 that	Walter	Ong	grasped	 in	 his	paramount	work:250	 a	 kind	
of	technological	literacy.	“It	is	not	difficult	to	conceive	of	access	to	information	
technology	as	access	to	a	new	kind	of	primary	language	that,	like	English,	is	an	
246.	 Morton	J	Horwitz,	“Conceptualizing	the	Right	of	Access	to	Technology,”	(2004)	79:1	Washington Law Review	
105-118,	<http://projects.ischool.washington.edu/lawsymposium/docs/horwitz.pdf>.
247.	 See	CCH,	supra	note	9.
248.	 Horwitz,	“Conceptualizing	the	Right	of	Access	to	Technology,”	supra	note	246	at	p.	113.
249.	 “In	those	States	in	which	ethnic,	religious	or	linguistic	minorities	exist,	persons	belonging	to	such	minorities	
shall	not	be	denied	the	right,	in	community	with	the	other	members	of	their	group,	to	enjoy	their	own	culture,	
to	profess	and	practise	their	own	religion,	or	to	use	their	own	language”:	ICCPR,	supra note	195,	art.	27.
250.	 Walter	Ong,	Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word	(Methuen,	1982).
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indispensable	prerequisite	for	becoming	a	full	participant	in	modern	society	and	
economy.”251		Hence,	if	access	to	technology,	like	language,	shapes	access	to	the	
external	world,	we	should	also	understand,	with	Walter	Ong,	that	the	opposite	
occurs.	Technological	literacy	can	shape	individuals,	and	turn	into	a	dehumanizing	
process.	In	his	words:
The	fact	 is	that	by	using	a	mechanical	contrivance,	a	violinist	or	an	organist	
can	express	something	poignantly	human	that	cannot	be	expressed	without	
the	mechanical	contrivance.	To	achieve	such	expression	of	course	the	violinist	
or	organist	has	to	have	interiorized	the	technology,	made	the	tool	or	machine	
a	second	nature,	a	psychological	part	of	himself	or	herself.	This	calls	for	years	
of	‘practice’,	learning	how	to	make	the	tool	do	what	it	can	do.	Such	shaping	
of	 a	 tool	 to	 oneself,	 learning	 a	 technological	 skill,	 is	 hardly	 dehumanizing.	
The	use	of	 a	 technology	can	enrich	 the	human	psyche,	enlarge	 the	human	
spirit,	 intensify	 its	 interior	 life.	Writing	 is	 an	 even	more	 deeply	 interiorized	
technology	than	instrumental	musical	performance	is.	252
This,	of	course	has	transindividual,	societal	implications.	The	shaping	of	
technology,	as	the	shaping	of	language,	has	to	do	with	the	shaping	of	a	people.	
And	here	we	turn	again	to	our	reasoning	on	self-determination,	in	order	to	see	
the	 right	 to	 language	more	 as	 a	 collective	 right	 than	 an	 individual	 one	 in	 the	
international	 human	 rights	 framework	 (in	 the	 circumstances	 that	 do	 not	meet	
Article	 27	 of	 the	 ICCPR).	 In	 general	 cases	 I	 cannot	 understand	 its	 individual	
expression,	with	 respect	 to	 individual	autonomy,	as	 something	external	 to	 the	
right	 to	 education	 and	 the	 right	 to	 culture	 themselves,	 as	 already	 referred	 to	
above.253	 	Hence,	 if	 technology,	 as	 a	 language,	 has	 to	do	with	education	 and	
culture,	it	follows	that	access	to	technological	education	and	culture	demands	to	
be	read	through	a	broader	lens.	This	lens	encompasses	autonomy	of	the	person	
to	access	the	signs	and	symbols	that	shape	his	or	her	identity.	As	what	one	uses	
turns	to	be	relevant	for	who	one	is,	one	has	the	right	to	be	more	educated	and	
cultured	of	what	one	uses	to	educate	and	culture	him	or	herself,	openness	is	key.
A	very	 important	case	 that	can	underline	 the	 importance	of	providing	
the	means	to	access	for	exercising	the	right	to	language,	in	the	context	of	Article	
27	of	the	ICCPR,	is	Lovelace	v	Canada,	a	case	recognized	by	the	Human	Rights	
Committee	under	the	Optional	Protocol	to	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	
and	Political	Rights	(examined	here	for	sequential	reasons).254		In	that	case,	Ms.	
Sandra	Lovelace	lost	her	status	as	an	Indian	under	the	Indian	Act	after	marrying	
a	non-Indian	man.	Later	on,	divorced,	she	sought	to	return	to	her	native	 land,	
the	Tobique	Reserve,	but	was	not	allowed	to	by	the	Canadian	government.	The	
Human	Rights	Committee,	on	assessing	her	communication,	understood	that	her	
251.	 Horwitz,	“Conceptualizing	the	Right	of	Access	to	Technology,”	supra	note	246	at	p.	111.
252.	 Ong,	Orality and Literacy,	supra	note	250	at	p.	83.	
253.	 And	that	is	why	scholars	make	a	remarkable	and	sometimes	compassionate	effort	to	defend	the	recognition	
of	the	human	right	to	use	the	own	language	in	situations	not	comprehended	in	Article	27	of	the	ICCPR.	See	
Anna-Miria	Mühlke,	“The	Right	to	Language	and	Linguistic	Development:	Deafness	from	a	Human	Rights	
Perspective,”	(2000)	40:2	Virginia Journal of International Law	705–762.	See	also	Leslie	V	Dery,	“Hear	My	
Voice:	Reconfiguring	The	Right	to	Testify	to	Encompass	the	Defendant’s	Choice	of	Language,”	(2002)	16:3	
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal	545–600.
254.	 Lovelace v Canada,	(1981)	Human	Rights	Committee,	Communication	No.	R.26/24,	30	July	1981,	UN.	Doc.	
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977,	<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/cc245da4e1c73a55c1256a16003b21a8?OpenD
ocument>	[Lovelace].
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rights	under	the	Indian	Act	had	to	be	separated	from	her	rights	under	Article	27	of	
ICCPR.	Under	the	latter,	she	could	still	be	considered	to	pertain	to	a	minority,	and	
thus	should	have	her	right	to	enjoy	her	own	culture	and	to	use	her	own	language.	
As	 there	was	 no	other	place	where	 she	 could	do	 it	 but	 the	Tobique	Reserve,	
her	right	to	access	the	land	should	be	respected,	as	a	means	for	using	her	own	
language,	even	though	the	right	to	live	on	a	reserve	is	not	as	such	guaranteed	by	
Article	27	of	the	Covenant.	Per	the	words	of	the	Committee:
the	 right	 of	 Sandra	 Lovelace	 to	 access	 to	 her	 native	 culture	 and	 language	
“in	community	with	the	other	members”	of	her	group,	has	in	fact been,	and	
continues	to	be	interfered	with,	because	there	is	no	place	outside	the	Tobique	
Reserve	where	such	a	community	exists.255
	
	 Ms.	 Lovelace	was	 granted	 the	means	 of	 access	 to	 property	 held	 in	 a	
regime	of	commons	by	the	members	of	her	group,	as	a	background	for	exercising	
her	right	to	use	her	own	language.	The	right	to	access,	said	the	Committee,	could	
be	inferred	from	the	covenant,	as	a	measure,	as	a	background,	I	should	add,	of	
her	right	to	language.	It	was	different	from	such	a	right,	but	it	was	an	adequate	
measure	for	realizing	it.
This	idea	of	access	to	property	held	in	common	comes	in	close	connection	
with	the	last	right	mentioned	by	Horwitz,	which	is	a	right	that	is	not	present	in	the	
ICESCR	or	in	the	ICCPR,	as	I	already	explained	above.	Property,	as	a	human	right,	
is	affirmed	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(Article	17(1))	as	“the	right	
to	own	property	alone	as	well	as	in	association	with	others.”	The	right	to	property	
has	different	dimensions	or,	as	Michael	Heller	explains	 it,	different	boundaries,	
that	flow	from	the	idea	of	a	commons,	where	access	is	opened	through	the	idea	
of	private	property	which	admits	of	different	graduations	of	access	(from	limited	
access	to	limited	exclusion)	toward	the	idea	of	an	anti-commons,	where	there	is	
full	exclusion.	From	an	economic	point	of	view,	the	regulation	of	those	different	
boundaries	 is	 relevant	 as	 a	 technique	 to	 avoid	 fragmentation	 as	 a	 matter	 of	
“property	governance.”256
The	wording	of	 the	Universal	Declaration	 seems	 to	 comport	 all	 these	
possibilities,	 and	 also	 to	 foster	 the	 interesting	 debate	 of	 what	 right	 is	 more	
relevant	for	a	certain	society	–	if	to	promote	the	right	to	access	(and	thus	ideals	
of	association,	commons),	or	to	promote	the	right	to	exclude	as	the	paramount	
faculty	of	the	right	to	property.257	Those	who	prefer	to	take	up	the	latter	approach	
tend	 to	 focus	 on	 economic	 aspects	 and	 understand	 that	 “[c]ommon	property	
or	 communal	 property	 is	 trickier,	 because	 it	 is	 often	 confused	 with	 unowned	
resources,”258	 and	 also	 to	 believe	 that	 “the	 right	 to	 exclude	 others	 is	 more	
than	just	‘one	of	the	most	essential’	constituents	of	property	–	it	is	the	sine	qua	
non.”259		Those	who	prefer	the	former	approach	understand	that	there	should	be	
spaces	for	property	not	subject	to	individual	control,	but	rather	controlled,	if	at	
255.	 Lovelace,	supra	note	254	at	para.	15	(emphasis	added).
256.	 Michael	A	Heller,	“The	Boundaries	of	Private	Property,”	(1999)	108:6	Yale Law Journal 1163–1223	at	p.	1167.
257.	 Thomas	W.	Merrill,	“Property	and	the	Right	to	Exclude,”	(1998)	77	Nebraska Law Review	730–755.
258.	 Merrill,	“Property	and	the	Right	to	Exclude,”	supra note	257	at	p.	750.
259.	 Merrill,	“Property	and	the	Right	to	Exclude,”	supra note	257	at	p.	730.
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all,	by	some	larger	group.260	This	social	dimension	is	exactly	the	one	that	would	
dislocate	property	to	an	inclusion	within	the	boundaries	of	the	ICESCR,	if	it	was	
to	be	inserted	in	one	of	both	covenants;	while	the	first	liberal	perspective	would	
lead	property	towards	the	scope	of	the	ICCPR.
With	 respect	 to	 intellectual	 property	 rights,	 like	 copyright,	 I	 do	 not	
believe	in	a	human	rights	nature	of	those	institutes,	as	already	explained	in	this	
paper.	However,	I	think	that,	even	if	we	could	conceive	of	it,	the	wording	of	the	
UDHR	is	auspicious	for	considering	the	hypothesis	of	a	commons	–	what	leads	
us	to	admit	the	protection,	respect	and	fulfilment	of	the	right	to	own	property	
in	 commons,	 as	 seen	 above	 in	what	 concerns	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 state	parties	
obligations.	Hence,	it	would	follow	that	the	state	should	also	foster	alternative	
property	regimes,	more	commons-oriented,	as	for	instance	under	free	software	
or	Creative	Commons	licenses.	Nonetheless,	if	we	are	to	understand	intellectual	
property	 as	 a	 human	 right	 and	 are	 willing	 to	 think	 of	 its	 relativization,	 the	
provision	above	may	not	be	of	complete	utility,	as	it	leaves	aside	all	those	other	
alternatives	of	access	by	people	who	do	not	hold	something	in	common	property.	
The	clearest	example	of	this	is	situations	of	fair	dealing	with	a	work,	when	users	
will	not	be	owners.	It	follows	that	the	limitation	of	the	right	to	property	would	
come	not	from	an	inherent	dimension	of	this	provision	of	the	UDHR,	but	rather	
from	its	intertextuality,	from	its	interrelation	with	other	provisions	that	we	already	
examined	above,	if	we	are	to	consider	intellectual	property	as	a	human	right,	a	
position	with	which	I	do	not	agree.
In	this	case,	still,	it	would	be	interesting	to	consider	the	Article	XXIII	of	
the	American	Declaration	of	the	Rights	and	Duties	of	the	Man,	which	establishes	
some	reasonable	boundaries	for	a	right	to	property	as	a	human	right:
Every	person	has	a	right	to	own	such	private	property	as	meets	the	essential	
needs	of	decent	living	and	helps	to	maintain	the	dignity	of	the	individual	and	
of	the	home.261
Is	this	the	same	kind	of	property	wished	by	the	big	media?
4.4.1.2	The	Resolution	2000/7	of	the	Sub-Commission	on	the	Promotion	and	
Protection	of	Human	Rights
In	 its	 25th	 meeting,	 held	 on	 August	 17,	 2000,	 the	 Sub-Commission	 on	 the	
Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights	adopted	a	Resolution	on	Intellectual	
Property	and	Human	Rights,	welcoming	the	preliminary	report	submitted	by	Mr.	
J	Oloka-Onyango	and	Ms.	D	Udagama	on	globalization	and	 its	 impact	on	 the	
full	enjoyment	of	human	rights.262		In	that	document,	the	rapporteurs	addressed,	
among	other	 issues	 related	 to	 globalization	 and	 human	 rights,	 the	 ineptitude	
260.	 James	Boyle,	“Foreword:	The	Opposite	of	Property,”	in	James	Boyle,	ed.,	Public Domain,	Special	Issue,	(2003)		
66:1–2	Law and Contemporary Problems	1–32	<http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/foreword.pdf>.
261.	 Organization	of	American	States,	Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights,	American	Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of the Man,	OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4	Rev	9	(1948),		<http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/
Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm>,	art.	XXIII.
262.	 United	Nations	Sub-Commission	on	Human	Rights, “Intellectual	Property	and	Human	Rights”	Res. 2000/7,	
U.N.	Doc.	E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7	(2000),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a0
7b13c12569700046704e?Opendocument>	[Intellectual	Property	and	Human	Rights,	Res.	2000/7].
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with	which	the	WTO	had	been	conducting	 its	activities	with	respect	to	human	
rights,	particularly	in	what	pertains	to	the	interests	of	developing	countries.	
	 The	words	were	strong.	 In	summary,	the	rapporteurs	argued	that	“the	
assumptions	on	which	the	rules	of	WTO	are	based	are	grossly	unfair	and	even	
prejudiced,”	the	rules	of	its	agenda	“serves	only	to	promote	dominant	corporatist	
interests	that	already	monopolize	the	arena	of	international	trade”	and	“assume	
an	equality	of	bargaining	power	between	all	the	countries	that	engage	in	trade”	
–	as	those	rules	are	“designed	on	the	basis	of	a	premise	that	ignores	the	fact	that	
the	greater	percentage	of	global	 trade	 is	controlled	by	powerful	multinational	
enterprises	[...]	the	notion	of	free	trade	on	which	the	rules	are	constructed	is	a	
fallacy.”263
	 Another	document	in	which	the	Sub-Commission	based	its	understanding	
was	Resolution	1998/8,	on	the	relationship	between	the	enjoyment	of	economic,	
social	 and	 cultural	 rights	 and	 activities	 of	 transnational	 corporations.264	
Commenting	 on	 this	 point,	 Weissbrodt	 and	 Schoff	 argue	 that	 the	 Monsanto	
Corporation’s	 case	 of	 genetically	 modified	 “terminator”	 seeds	 (sterile	 seeds	
that	prevent	husbandmen	from	using	seeds	originated	in	one	season	in	another	
season)	was	a	significant	factor	for	the	understanding	of	the	Sub-Commission.	In	
their	words,	“the	potentially	devastating	effect	that	such	technology	could	have	
on	developing	nations’	agricultural	sectors	typified	the	concerns	that	motivated	
the	Sub-Commission	to	create	the	Working-Group	on	the	methods	and	practices	
of	transnational	corporations,	and	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	Sub-Commision’s	
decision	to	adopt	Resolution	2000/7.”265
	 In	what	pertains	to	this	analysis,	the	importance	of	the	Resolution	2000/7	
lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 acknowledges	various	other	 rights	 to	which	 the	 right	 to	
access	 is	 instrumental,	 stressing	 the	 need	 to	work	 towards	 the	 realization	 for	
all	people	and	communities	of	 rights	 such	as	 the	 right	 to	education,	 the	 right	
to	work,	the	right	to	food,	the	right	to	health,	and	also	(a	bit	mysteriously)	the	
right	 to	housing.	 Showing	 its	 awareness	of	 TRIPS,	 the	Sub-Commission	noted	
the	existence	of	“circumstances	attributable	to	the	implementation	of	the	TRIPS	
Agreement	that	constitute	contraventions	of	international	human	rights	law.”266
	 In	 line	 with	 the	 comments	 already	 addressed	 above	 with	 respect	 to	
the	 General	 Comment	 17	 of	 the	 ICESCR,	 the	 Sub-Commission	 affirmed	 that	
“the	 right	 to	protection	of	 the	moral	and	material	 interests	 resulting	 from	any	
scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	one	is	the	author	is,	in	accordance	
with	article	27(2)	of	the	UDHR	and	article	15,	1(c)	of	the	ICESCR,	a	human	right,	
subject	to	limitations	in	the	public	interest.”		However,	as	it	declares,	“since	the	
implementation	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement[,	such	a	right]	does	not	adequately	reflect	
the	fundamental	nature	and	indivisibility	of	all	human	rights,	including	the	right	of	
263.	 United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Council,	“The	Realization	of	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights:	
Globalization	and	its	impact	on	the	full	enjoyment	of	human	rights”	(15	June	2000),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2000.13.En?Opendocument>,	UN	Doc	E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2000/13	at	para.	15.
264.	 United	Nations	Economic	and	Social	Council,	“The	relationship	between	the	enjoyment	of	economic,	social	
and	cultural	rights	and	the	right	to	development,	and	the	working	methods	and	activities	of	transnational	
corporations”	in	Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities on Its Fiftieth Session	(30	September	1998),	<http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G98/143/30/pdf/G9814330.pdf?OpenElement>,	E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45.
265.	 Weissbrodt	and	Schoff,	“Human	Rights	Approach	to	Intellectual	Property	Protection,”	supra note	208	at	p.	25.
266.	 Intellectual	Property	and	Human	Rights,	Res.	2000/7,	supra	note	262	in	the	preamble.
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everyone	to	enjoy	the	benefits	of	scientific	progress	and	its	applications,	the	right	
to	health,	the	right	to	food	and	the	right	to	self-determination.”267		Hence,	there	
would	 be	 “apparent	 conflicts	 between	 the	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 regime	
embodied	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	on	the	one	hand,	and	international	human	
rights	law,	on	the	other.”268
	 Some	 important	 remarks	 and	 requests	 of	 the	 Resolution	were:	 i)	 that	
governments,	 national,	 regional,	 and	 international	 economic	 public	 forums	
consider	the	primacy	of	human	rights	over	economic	policies	and	agreements,	
taking	 the	 obligations	 and	 principles	 of	 the	 former	 fully	 into	 account;	 ii)	 that	
governments	 adjust	 their	 legislations	 and	 policies	 on	 intellectual	 property	 to	
comply	 with	 human	 rights	 obligations	 and	 principles,	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	
social	function	of	intellectual	property;	iii)	that	intergovernmental	organizations	
do	the	same	with	respect	to	their	policies,	practices	and	operations;	iv)	that	the	
WTO	and	the	Council	on	TRIPS	when	revising	the	agreement	take	full	account	
of	the	existing	state	obligations	under	international	human	rights	instruments,	as	
well	as	that	other	UN	agencies	such	as	the	WIPO	which	analyzes	the	TRIPS	with	
regards	to	its	human	rights	implications.
	 It	 also	 requested	 the	 UN	 High	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 to	
undertake	an	analysis	of	the	human	rights	impacts	of	the	TRIPS	and	the	CESCR	
to	clarify	the	relationship	between	intellectual	property	rights	and	human	rights,	
drafting	a	general	comment	on	this	subject.
	 In	the	years	that	followed,	as	Helfer	notices,	the	“UN	human	rights	system	
has	 responded	enthusiastically	 to	 the	Sub-Commission’s	 invitation	by	devoting	
unprecedented	attention	to	intellectual	property	issues.”	He	distinguishes	within	
the	most	important	actions:	“(1)	three	resolutions	of	the	Commission	on	Human	
Rights	on	Access	to	Medication	in	the	Context	of	Pandemics	such	as	HIV/AIDS;	
(2)	an	analysis	of	TRIPS	and	public	health	by	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	
Rights;	[and]	(3)	an	official	‘statement’	by	the	[CESCR]	that	‘intellectual	property	
regimes	must	be	consistent	with’	the	rights	in	the	Covenant.”269		However,	in	spite	
of	all	the	efforts,	the	fourth	document	mentioned	by	Helfer	is,	very	unfortunately,	
“(4)	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Special	 Rapporteurs	 on	 Globalization,	 which	 argues	 that	
intellectual	property	has	undermined	human	rights	objectives.”270
4.4.1.3.	United	Nations	Millennium	Declaration
Approved	by	the	8th	Plenary	Meeting,	55th	Session	of	the	United	Nations’	General	
Assembly,	 in	 September	 8,	 2000,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Millennium	 Declaration	
incorporates	 the	 shared	belief	 of	 the	 state	parties	 “that	 the	 central	 challenge	
[they]	face	today	is	to	ensure	that	globalization	becomes	a	positive	force	for	all	
the	world’s	people.”271
In	an	important	provision,	the	state	parties	recognized	the	need:
	
267.	 Intellectual	Property	and	Human	Rights,	Res.	2000/7,	supra	note	262	at	para.	2.
268.	 Intellectual	Property	and	Human	Rights,	Res.	2000/7,	supra	note	262	at	para.	2.
269.	 Helfer,	“Human	Rights	and	Intellectual	Property,”	supra	note	116	at	p.	56.
270.	 Helfer,	“Human	Rights	and	Intellectual	Property,”	supra	note	116	at	p.	56.
271.	 United Nations Millennium Declaration,	UN	GA,	UN	Doc.	A/Res/55/2	(2000),<http://www.un.org/millennium/
declaration/ares552e.htm>	at	para.	I.5	[United Nations Millennium Declaration].
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[t]o	ensure	that	the	benefits	of	new	technologies,	especially	information	and	
communication	technologies,	in	conformity	with	recommendations	contained	
in	the	ECOSOC	2000	Ministerial	Declaration,	are	available	to	all.272
The	 Millennium	 Declaration	 holds	 special	 importance	 for	 its	 intrinsic	
relation	 with	 the	 right	 to	 development.	 However,	 analyzing	 the	 full	 range	 of	
interesting	 but	 complex	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 right	 to	 development	 would	
be	too	much	a	complex	task	for	this	paper.	 Instead,	this	paper	will	now	briefly	
allude	to	an	ongoing	discussion	with	respect	to	its	relation	to	the	international	
intellectual	property	system	and	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge:	the	proposition	
of	a	Development	Agenda	for	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization.
4.4.1.4.	The	Development	Agenda	of	WIPO
We	have	already	observed	in	the	introduction	of	this	paper	that	the	trends	for	
approaching	intellectual	property	issues	vary	accordingly	to	if	they	are	discussed	
directly	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 system	 or	 if	 they	
are	discussed	 in	 the	protective	 realms	of	 specialized	United	Nation’s	agencies	
which	have	 specific	 competence	 to	deal	with	 intellectual	property	 –	 that	 is	 to	
say,	 the	World	 Intellectual	Property	Organization	 (WIPO)	and	 the	World	Trade	
Organization	 (WTO).	 In	 the	 latter case,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 tendency	 to	disregard	
human	rights	in	favor	of	intellectual	property	rights,	in	spite	of	the	clear	mandate	
of	those	agencies	to	also	promote	the	public	interest.273
The	so-called	Development	Agenda	before	WIPO	has	been,	up	to	now,	
another	unfortunate	and	gloomy	manifestation	of	this	tendency.	From	the	very	
beginning,	 it	was	 doubtful	 if	 its	 birth	would	 prosper.274	 It	was	 brought	 about,	
however,	 as	 an	 auspicious	 proposition	 of	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina,275	 and	 then	
counted	with	the	adhesion	of	other	thirteen	countries,	the	so-called	Group	of	the	
Friends	of	Development	(GFD).276		Recalling	a	series	of	commitments	assumed	by	
the	state	parties	before	the	UN	System	with	respect	to	the	right	to	development,	
Brazil	and	Argentina	claimed	that	the	development	dimension	of	the	intellectual	
property	system	should	be	also	assessed	by	WIPO	while	defining	its	policies,	in	
light	of	the	perspectives	raised	by	the	Millennium	Development	Goals.277
272.	 United Nations Millennium Declaration,	supra	note	271	at	para.	20.
273.	 It	is	interesting,	for	instance,	to	note	WIPO’s	mandate,	as	set	down	by	the	United	Nations	when	recognizing	
WIPO	as	a	specialized	agency	of	its	system:	“The	United	Nations	recognizes	the	World	Intellectual	Property	
Organization	(hereinafter	called	the	‘Organization’)	as	a	specialized	agency	and	as	being	responsible	for	
taking	appropriate	action	in	accordance	with	its	basic	instrument,	treaties	and	agreements	administered	by	it,	
inter	alia, for	promoting	creative	intellectual	activity	and	for	facilitating	the	transfer	of	technology	related	to	
industrial	property	to	the	developing	countries	in	order	to	accelerate	economic,	social	and	cultural	
development,	subject	to	the	competence	and	responsibilities	of	the	United	Nations	and	its	organs,	particularly	
the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development,	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	
and	the	United	Nations	Industrial	Development	Organization,	as	well	as	of	the	United	Nations	Educational,	
Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization	and	of	other	agencies	within	the	United	Nations	system.”	See	Agreement 
Between the United Nations and the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO	(1974),	<http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/index.html>.
274.	 See	Pedro	de	Paranaguá	Moniz,	“The	Development	Agenda	for	WIPO:	Another	Stillbirth?	A	Battle	between	Access	
to	Knowledge	and	Enclosure,”	(2005)	Social Science Research Network,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=844366>.
275.	 See	Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO,	World	
Intellectual	Property	Organization,	General	Assembly,	WO/GA/31/11	(2004),	<http://www.wipo.int/
documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf>	[Proposal by Argentina and Brazil].
276.	 See Group	of	Friends	of	Development,	Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11,	
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/fod-iim.doc>.
277.	 United Nations Millennium Declaration,	supra	note	271.
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	 In	 a	 broad	 perspective	 of	 access	 to	 knowledge	 involving	 also	 access	
to	 technology,	 the	 document	 registered	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 all	 the	 technological	
innovation,	science	and	creativity	of	 the	20th	century,	 the	“‘knowledge	gap’	as	
well	as	a	‘digital	divide’	continue	to	separate	the	wealthy	nation	from	the	poor.”278	
Hence,	it	argued	that	the	intellectual	property	system	may	be	well	scrutinized	in	
light	of	its	finalities.	That	is	to	say,	“[i]ntellectual	property	protection	cannot	be	
seen	as	an	end	in	itself,	nor	can	the	harmonization	of	intellectual	property	laws	
leading	to	higher	protection	standards	in	all	countries,	irrespective	of	their	levels	
of	development.”279
	 With	respect	to	propositions	of	patent	treaties	actually	 in	discussion,	the	
document	 called	on	WIPO	 to	 consider	 the	 suggestions	of	 amendment	made	by	
developing	countries	 that	would	not	be	able	 to	bear	 the	 level	of	protection	 that	
is	being	suggested	by	those	propositions.	It	also	called	on	WIPO	to	observe	very	
attentively	initiatives	to	balance	intellectual	property	rights	that	have	been	developed	
by	projects	such	as	the	Creative	Commons	and	the	Open	Source	Initiative.
In	this	sense,	it	registered:
While	access	to	information	and	knowledge	sharing	are	regarded	as	essential	
elements	 in	 fostering	 innovation	and	creativity	 in	 the	 information	economy,	
adding	new	layers	of	intellectual	property	protection	to	the	digital	environment	
would	obstruct	the	free	flow	of	information	and	scuttle	efforts	to	set	up	new	
arrangements	for	promoting	innovation	and	creativity,	through	initiatives	such	
as	the	‘Creative	Commons’.	...	The	provisions	of	any	treaties	in	this	field	must	
be	balanced	and	clearly	 take	on	board	 the	 interests	of	 consumers	 and	 the	
public	 at	 large.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 safeguard	 the	 exceptions	 and	 limitations	
existing	in	the	domestic	laws	of	Member	States.	
In	 order	 to	 tap	 into	 the	 development	 potential	 offered	 by	 the	 digital	
environment,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	mind	 the	 relevance	of	 open	 access	
models	for	the	promotion	of	 innovation	and	creativity.	 In	this	regard,	WIPO	
should	consider	undertaking	activities	with	a	view	to	exploring	the	promise	
held	by	open	collaborative	projects	to	develop	public	goods,	as	exemplified	
by	the	Human	Genome	Project	and	Open	Source	Software.	280
	
Other	very	important	propositions	are:	
•	 that	WIPO	should	consider	broader	societal	interests	and	development	
concerns	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 intellectual	 property	
rights,	and	not	just	the	interests	of	the	rights-holders,	allowing	for	the	
internalization	of	 its	 treaties	by	 the	state	parties	 in	accordance	with	
their	own	internal	legal	system;	
•	 that	 its	 technical	 assistance	 services	 are	 not	 just	 geared	 towards	 IP	
protection,	but	 also	orient	 countries	with	 respect	 to	 the	 flexibilities	
the	 system	 may	 allow	 them	 to	 use,	 such	 as	 to	 promote	 all	 the	
objectives	of	the	United	Nations	system	and	to	adjust	the	IP	system	
278.	 Proposal by Argentina and Brazil,	supra	note	275	at	p.	1.
279.	 Proposal by Argentina and Brazil,	supra	note	275	at	p.	1.
280.	 Proposal by Argentina and Brazil,	supra	note	275	at	p.	3	(emphasis	added).
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to	the	different	levels	of	development	of	each	country;	
•	 that	 WIPO	 be	 attentive	 to	 the	 development	 of	 measures	 for	 the	
transference	of	 technology	between	countries	and	create	a	 specific	
body	to	monitor	such	a	goal;	that	one	of	those	measures	could	involve	
access	 by	 developing	 countries	 to	 publicly	 funded	 research	 carried	
out	by	the	developed	countries;	and,	
•	 that	the	measures	aiming	at	the	transference	of	technology	between	
the	 state	 parties	 could	 be	 grouped	 under	 a	 Treaty	 on	 Access	 to	
Knowledge.	
Finally,	 openly	 suggesting	 that	 the	 public	 interest	 has	 no	 voice	 at	WIPO,	 the	
proposal	claims	that	WIPO	should	not	group	under	the	same	name	of	“NGO”	
in	 its	sessions	 the	groups	of	users	of	 the	 intellectual	property	system,	and	the	
groups	whose	interest	is	to	promote	the	public	interest.281
	 The	General	 Assembly	 of	WIPO	welcomed	 the	 proposal,	 some	 inter-
sessional	 meetings	 were	 held,	 and	 the	 discussions	 continued	 during	 2006.	
A	 formal	 Provisional	 Committee	 on	 the	 Development	 Agenda	 (PCDA)	 was	
constituted,	 and	held	 two	 sessions	aimed	at	 agreeing	on	a	 common	proposal	
to	be	submitted	to	the	WIPO’s	General	Assembly,	which	would	be	meeting	 in	
between	 late	 September	 and	 early	 October	 of	 2006.	 However,	 its	 prospects	
were	 now	 not	 very	 promising.	 The	 discussions	 were	 completely	 disturbed	 by	
an	apparent	alliance	between	 the	PCDA’s	Chairman	and	 the	 representative	of	
the	United	States'	delegation,	with	whom	the	Chairman	was	even	seen	arriving	
together	for	one	of	the	meetings.	Both	presented	new	propositions	extremely	
similar	 which	 took	 away	 many	 of	 the	 items	 originally	 proposed	 by	 Brazil,	
Argentina	and	the	GFD,	 in	a	clear	attempt	of	emptying	the	discussions.	Many	
parts	of	the	meetings	were	held	behind	closed	doors,	and	the	representatives	
of	NGOs	were	not	able	to	follow	and	intervene	in	them.	The	representative	of	
the	Brazilian	delegation	was	ignored	in	a	decisive	moment	and	had	to	strike	the	
meeting	room’s	table	with	a	plaque	to	call	for	the	Chairman’s	attention.	And	at	
the	last	minute	of	the	last	day	of	the	session,	a	representative	of	Kyrgyzstan,	a	
former	country	of	the	ancient	USSR,	presented	a	proposal	which	was	identical	to	
that	present	by	the	Chairman’s.	Such	a	proposition	would	then	be	appreciated	by	
the	General	Assembly	as	a	proposition	of	a	WIPO’s	member	country.282
	 On	 one	 side	 sat	 Brazil,	 Argentina,	 and	 the	 Group	 of	 the	 Friends	 of	
Development	 (África	 do	 Sul,	 Bolivia,	Cuba,	 Equator,	 Egypt,	 Iran,	 Peru,	 Kenya,	
Dominican	 Republic,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Tanzania,	 Uruguay	 and	 Venezuela).	On	 the	
other	 side	 were	 the	 countries	 that	 most	 welcomed	 the	 Chairman’s	 proposal:	
United	 States,	 Japan,	 Austria	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	 European	 Union),	 Canada,	
Australia,	China,	Russia,	and	Kyrgyzstan.
281.	 Proposal by Argentina and Brazil,	supra	note	275	at	p.	2.
282.	 Excellent	reports	on	the	Provisional	Committee’s	meetings	were	delivered	by	the	Free	Culture	Project	of	
FGV	DIREITO	RIO,	which	represents	the	Creative	Commons	in	Brazil	and	is	one	of	the	NGOs	accredited	by	
WIPO	to,	in	thesis,	take	part	in	the	PCDA’s	meetings.	For	those	reports,	see	Pedro	de	Paranagua	Moniz,	
“OMPI:	Reuniao	Encerrada	com	Tensao”	A2Kbrasil.org.br (30	June	2006)	<http://www.culturalivre.org.br/
index.php?option=com_content	&task=view&id=74&Itemid=58>	[de	Paranagua	Moniz,	“OMPI:	Reuniao	
Encerrada	com	Tensao”].	See	also	Pedro	de	Paranagua	Moniz,	“OMPI:	O	Circo	Pega	Fogo,”	(28	June	2006)	
A2Kbrasil.org.Br, 	<http://www.culturalivre.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=73&Ite
mid=58>	[de	Paranagua	Moniz,	“OMPI:	O	Circo	Pega	Fogo”].	
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	 The	 General	 Assembly	 convened	 again	 to	 assess	 this	 issue	 from	
September	 25th	 to	 October	 3rd,	 2006.	 The	 group	 of	 developed	 countries	
presented	a	proposition	not	to	extend	the	PCDA’s	mandate	for	during	the	2007	
year,	in	an	explicit	attempt	to	extinguish	the	Development	Agenda’s	discussions.	
It	was	agreed,	however,	that	the	PCDA	would	meet	again	in	two	different	five-
day	sessions,	to	in-depth	discussions	on	the	111	different	propositions	from	both	
developed	countries	(condensed	in	the	Kyrgyzstan’s	document)	and	the	Group	of	
the	Friends	of	Development.	Both	are	grouped	in	two	different	annexes,	which	
will	be	assessed	individually	in	each	meeting.	The	PCDA’s	recommendations	will	
then	be	submitted	to	the	next	General	Assembly’s	meeting	in	2007.283
4.4.1.5	The	Tunis	Commitment
The	World	Summit	on	the	Information	Society	was	established	by	the	Resolution	
56/183284	of	the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations,	on	December	21,	2001.	
Its	first	phase	was	held	 in	Geneva,	 in	2003,	with	the	objective	of	asserting	the	
political	will	of	the	stakeholders	and	establishing	the	foundations	for	a	pluralistic	
Information	 Society.	 It	 ended	 up	 in	 the	Geneva	Declaration	 of	 Principles	 and	
Geneva	Plan	of	Action.	The	second	phase,	held	in	Tunis	last	November,	had	the	
objective	of	putting	in	practice	the	Geneva	Plan	of	Action	and	convening	solutions	
for	the	realms	of	“Internet	governance,	finance	mechanisms,	and	follow-up	and	
implementation	of	the	Geneva	and	Tunis	documents.”285
	 It	gave	birth	to	clear	customary	sources	from	where	the	existence	of	a	right	
of	access	to	knowledge	in	the	international	human	rights	framework,	as	well	as	the	
broad	dimensions	of	such	a	right,	can	be	verified	without	any	further	doubt.	
The	Tunis	Commitment	is	a	kind	of	Rio	Declaration	for	the	information	
age,	 clearly	 institutionalizing	 an	 environmentalist	 policy	 for	 the	 information	
society.	It	directly	reminds	us	of	the	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	
114957	Canada	Ltée	(Spraytech,	Société	d’arrosage)	v	Hudson	(Town),	bringing	
new	clothes	to	the	so-called	precautionary	principle.286		Here,	the	goal	is	to	protect	
the	cognitive	ecology,	the	principle	of	balance	among	different	autonomies	that	
surround	the	flow	of	knowledge	and	the	construction	of	the	democratic	discourse	
within	 and	 upon	 it.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 promote	 access.	 Indeed,	 the	 Commitment	
definitely	consecrates	the	right	to	access	 in	a	 large	and	 liberal	dimension,	and	
expels	any	mythic	nature	or	suspicion	of	ghostliness	that	could	eventually	remain	
with	respect	to	it.
As	reported	by	the	International	Telecommunications	Union,	specialized	
283.	 See	Pedro	de	Paranaguá	Moniz,	“Termina	a	Assembléia	Geral	de	2006	da	OMPI,” 	(2	October	2006)	,	
A2Kbrasil.org.br 	<http://a2kbrasil.org.br/Termina-Assembleia-Geral-de-2006>.	
284.	 See World Summit of the Information Society,	Resolution	56/183,	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	UN	
Doc.	A/RES/56/183	(2001),	<http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.	pdf>	
[World Summit of the Information Society].
285.	 See	United	Nations,	International	Telecommunications	Union,	“Basic	Information:	About	WSIS,”	<www.itu.
int/wsis/basic/about.html>.
286.	 Spraytech,	supra	note	72.	For	interesting	and	logical	propositions	of	applying	principles	deriving	from	the	
environmental	law	to	the	cognitive	environment	of	the	information	age,	see	James	Boyle,	“A	Politics	of	
Intellectual	Property:	Environmentalism	for	the	Net?”	(1997)	47:1	Duke Law Journal	87–116.	<http://www.law.
duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?47+Duke+L.+J.+87>.	Speaking	on	a	“battle	over	the	institutional	ecology	of	the	
digital	environment”	see	the	unparalleled	work	of	Yochai	Benkler,	The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom	(Yale	University	Press,	2006),	<http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_
Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf>	at	pp.	383–459.
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agency	of	the	UN	system	responsible	for	the	executive	secretariat	of	the	Summit,	
“nearly	50	Heads	of	 state/government	and	Vice-Presidents	and	197	Ministers,	
Vice	Ministers	 and	 Deputy	Ministers	 from	 174	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 high-level	
representatives	from	international	organizations,	private	sector,	and	civil	society	
attended	 the	 Tunis	 Phase	 of	 WSIS	 and	 gave	 political	 support	 to	 the	 Tunis	
Commitment287	and	Tunis	Agenda	for	the	Information	Society.288
	 The	Resolution	which	established	the	Summit	foresaw,	already	in	2001,	
the	 “pivotal	 role	 of	 the	United	Nations	 system	 in	 promoting	development,	 in	
particular	 with	 respect	 to	 access	 to	 and	 transfer	 of	 technology,	 especially	
information	 and	 communication	 technologies	 and	 services,	 inter	 alia,	 through	
partnerships	with	all	relevant	stakeholders,”	and	stressed	the	conviction	of	the	
General	Assembly	“of	the	need,	at	the	highest	political	level,	to	marshal	the	global	
consensus	 and	 commitment	 required	 to	 promote	 the	urgently	 needed	 access	
of	all	countries	to	information,	knowledge	and	communication	technologies	for	
development	so	as	to	reap	the	full	benefits	of	the	information	and	communication	
technologies	revolution.”289	
	 In	 Tunis	 an	extremely	detailed	 and	 auspicious	Agenda	was	 approved,	
denoting	a	strong	commitment	of	 the	state	parties	with	 the	promotion	of	 the	
right	to	access.	In	the	Commitment,	the	state	parties	reaffirmed	their	resolution	
“in	 the	quest	 to	ensure	 that	everyone	can	benefit	 from	the	opportunities	 that	
ICTs	can	offer,	by	recalling	that	governments,	as	well	as	private	sector,	civil	society	
and	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 other	 international	 organizations,	 should	 work	
together	 to:	 improve	 access	 to	 information	 and	 communication	 infrastructure	
and	technologies	as	well	as	to	information	and	knowledge.”290	They	recognized	
“that	access	to	information	and	sharing	and	creation	of	knowledge	contributes	
significantly	 to	 strengthening	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 development.”291	
They	 committed	 themselves	 “to	 evaluate	 and	 follow	 up	 progress	 in	 bridging	
the	digital	divide.”292	 	 In	a	clear	demonstration	of	balancing	between	different	
autonomies,	they	affirmed	the	commitment	to	“continue	their	efforts	to	protect	
and	promote	cultural	diversity,	as	well	as	cultural	identities,	within	the	Information	
Society.”293
	 But	mostly,	 they	assumed	not	only	 that	 they	 should	 take	 steps	with	a	
view	to	achieve	progressively	an	unquantifiable	 right	 to	access.	They	assumed	
that	they	“shall	strive	unremittingly	therefore	to	promote	universal,	ubiquitous,	
equitable,	and	affordable	access	to	ICTs	[...]	for	all	people,	especially	those	with	
disabilities,	everywhere,	to	ensure	that	the	benefits	are	more	evenly	distributed	
between	and	within	societies,	and	to	bridge	the	digital	divide	in	order	to	create	
digital	 opportunities	 for	 all	and	benefit	 from	 the	potential	 offered	by	 ICTs	 for	
development.”294
And	they	willingly	linked	their	commitments	to	democratic	reasons	and	
287.	 See	Tunis Commitment,	United	Nations	World	Summit	on	the	Information	Society,	UN	Doc.	WSIS-05/
TUNIS/DOC/7	(2005),		<http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.pdf>	[Tunis Commitment].
288.	 See	Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,	UN	WSIS,	UN	Doc.	WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6	(rev	1)	(2005),	
<http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf>.
289.	 World Summit of the Information Society,	supra	note	284	in	the	preamble	(emphasis	added).
290.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	para.	9	(emphasis	added).
291.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	para.	10	(emphasis	added).
292.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	para.	16.
293.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	para.	32	(emphasis	added).
294.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	para.	18	(emphasis	added).
	 Property	Enforcement	or	Retrogressive	Measure?	 233(2007)	4:1&2		UOLTJ	163
to	the	international	human	rights	system.	Indeed,	in	two	quintessential	provisions	
of	the	instrument,	174	state	parties	stated:
2.	 We	 reaffirm our	 desire	 and	 commitment	 to	 build	 a	 people-centered,	
inclusive	 and	 development-oriented	 Information	 Society,	 premised	 on	 the	
purposes	and	principles	of	 the	Charter	of	 the	United	Nations,	 international	
law	 and	 multilateralism,	 and	 respecting	 fully	 and	 upholding	 the	 Universal	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	so	that	people	everywhere	can	create,	access,	
utilize	and	 share	 information	and	knowledge,	 to	achieve	 their	 full	potential	
and	 to	attain	 the	 internationally	agreed	development	goals	and	objectives,	
including	the	Millennium	Development	Goals.	
3.	We	reaffirm the	universality,	indivisibility,	interdependence	and	interrelation	
of	 all	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms,	 including	 the	 right	 to	
development,	 as	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Vienna	 Declaration.	 We	 also	 reaffirm 
that	 democracy,	 sustainable	 development,	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	
and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 as	 well	 as	 good	 governance	 at	 all	 levels	 are	
interdependent	 and	mutually	 reinforcing.	We	 further	 resolve to	 strengthen	
respect	for	the	rule	of	law	in	international	as	in	national	affairs.295
	 It	is	interesting	at	this	point	to	perceive	the	clear	conventional	dimension	
of	the	commitment	of	the	state	parties	in	relation	to	a	human	right	of	access	to	
knowledge,	but,	mostly,	 the	extremely	straightforward	 language	they	selected	
to	affirm	their	commitment	towards	the	progressive	realization	of	such	a	right.	
Instead	of	the	broad	and	arguably	vague	provision	of	Article	2(1)	of	the	ICESCR,	
instead	 of	 committing	 themselves	 “to	 take	 steps	 to	 the	 maximum	 of	 [their]	
available	resources,	with	a	view	to	achieving	progressively	the	full	realization	of”	
a	right	of	access	to	knowledge,	the	state	parties	committed	themselves	to	“strive	
unremittingly	to	promote	universal,	ubiquitous,	equitable,	and	affordable	access	
to	ICT.”
	 It	will	be	interesting,	thus,	to	wonder	if	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	
can	claim	to	have	a	higher	degree	of	justiciability	than	other	human	rights.	What	
remains	very	clear	from	a	fast	glance	at	these	commitments	is	that	the	progressive	
realization	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	seems	to	have	a	different	measure	
of	time	than	that	of	other	traditional	economic,	social,	and	cultural	rights.	If	such	
a	measure	will	 also	 exert	 any	 influence	 upon	 the	 degree	 of	 its	 justiciability	 is	
still	not	possible	 to	conclude.	However,	 it	 seems	 reasonable	 to	affirm	that	 the	
presumption	 against	 retrogressive	 measures	 that	 is	 directed	 to	 other	 rights	
present	at	the	Covenant	has	all	the	same	if	not	higher	grounds	to	be	applied	to	
the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.
	 Finishing	this	topic,	it	is	interesting	to	add	to	the	Commitments	above	
the	statement	made	in	Tunis	by	Canada,	represented	by	Senator	Mac	Harb:
All	of	us	have	come	to	Tunis	to	reflect	on	the	positive	role	this	Summit	can	
play	by	developing	 a	 vision	of	 the	 future	 for	 our	 societies	 –	 a	 vision	of	 an	
information	and	knowledge-based	society.
295.	 Tunis Commitment,	supra	note	287	at	paras.	2-3.
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The	mere	existence	of	advanced	communication	systems	does	not,	by	itself,	
ensure	 progress.	Our	 vision	must	 have	 people	 at	 its	 centre.	 Unless	we	 set	
out,	 with	 purpose,	 to	 harness	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 information	 age	 for	 the	
betterment	of	our	people,	we	cannot	expect	to	reach	our	development	goals.	
(…)
In	a	rapidly-changing	technological	field,	we	can	rely	on	one	thing	to	remain	
constant:	human	creativity	and	 innovation.	 ICTs	have	developed	as	a	direct	
result	of	our	collective	innovation.	We	humans	are	innately	driven	to	express	
ourselves.	That	is	why,	Mr.	President,	the	information	society	that	we	aim	to	
build	must	 be	 rooted	 in	 respect	 for	 the	 freedom	 to	 hold	 opinions	without	
interference	and	to	seek,	receive,	and	impart	information	and	ideas	through	
any	media,	and	regardless	of	frontiers.
Restricting	 these	 freedoms	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 obligations	 all	 countries	
represented	here	entered	into	the	day	they	signed	the	UN	Charter.	Restricting	
the	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression	impoverishes	a	society.	It	deprives	it	of	
the	vitality,	creativity	and	diversity	it	needs	to	thrive.296
	
	 It	 is	 interesting,	thus,	to	notice	how	Canada	expressly	acknowledged:	 i)	
the	cogent	character	of	issues	related	to	access	in	a	knowledge-based	society;	ii)	
the	importance	reserved	to	collective	innovation,	which	seems	to	clearly	portray	
the	 importance	 of	 commons-based	 peer	 production;	 and	 iii)	 the	 centrality	 of	
people	and	their	betterment	–not	the	profitability	of	companies	-	as	the	purpose	
of	 achieving	 development	 goals.	 Isn’t	 it	 the	 case	 to	 conciliate	 such	 a	 beautiful	
discourse	with	other	governmental	goals	towards	copyright	reform	in	this	country?
4.4.1.6.	The	General	Comment	No.	17
On	November	21,	 2005,	 five	 years	 after	 the	Sub-Commission’s	 request,297	 the	
Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	adopted	its	General	Comment	
No.	17	on	the	Article	15,	paragraph	1(c)	of	the	IESCR:	the	right	of	everyone	to	
benefit	from	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	resulting	from	any	
scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he	is	the	author.
	 We	addressed	this	extensively	in	the	document	above.	Here	this	paper	will	
briefly	allude	to	one	last	point	of	it:	that	of	the	instrumentality	of	the	right	to	access,	
which	seems	to	have	been	implicitly	recognized	by	the	committee	when	affirming	
that	the	right	defined	in	Article	15(1)(c)	of	the	Covenant	needs	to	comply	with	any	
other	right	of	the	International	Bill	of	Rights	and	other	international	and	regional	
instruments,298	and	that	any	higher	protection	standards	in	laws	or	international	
treaties	for	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	of	authors	needs	
to	be	justified	with	respect	to	the	limitations	that	it	imposes	to	other	Covenant	
rights.299		In	particular,	as	examples	of	these	rights,	the	Committee	mentioned	the	
right	to	food	(Article	11),	to	health	(Article	12)	to	education	(Article	13),	as	well	as	
296.	 Mac	Harb,	“Statement	delivered	by	The	Honourable	Mac	Harb,	Senator	before	the	World	Summit	on	the	
Information	Society”	(17	November	2005),	<http://www.itu.int/wsis/tunis/statements/docs/g-canada/1.pdf>.
297.	 Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Res. 2000/7,	supra	note	262.
298.	 ECOSOC,	General Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138	and	accompanying	text.
299.	 ECOSOC,	General Comment	No.	17	(2005),	supra	note	138.
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the	rights	to	take	part	in	the	cultural	life	(Article	15(1)(a))	and	to	enjoy	the	benefits	
of	 scientific	 progress	 and	 its	 applications	 (Article	 15(1)(c)).	 Understanding	 the	
instrumentality	of	the	right	to	access,	which	was	also	recognized	by	the	Human	
Rights	Committee	in	the	Lovelace	case,300	has	an	interesting	theoretical	link,	as	I	
will	soon	portray	in	the	last	part	of	this	section.
4.4.1.7.	Convention	on	Cultural	Diversity
The	end	of	2005	was	a	fertile	period	for	the	strengthening	of	the	recognition	of	
the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	in	the	United	Nations	System.	Within	a	short	
time	frame,	the	General	Comment	17	was	stated	by	the	CESCR	and	the	Tunis	
Commitment	was	affirmed	in	the	World	Summit	on	the	Information	Society.	The	
third	instrument	of	this	formidable	trinity	to	receive	our	attention	is	the	Convention	
on	 the	 Protection	 and	 Promotion	 of	 the	 Diversity	 of	 Cultural	 Expressions,	 as	
adopted	by	General	 Conference	 of	 the	United	Nations	 Educational,	 Scientific	
and	Cultural	Organization	(UNESCO)	in	Paris,	on	October	20,	2005.301
	 The	convention	has	many	interesting	aspects	with	respect	to	intellectual	
property,	even	though	the	expression	“intellectual	property”	is	not	referred	but	
once	in	it.	The	first	and	most	important	from	a	theoretical	perspective	is	its	adoption	
of	balance	as	a	principle.	Indeed,	as	a	clear	manifestation	of	that	“link	between	
autonomy	regimes	and	an	ideal	of	maintaining	diversity”	of	which	Steiner	speaks	
about,302	as	dealing	with	the	challenge	of	creating	zones	of	autonomy	without	
at	the	same	time	restricting	the	flow	of	information	and	the	cultural	interchange	
between	peoples,	it	was	important	that	the	Convention	established	a	conception	
of	balance.	Hence,	while	embracing	the	principle	of	sovereignty,303	which	is	pretty	
much	connected	to	the	idea	of	a	cultural	self-determination,	as	seen	above	–	and	
thus	 to	 the	 affirmation	 of	 a	 collective	 cultural	 autonomy,	 the	Convention	 also	
reflected	the	principles	of	solidarity	and	cooperation,304	equitable	access,305	and	
openness	and	balance.306
	 Inherent	to	this	balanced	perspective	is	the	linkage	between	culture	and	
democracy,	which	is	also	present	in	the	Convention.	Indeed,	seeming	to	reflect	the	
ideas	we	advanced	in	the	preceding	sections,	the	General	Conference	recalled	that	
cultural	diversity	flourishes	within	a	framework	of	democracy	and	social	justice.307
300.	 Lovelace,	supra	note	254.
301.	 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,	United	Nations	
Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization,	UN	Doc.	CLT-2005/CONVENTION	DIVERSITE-CULT	REV	
(2005),	<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf>	[Convention on Cultural Diversity].
302.	 Steiner,	“Ideals	and	Counter-Ideals,”	supra	note	243.
303.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra note	301,	art	2(2):	“States	have,	in	accordance	with	the	Charter	of	
the	United	Nations	and	the	principles	of	international	law,	the	sovereign	right	to	adopt	measures	and	
policies	to	protect	and	promote	the	diversity	of	cultural	expressions	within	their	territory.”
304.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra note	301,	art.	2(4):	“International	cooperation	and	solidarity	should	
be	aimed	at	enabling	countries,	especially	developing	countries,	to	create	and	strengthen	their	means	of	
cultural	expression,	including	their	cultural	industries,	whether	nascent	or	established,	at	the	local,	national	
and	international	levels.”
305.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra note	301,	art.	2(7):	“Equitable	access	to	a	rich	and	diversified	range	of	
cultural	expressions	from	all	over	the	world	and	access	of	cultures	to	the	means	of	expressions	and	dissemination	
constitute	important	elements	for	enhancing	cultural	diversity	and	encouraging	mutual	understanding.”
306.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra	note	301,	art.	2(8):	“When	States	adopt	measures	to	support	the	
diversity	of	cultural	expressions,	they	should	seek	to	promote,	in	an	appropriate	manner,	openness	to	other	
cultures	of	the	world	and	to	ensure	that	these	measures	are	geared	to	the	objectives	pursued	under	the	
present	Convention.”
307.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra	note	301,	Preamble.
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	 Most	directly	related	to	our	subject,	the	General	Conference	recognized	
“the	 importance	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 in	 sustaining	 those	 involved	 in	
creativity”	 but	 noted	 that	 “while	 the	 processes	 of	 globalization,	 which	 have	
been	 facilitated	by	 the	 rapid	development	of	 information	 and	 communication	
technologies,	afford	unprecedented	conditions	for	enhanced	interaction	between	
cultures,	they	also	represent	a	challenge	for	cultural	diversity,	namely	in	view	of	
risks	of	 imbalances	between	 rich	and	poor	countries.”308	 	Hence,	 it	defined	as	
one	of	the	objectives	of	the	convention	“to	reaffirm	the	importance	of	the	link	
between	culture	and	development	for	all	countries,	particularly	 for	developing	
countries,	 and	 to	 support	 actions	 undertaken	 nationally	 and	 internationally	 to	
secure	recognition	of	the	true	value	of	this	link.”309
	 Still,	it	is	interesting	to	remark	that	the	General	Conference	recognized	
“that	 cultural	 activities,	 goods	 and	 services	 have	 both	 an	 economic	 and	 a	
cultural	nature,	because	they	convey	identities,	values	and	meanings,	and	must	
therefore	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 solely	 having	 commercial	 value.”310	 Hence,	 the	
Convention	seems	also	to	reflect	another	remark	we	made	above:	that	of	the	
impacts	of	technology	on	the	definition	of	the	identity	and	on	the	autonomy	of	
a	people,	which	fosters	the	need	to	recognize	the	right	to	access	as	a	means	
of	 cultural	 and	political	participation	–	especially	 in	 light	of	 the	 link	between	
culture	and	democracy,	also	established	by	the	convention.	As	William	Fisher	
explains,	 “[r]eversing	 the	 concentration	 of	 semiotic	 power	 would	 benefit	 us	
all.	People	would	be	more	engaged,	 less	alienated,	 if	they	had	more	voice	in	
the	construction	of	their	cultural	environment.	And	the	environment	itself	–	to	
return	to	a	previous	theme	–	would	be	more	variegated	and	stimulating.	The	
new	technology	makes	that	possible.”311
	 Two	 last	observations	demand	 to	be	made.	The	first	 I	 transpose	 from	
Laurence	Helfer's	analysis	of	the	Convention,	about	its	problematic	relationship	
with	 the	 international	 system	 of	 trade.	 As	 Helfer	 argues,	 “[i]n	 particular,	 the	
Cultural	Diversity	Convention	authorizes	 its	member	states	to	give	preferential	
treatment	 to	 the	 production,	 distribution,	 dissemination,	 and	 consumption	 of	
domestic	cultural	 industries,	a	preference	 that	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	national	
treatment	rules	in	GATT,	GATS,	and	TRIPs.”312	The	possible	reason	for	that	would	
be	to	restrain	the	TRIPS-Plus	agenda	of	the	United	States.313
	 The	 second,	 and	 last,	 remark	 is	 about	 its	 language	 of	 rights.	 The	
Convention	refers	many	times	and	links	itself	to	the	international	human	rights	
system.	 Article	 2(1)	 defines	 as	 a	 principle	 the	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 and	
fundamental	freedoms,	mentioning	expressly	the	rights	to	freedom	of	expression,	
information	 and	 communication.	However,	 there	 is	 no	 apparent	 affirmation	of	
individual	rights	and	the	Convention	works	more	from	a	collective	perspective,	
linked	 to	 transindividual	 aspects	 of	 ideas	 examined	 above.	 Its	 language	 of	
cultures,	peoples,	persons	seems	to	confirm	such	a	suspicion.	Hence,	 it	seems	
doubtful	that	we	can	rush	to	point	out	the	Convention	as	a	binding	instrument	
308.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra	note	301,	Preamble.
309.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra note	301,	art.	1(f).
310.	 Convention on Cultural Diversity,	supra note	301,	art.	1(c).
311.	 Fisher,	Promises to Keep,	supra	note	215	at	pp.	30–31.
312.	 Laurence	R	Helfer,	“Toward	a	Human	Rights	Framework	for	Intellectual	Property,”	(2007)	40:3	UC Davis Law 
Review	971–1020,	<http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/articles/Vol40/Issue3/DavisVol40No3_Helfer.pdf>	at	p.	1003.
313.	 Helfer,	“Towards	a	Human	Rights	Framework	for	Intellectual	Property,”	supra	note	312	at	p.	1004.
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where	the	human	right	of	access	to	knowledge	was	recognized	from	an	individual	
perspective.	From	a	collective	perspective,	it	undoubtedly	was.	With	respect	to	
individual	rights,	however,	the	Convention	seems	to	serve	more	as	a	theoretical	
framework,	and	a	confirmation	of	ideas	that	can	nevertheless	be	grasped	from	
other	instruments	of	the	United	Nations	System	that	deal	with	the	human	right	of	
access	to	knowledge.
4.4.2	Mythical	Beast?
In	 the	 last	 meeting	 of	 WIPO’s	 Provisional	 Committee	 for	 the	 Development	
Agenda’s	 2nd	 session,	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 Austrian	 delegation	 (then	
acting	on	behalf	of	the	European	Union),	affirmed	that	God	had	not	given	him	
enough	imagination	to	understand	why	Brazil	would	not	agree	with	the	proposal	
presented	by	the	PCDA’s	Chairman	(and	which	echoed	the	American	one).314
	 He	 was	 looking	 at	 the	 wrong	 survey.	 Access	 to	 knowledge	 is	 not	 a	
transcendental	entity,	 is	not	a	ghost,	and	 is	not	a	mythical	beast.	From	all	 the	
sources	examined	above,	from	their	intertwinement	with	scholarly	literature,	from	
the	rulings	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada,	and	even	from	the	perception	of	the	
common	man	–	in	the	sphere	of	things	that	simply	are,315	we	can	conclude	that	
the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	can	clearly	be	recognized	among	us	as	having	
human	rights	status.	It	is	definitely	entrenched	in	the	practices	which	are	acted	
upon	and	recognized	as	binding	 in	 the	 international	human	rights	system	–	as	
much	as	many	other	rights	to	whose	realization	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	
is	an	important	measure,	and	was	implicitly	recognized	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Canada	by	rightfully	enforcing	the	right	vector	of	the	framework	we	examined	
above,	 both	 in	 its	 individual	 dimension	 (users’	 rights)	 and	 in	 its	 collective	
perspective	(the	public	interest).
	 There	are	 two	characteristics	of	such	a	 right	 that	 I	deem	 important	 to	
remark,	 in	 conclusion	 of	 comprehensive	 venture	 in	 this	 work.	 The	 first	 is	 the	
multi-layered	dimension	of	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	The	second	is	 its	
instrumentality	as	a	background	right.	
Both	ideas	are	not	completely	disjointed.	Access	to	knowledge	is	a	right	
that	 has	 an	 instrumental	 nature	 to	many	others	 and	which	does	 involve	many	
different	kinds	of	“accesses,”	demands	being	realized	in	many	different	means,	
and	through	many	different	layers.	Access	is	inherent	to	the	democratic	process	
314.	 Pedro	de	Paranagua	Moniz,	“OMPI:	O	Circo	Pega	Fogo,”	supra	note	282.
315.	 If	we	are	willing	to	resort	to	natural	law	theories—which	must	not	necessarily	be	the	case,	as	we	have	
enough	instrumental	support	to	understand	a	conventional	dimension	of	the	right	of	access	to	
knowledge—we	can	think	of	movements	such	as	peer-to-peer	file	sharing,	collaborative	development	
models	such	as	the	Wikipedia,	and	many	others,	to	conclude	that	what	we	understand	for	access	to	
knowledge	is	increasingly	entrenched	on	the	social,	on	the	ethical	practices	of	the	information	age.	It	is	in	
this	sense	that	Pekka	Himanen	cleverly	traced	a	parallel	between	the	ethic	of	our	time	and	the	hacker ethic.	
Indeed,	in	“The	hacker	ethic	as	the	culture	of	the	information	age,”	Himanen	argues	that	if	we	could	speak	
of	the	protestant	ethic	as	a	metaphor	of	the	capitalist	ethic,	as	Max	Weber	did	in	his	The	Protestant	Ethics	
and	The	Rise	of	the	Capitalism,	in	the	information	age	we	can	talk	about	a	hacker	ethics	as	the	metaphor	of	
the	ethics	of	our	times.	The	network	society,	he	clarifies,	is	still	a	capitalist	society.	But	its	ethics	is	the	ethics	
of	a	passion	for	creation	and	for	self	development,	and	of	a	different	relationship	with	time	and	money.	He	
identifies	this	new	culture	with	the	culture	of	the	hackers	(not	the	criminals,	but	the	“heroes	of	the	computer	
revolution,”	as	described	by	Steven	Levy).	The	networked	structure	of	our	society,	the	importance	that	the	
values	of	openness	and	sharing	assume	to	us,	the	willingness	to	play,	to	explore,	to	create,	and	to	share,	
reflect	this	positive	attitude	of	the	individual	towards	the	technology,	and	towards	the	other	men.	See	Pekka	
Himanen,	“The	Hacker	Ethic	as	the	Culture	of	the	Information	Age”	in	Manuel	Castells,	ed.,	The Network 
Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective	(Edward	Elgar,	2004)	420–431.
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and	 to	 individual	and	collective,	political	 and	cultural	autonomies.316	 	As	 such,	
access	must	be	as	broad	as	possible	for	the	fulfillment	of	the	full	potentialities	of	
those	autonomies	(albeit	in	a	balanced	perspective).	Access,	as	instrumental	to	
political	and	cultural	discourses,	demands	being	realized	in	all	the	instances,	in	all	
the	layers	within	or	upon	which	those	discourses	are	expected	to	happen.
In	the	words	of	Pierre	Lévy:	
“[a]ccess	for	all,	yes!	But	we	cannot	understand	it	as	“access	to	equipment,”	
to	 the	mere	 technical	connections	 that	will	 soon	be	very	cheap,	nor	even	as	
“access	 to	 content”	 (consumption	 of	 information	 or	 knowledge	 diffused	 by	
specialists).	We	have	to	understand	it	as	access	of	all	to	the	collective	intelligence	
processes,	i.e.,	to	cyberspace	as	an	open	system	of	dynamic	auto-cartography	
of	the	real,	of	expression	of	the	singularities,	of	elaboration	of	the	problems,	
of	confection	of	the	social	glue	by	reciprocal	 learning,	and	of	free	navigation	
of	knowledge.	…	[T]he	supreme	architecture	comes	from	politics:	it	is	related	
to	the	articulation	and	to	the	respective	roles	of	different	spaces. To	place	the	
collective	intelligence	in	command	is	to	choose	democracy	again,	actualize	it	
again	by	exploring	the	positive	potentialities	of	communication	means.317
	 Slightly	disagreeing	with	Lévy,	I	believe	that	the	right	to	access	demands,	
yes,	 access	 to	 equipment,	 access	 to	 content,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 not	 just	 that.	 It	
is	 exactly	 for	 establishing	 this	 collective	 intelligence	 process,	 for	 choosing	 the	
democratic	 process,	 that	 all	 the	means	must	 be	 largely	 available	 to	 all.	 Lessig,	
drawing	upon	Benkler,	divides	the	communicative	process	in	three	different	layers:
At	the	bottom	is	a	‘physical’	layer,	across	which	communications	travels.	This	
is	the	computer,	or	wires,	that	link	computers	on	the	internet.	In	the	middle	
is	a	‘logical’	or	‘code’	layer	–	the	code	that	makes	the	hardware	run.	Here	we	
might	 include	the	protocols	that	define	the	 Internet	and	the	software	upon	
which	those	protocols	run.	At	the	top	is	a	‘content’	layer	–	the	actual	stuff	that	
gets	 said	or	 transmitted	across	 the	wires.	…	Each	of	 these	 layers	could	be	
controlled	or	could	be	free.318	
The	 measures	 of	 access	 to	 these	 layers	 define	 the	 measures	 of	 access	 to	
knowledge.	
To	realize	the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	means	to	promote	it	in	each	
of	those	layers	–	to	the	extent	compatible	with	the	principles	that	are	at	the	very	
core	of	 its	promotion,	of	 course	 (i.e.	democracy,	balance,	 solidarity).	To	 speak	
of	a	physical	layer	may	seem	not	to	have	much	to	do	with	copyright,	but	it	does	
have.	Restrictions	at	the	hardware	level,	at	the	software	level,	and	at	the	content	
level	can	delimit	the	boundaries	of	access	to	knowledge.	Think	of	technological	
protection	 measures	 (TPMs),	 for	 instance.	 To	 restrict	 access	 to	 knowledge,	
conversely,	means	 to	 restrict	 the	 rights	 that	 should	 be	 instrumentalized	 by	 it:	
education,	culture,	work	et	al.	There	is	one	other	layer,	however,	which	I	would	
316.	 Not	to	mention	its	other	dimensions,	where	access	is	related	to	objects	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper,	e.g.	
health	and	food.
317.	 Pierre	Lévy,	Cibercultura	(Editora	34,	2003)	at	p.	196	(author’s	translation;	emphasis	added).
318.	 Lawrence	Lessig,	The Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons in a Connected World	(Random	House,	
2001)	at	p.	23.
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still	add	to	this	process:	the	social	layer,	the	layer	of	people.	Indeed,	law,	as	well	
as	contracts	can	impose	an	additional	layer	of	restrictions	on	the	right	of	access	
to	knowledge.	Out	of	the	digital	world,	we	saw	in	Théberge	that	the	Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	mentioned	the	possibility	of	establishing	contractual	restrictions	
in	a	chain	of	contracts	that	would	restrict	the	circulation	of	works	of	authorship.319	
The	 recognition	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 status	 of	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	
knowledge	could	perhaps	redress	this	situation	and	combat	the	growing	tendency	
of	an	excessive	strengthening	of	copyright	and	paracopyright	possibilities	in	each	
of	those	layers.	This	simple,	but	important,	idea,	is	what	I	meant	by	saying	that	
the	right	of	access	to	knowledge	is	a	multi-layered	right,	as	much	as	it	has	a	multi-
layered	objective:	the	protection	of	human	autonomy	or,	if	better,	dignity,	in	each	
of	the	means	it	can	be	manifested	through.
The	notion	of	access,	so	essential	it	is,	moves	me	to	the	ideas	of	Hannah	
Arendt	and	the	remarks	of	Werner	Hamacher	in	his	“The	Right	to	Have	Rights.”320	
Speaking	of	a	right	to	have	rights	as	a	human	right,	Hamacher	explains	that	“[t]he	
only	reality	that	is	laid	down	in	this	right	is	that	of	this	very	possibility	–	of	having	
rights,	of	using,	 transforming,	and	expanding	 them.”	 	“The	 right	 to	have	 rights	
is	therefore	primarily	and	above	all	valid	for	those	whom	Arendt	characterizes	as	
absolutely	deprived,	alienated	in	every	sense	of	the	word,	exploited	and	divested,	
for	those	who	exist	in	‘the	abstract	nakedness	of	being	human’	[…]	as	‘a	human	
being	in	general	–	without	a	profession,	without	citizenship,	without	an	opinion,	
without	a	deed	by	which	to	identify	and	specify	himself	–	and	different	in	general,	
representing	nothing	but	his	own	absolutely	unique	individuality	which,	deprived	
of	expression	within	action	upon	a	common	world,	loses	all	significance.”321		This	is,	
precisely,	the	man	without	access.	For	that	the	man	without	access,	for	all	that	we	
saw	in	the	preceding	sections,	would	be	the	man	without	possibilities	of	individual	
or	 collective,	 political	 or	 cultural	 expressions,	 without	 education,	 without	 work,	
without	food,	as	much	as	the	very	idea	of	access	to	knowledge,	in	the	information	
age,	turns	to	be	essential	and	instrumental	for	the	fulfillment	of	each	of	those	rights.	
Access	to	knowledge,	thus,	is	as	essential	as	a	right	to	have	rights.
Drawing	upon	James	Harris’s	theory	of	human	rights,	access	to	knowledge	
is	in	the	background	of	other	human	rights.	It	is	a	human	right	against	which	the	
other	human	rights	it	serves	will	be	measured	and	enforced.	In	his	article	“Human	
Rights	 and	 Mythical	 Beasts,”322	 	 Harris	 has	 divided	 rights	 in	 three	 categories:	
i)	 strictly-correlative	 rights,	which	would	be	 those	 rights	 that	express	a	duty;	 ii)	
domain	rights,	which	will	be	those	rights	that	refer	to	liberty	within	a	protected	
sphere	in	which	someone	can	chose	to	act	or	not	to	act;	and	iii)	background	rights,	
which	would	conjoin	“the	interest	of	a	subject	with	measures	that	are	taken	to	be	
warranted	as	ways	of	protecting	or	promoting	that	interest.”		A	human	right,	in	
the	proper	sense,	as	his	article	goes	on	to	explain,	will	pertain	to	this	last	category,	
as	a	background	right	which,	by	social	convention	 (e.g.	customary	 international	
law)	or	canonical	proclamation	(e.g.	in	constitution),	is	alleged	to	be	common	to	
all	human	beings.323
319.	 Théberge,	supra	note	8.
320.	 Werner	Hamacher,	“The	Right	to	Have	Rights	(Four-and-a-Half	Remarks),”	(2004)	103:2/3	The South Atlantic 
Quarterly	343–356	at	pp.	354–356.
321.	 Hamacher,	“The	Right	to	Have	Rights,”	supra	note	320	at	p.	354.
322.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra	note	113.
323.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra	note	113	at	p.	432.
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In	Harris’s	words,	“[s]trictly-correlative	rights	are	discharged,	or	they	are	
not.	Domain	rights	are	exercised	without	interference,	or	they	are	not.	When	a	
background	right	is	invoked	as	reason	for	introducing	a	measure,	the	outcome	
consists	of	an	all-things-considered	judgement	in	which	the	cited	right	may	be	
weighed	against	other	background	rights,	as	well	as	other	considerations	having	
nothing	to	do	with	rights.”324		Background	rights	are	the	measures	against	which	
strictly-correlative	and	domain	 rights	are	measured.	 In	 their	evolution	process,	
he	 argues,	 background	 rights	 go	 from	 being	merely	 enforced	 towards	 being	
fostered.	He	calls	 this	evolutionary	process	“the	enforcement	hinge.”325	Socio-
economic	rights	will	“evolve	where	some	measures	can	at	 least	be	considered	
for	adoption	today,	and	others	may	be	envisaged	 in	 the	 future.	 It	 follows	that	
proclamations	of	such	rights	are	not	necessarily	misconceived.”326
Bringing	it	all	to	our	universe,	I	would	say	that	human	rights	to	education,	
to	culture,	 to	take	part	 in	 the	conduct	of	 the	public	affairs,	among	others,	are	
backgrounds	 human	 rights	 against	 which	 strictly	 correlative	 or	 domain	 rights	
will	 be	measured.	 For	 instance,	 the	 strictly-correlative	 right	 to	 obtain	 primary	
education	from	the	state	will	be	measured	against	the	conventional	dimension	of	
the	background	human	right	to	education	and	will	succeed.	The	claim	to	obtain	
secondary	education	may	or	may	not	succeed	according	to	the	same	dimension.	
With	time,	however,	the	evolutionary	process	of	the	background	human	right	to	
education,	its	enforcement	hinge,	may	provide	for	the	fulfillment	of	the	strictly-
correlative	right	to	obtain	secondary	education	from	the	state.	The	human	right	
to	education	intertwines	with	other	human	rights,	which	are	equally	background	
rights,	and	finds	its	measure	in	them.	
The	 right	of	 access	 to	 knowledge,	however,	 seems	 to	have	as	 its	 real	
essence	being	a	measure	for	other	human	rights.	It	seems	to	be	a	background	
right	 of	 background	 rights;	 an	 instrumental	 background	 right,	 a	 right	 to	 have	
rights	 –	 a	 right	 of	 urgent	 respect,	 protection	 and	 fulfillment,	 for	 whom	 the	
enforcement	 hinge	 calls	 the	 world	 to	 strive	 unremittingly	 to	 promote	 it	 in	 a	
universal,	ubiquitous,	equitable	and	affordable	fashion	–	so	material,	so	essential	
that	it	shall	make	part	of	any	updated	survey	of	legal	creatures.
*
5. CONCLUSION
in the g8 Countries meeting last July,	these	most	developed	countries	firmed	
a	commitment	for	combating	piracy	and	counterfeiting	(likely	in	the	developing	
and	least	developed	ones).	One	of	the	considerations	raised	by	the	document	
was	that	it	is:
	 necessary	 to	 give	 priority	 to	 promoting	 and	 upholding	 laws,	 regulations	
and/or	 procedures	 to	 strengthen	 intellectual	 property	 enforcement,	 raising	
awareness	in	civil	society	and	in	the	business	community	of	the	legal	ways	to	
protect	and	enforce	 intellectual	property	rights	and	of	the	threats	of	piracy	
324.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra	note	113	at	p.	440.
325.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra	note	113	at	p.	447.
326.	 Harris,	“Human	Rights	and	Mythical	Beasts,”	supra	note	113	at	p.	450.
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and	counterfeiting,	and	also	to	providing	technical	assistance	in	that	area	to	
developing	countries.	Close	cooperation	between	law	enforcement	agencies,	
including	customs	authorities,	is	also	of	great	importance.327		
One	of	the	concrete	measures	envisioned	was	to	“instruct	[their]	experts	to	study	
the	possibilities	of	strengthening	the	international	legal	framework	pertaining	to	
IPR	enforcement.”328
	 It	 seems	 that	 intellectual	 property	 law	 and	 the	 international	 human	
rights	 system,	 unfortunately,	 continue	 to	 walk	 to	 different	 paths.	 Things	 that	
are	said	before	human	rights	bodies	are	completely	different	 from	the	praxis	 in	
the	 intellectual	property	field.	Canada	 is	unfortunately	no	different	 from	 its	 rich	
partners.	But	 this	 is	not	a	 threat	 just	 to	developing	countries;	 this	 is	a	 threat	 to	
the	whole	cognitive	ecology	of	our	age,	to	the	domestic	and	international	flux	of	
knowledge,	to	the	innovative	process	as	a	whole	and	to	the	cultural	and	political	
autonomies	of	our	individuals	and	our	society.	To	revert	this	scowling	tendency,	to	
expel	the	ghosts	from	among	us,	it	is	imperious	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	
expressly	acknowledges	the	existing	link	between	Canadian	copyright	law	and	the	
norms	of	the	international	human	rights	system	that	allow	for	the	existence	of	a	
human	right	of	access	to	knowledge.	Only	in	this	way	will	we	be	able	to	protect	
users’	 rights	 (and	 the	public	 interest)	 in	Canada	against	 retrogressive	measures,	
and	to	tell	the	best	story	we	can,	finding	law	as	integrity	in	the	up	to	now	much	
fragmented	users’	rights	chain	novel	in	Canadian	copyright	law.
327.	 G8,	“Combating	IPR	Piracy	and	Counterfeiting,”	St.	Petersburg	Meeting”	(16	July	2006),	<http://www.g8.gc.
ca/combating_IPR-en.asp>	at	para.	4.	(emphasis	added).
328.	 G8,	“Combating	IPR	Piracy	and	Counterfeiting,”	supra note	327.
